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The need for robust analysis of decarbonisation pathways has never been as high or as 
demanding.  Globally, climate action is picking up pace.  Yet, its momentum may hinge on 
informed policy decisions being made in a timely manner.  Energy research must provide the 
analysis for these informed decisions.  However, the scientific field lags others such as 
medicine or economics in moving to more open and reproducible science.  The fact that this 
research is directly relevant to the urgent policy challenge of rapid energy system 
decarbonisation makes reproducibility of results particularly important.  Aligning with this 
belief, all models and datasets used as part of this thesis are made openly available and 
accessible. 
The central focus of this thesis is to understand the effects of climate mitigation policy on 
Europe’s power sector.  The approach applied in this thesis looks back in time as well as 
forward to capture the learnings from previous marketplace evolutions that may help avoid 
similar pitfalls in the future.  Coupled with insights from a power system already having to 
endure complete market transformation while attempting to remain fit-for-purpose, this 
knowledge is the basis for analysing proposed decarbonisation pathways for Europe in terms 
of policy, regulation, economics and system operation perspectives. 
Today, policymakers and society are confronted by important decisions regarding the balance 
between cost equality, economic growth, energy security and climate action on a global scale.  
The key contributions of this thesis to that decision making process are new insights into the 
effects of policy decisions on cost inequalities stemmed from cross-border subsidisation of 
renewable energies, the risk exposures associated with over-reliance on technological 
development/readiness and finally a better, more well-rounded understanding of power system 
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Climate Action has become a powerful driver of energy sector policy, especially since the 
signing of the Paris climate agreement in December, 2015 (UNFCCC, 2015).  Globally, the 
energy sector contributes two-thirds of all greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions (International 
Energy Agency, 2018), making it the single largest emissions source and, therefore, 
inextricably linked to the success or failure of achieving the agreed emissions reduction.  
Electricity accounts for just 19% of today’s final energy consumption sector, yet it has 
experienced more success in decarbonisation than other areas combined.  The word “success” 
is inherently subjective in nature and applied here in relative terms with respect to any form of 
sectoral decarbonisation, of which there is little.  The challenge remains stark.  In 2018 for 
example, global electricity demand rose by 4% and generation from coal- and gas-fired power 
plants increased considerably, driving up CO2 emissions from the sector by 2.5% (International 
Energy Agency, 2019).  Electricity has never been more essential to society than it is today.  
As such, ensuring a smooth transition away from the ever-reliable yet ever-polluting fossil fuel-
based electricity generation to a more sustainable alternative is of upmost importance.  
Motivated by overlapping challenges of climate change, security of supply and health impacts, 
multiple analyses involving varied levels of effort, technological development and policy 
support have explored the roles of high levels of renewable electricity, low carbon nuclear 
power, increased energy efficiency and carbon sequestration on electricity system 
decarbonisation (Capros et al., 2013; Capros et al., 2016; European Climate Fund, 2010; 
European Commission, 2011; International Energy Agency, 2017b; International Energy 
Agency. Office of Energy Technology, 2006; IPCC, 2014; Jacobson et al., 2018; Krey and 
Clarke, 2011).  However, the prospect of 100% or near-100% renewable electricity (or energy) 
systems has ignited several debates within the energy modelling community on their technical 
feasibility and/or economic viability, often leading to contentious exchanges on different 
viewpoints.  Public controversies such as that surrounding Jacobson et al. (2015) and Clack et 
al. (2017) divergent views regarding a fully decarbonised U.S. energy system highlight the 
importance of the assumptions going into the models used to determine the feasibility of such 
scenarios.  Yet energy research lags behind other scientific fields such as medicine or 





science (Pfenninger, 2017; Pfenninger et al., 2017).  The fact that this research is directly 
relevant to the urgent policy challenge of rapid energy system decarbonisation makes 
reproducibility of results particularly important (DeCarolis et al., 2012; Nature, 2014). 
Aside from the many divergent views on a 100% renewable pathway, achieving carbon-
neutrality in the electricity sector may not even be adequate, according to recent reports by the 
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC, 2018) and the European Commission 
(2018).  The IPCC report highlights the importance of carbon dioxide removal and net negative 
emissions within the economy to achieving the goals of the Paris climate agreement – a view 
shared by Glynn et al. (2018); Grubler et al. (2018); Kriegler et al. (2018); Rogelj et al. (2018); 
Strefler et al. (2018); van Vuuren et al. (2018).  Negative emissions technologies (NETs), such 
as bioenergy with carbon capture and storage technology (BECCS), offer the prospect of 
electricity supply with large-scale net negative emissions (Chen and Tavoni, 2013; Marcucci 
et al., 2017).  However, notwithstanding the reality that there are no NETs currently in 
commercial operation in the electricity sector, there are also challenges and risks associated 
with the availability and provision of fuel (biomass for BECCS), transportation and storage of 
CO2 and the financing of such plants (Davis et al., 2018; Kapetaki and Scowcroft, 2017).  
Energy system modelling can (and must) reduce these types of uncertainties by moving towards 
highly transparent, reproducible science. 
The role of energy modelling to guide climate and energy policy alongside regulation for both 
guidance and direction is pivotal if the sector is to evolve into a more carbon-friendly entity.  
Coordinating support schemes for renewables may provide the necessary platform to eliminate 
the potential for cost inequalities caused by cross-border subsidisation of electricity across a 
multi-country region, leading to a more equitable and optimal electricity sector 
decarbonisation.  In a similar vein, regulation must support strategies to facilitate renewable 
ambitions with market economics and system operations by establishing an optimal balance 
between efficiency, flexibility and adequacy while maintaining a fully functional electricity 
market that strives to adapt to evolving conditions without affecting the competitive edge that 
protects consumers. 
‘Over the coming decades, continued sectoral evolution will rely on focused energy 
policy and strong regulation for both guidance and direction, but also on technological 
development to dictate the level of decarbonisation achieved, all the while remaining cognisant 





– a statement penned by the author of this thesis that encapsulates the motivation behind this 
thesis. 
 Aims 
This thesis addresses the following research questions (RQ): 
1. How did the electricity sector in Ireland evolved over the past century and what were 
the key learnings for the future? 
2. How can power sector decarbonisation ambitions be reconciled with market economics 
and system operations? 
3. Can coordinated European policy support schemes for renewable energies lead to more 
equitable and optimal power sector decarbonisation? 
4. Should Europe aim for a negative emissions power system over a high renewable 
alternative? 
5. Can a 100% renewable energy system be operationally resilient in Europe when based 
on wind, water and sunlight alone? 
The following section summarises the thesis and describes where each aim is addressed. 
 Thesis in Brief 
• Chapter 2: (RQ 1) A 100-year review of electricity sector policy in Ireland. 
Documenting a story that is recognisable almost anywhere in the world; from a nation 
struggles to establish an electricity sector, through security of supply concerns and 
leading to portfolio diversification. The chapter discusses the key events that occurred 
globally which gave clear impetus to energy policy in Ireland making it a world-leader 
in the facilitation of variable renewable energy, i.e. wind power.  
• Chapter 3: (RQ 2) This chapter uses Ireland’s evolving electricity market as a case 
study to identify strategies required to reconcile renewable ambitions with market 
economics and system operations on a small, isolated electricity system akin to many 
island nations worldwide. The case study focuses on the establishment of an optimal 
balance between efficiency, flexibility and adequacy while maintaining a fully 
functional electricity market that strives to adapt to evolving conditions without 





• Chapter 4: (RQ 3) An analysis showing the potential for cross-border subsidisation of 
renewables resulting from uncoordinated policy support schemes. Methodological-rich 
chapter which outlines and demonstrates a more equitable and optimal approach to 
power sector decarbonisation using an innovative post-processing approach to identify 
the origins of the renewable electricity being transferred between countries based on an 
hourly simulation of the European power system in 2030. This chapter aims to provide 
policy makers with ‘food for thought’. 
• Chapter 5: (RQ 4) A comparative analysis of decarbonisation trajectories for the 
European power system in 2050. This discrete scenario analysis compares a negative 
emissions power system to a high renewables alternative in terms of emissions 
reduction, technical operation and total system costs. Investigating whether a high 
renewable power system coupled with low levels of negative emissions technologies 
such as biomass carbon capture and storage could deliver negative emissions for the 
European power system without breaching published sustainable domestic biomass 
potentials in Europe or geological storage potential. 
• Chapter 6: (RQ 5) An evaluation of a 100% renewable energy system primarily based 
on wind, water and sunlight. This chapter examines the technical feasibility of a 100% 
renewable Europe, basing the results on a replication and extension of the Jacobson et 
al. (2018) study using a detailed and available European power system model. Applying 
input data from the aforementioned study, the analysis aims to reproduce the highly 
electrified, highly renewable European energy system, testing the societally critical 
objective of providing a reliable power system whilst determining the relationship 
between variable generation, energy storage, transmission capacity and dispatchable 
power. Particular attention is paid to concerns outlined in recent literature on 100% 
renewable energy systems namely system adequacy, flexibility and stability.  
The structure of this thesis is summarised in Figure 1.1 along with the over-arching themes that 





















Figure 1.1: Thesis overview 
 Methodology 
This thesis applies two research methods. Chapters 2-3, which are qualitative in nature, 
highlight the ‘key learnings’ from sectoral development over the past century before moving 
forward to discuss the regulatory advancements being implemented to facilitate renewable 
ambitions. Chapters 4-6 assume a quantitative approach where replication, simulation and 
examination of the European power system under different circumstances is carried out to 
improve understanding of incremental changes on decarbonisation, technical operation and 
market economics. In terms of geographical scope, Chapters 2-3 present case studies based on 
a small isolated electricity system which provides interesting insights to a system aiming to 
future-proof itself by adapting to their renewable ambition – could also be seen as a precursor 
to conversations yet to happen in larger, more interconnected systems. Chapters 4-6 encompass 
a larger regional power system containing between 30-40 countries depending on geographical 
scope of the specific scenario. 
Chapter 2: Establishing the 
electricity sector 
Chapter 6: Towards an 
operable 100% renewable 
energy system 
Chapter 4: Policy barriers to a 
more equitable power sector 
decarbonisation 
Chapter 3: Reconciling 
renewable ambitions with 
techno-economics 










 Soft-linked power system dispatch modelling 
The modelling approach applied in Chapters 3-4 involve soft-linking power system models to 
larger energy system models, as first described by Deane et al. (2012). The interaction makes 
high temporal resolution, detailed unit commitment and dispatch modelling possible without 
simulating an entire energy system which is often computationally and economically 
exhaustive. The generation portfolios, demand and other attributes are taken from the energy 
system model and inputted into the power system model. There is no automatic feedback loop, 
hence the term “soft-linked” rather than the alternative. This approach can provide a multitude 
of insights around wholesale price forecasting, interconnection congestion, capacity expansion 
modelling, cycling of thermal capacity, curtailment, which may not be possible using an energy 
system model only.  
 Modelling platform 
PLEXOS® Integrated Energy System Modelling software is used for power system modelling 
in this thesis (Energy Exemplar). PLEXOS® is a unit commitment and economic dispatch 
modelling tool that cost optimises the technical operation of a power system subject to technical 
constraints. For equations underlying the software, see Appendix A. The temporal resolution 
of simulations in this thesis varies between chapters from 60-minute to 5-minute. 
Sub-hourly temporal resolution offers the added benefit of examining the technical ability of 
generation portfolios to achieve different levels of power output in short temporal timeframes 
as shown by Deane et al. (2014). For example, there is a higher likelihood ramp rates and other 
technical aspects of thermal generation will bind at 5-minute resolution compared to hourly 
dispatch. Deane et al. (2014) show that increasing temporal resolution increases the accuracy 
of estimating start cost of thermal power generation capacity. 
 Scenario analysis 
In Chapters 4-6, a multitude of scenarios are presented and used for comparative analysis to 
inform policy and improve general awareness around different technologies. Scenario analysis 
allows the user to stress-test the robustness of assumptions. Introducing multi-sample weather 
variances into the models adds a level of confidence to the results through a resulting range or 
error bars that represent 30 years’ worth of data. This stochasticity can equally be applied to 





In this thesis, scenarios are based on proposed European system conditions of 2030 and 2050 
from a range of different sources. Each with their own individualities around installed 
generation mixes, demand forecasts and profiles, variable renewable energy profiles and 
operational constraints. These simulations are carried out with a view to inform policy 
development for the future of European power and energy systems. Throughout Chapters 4-6, 
a range of different analyses are identifiable. From analysing cross-border renewable electricity 
flows in Chapter 4, through carbon intensity quantification and total system cost estimation in 
Chapter 5, to determining potential operational attributes of different power generation types 
in a 100% renewable system gives a broad sense of where this thesis is and the landscape that 
it covers. 
 Role of Collaborators 
This thesis is the summation of my research work in this area. However, it would not have been 
possible without a range of collaborative research which played a significant part in the 
formulation of all chapters. The essence of progressive research lies in collaboration that 
leverages expertise from multiple disciples and institutions to produce invaluable insights. To 
this end, this thesis was created off the back of various collaborate work with various institutes 
and universities. This section aims to provide clarity to the roles of these collaborations. It 
should also be noted that these five chapters are the result of five journal papers, of which two 
are published with three in the peer-review process. 
• Chapter 2 is based on a published peer-reviewed journal paper for which I was the lead 
author. I wrote this chapter in its entirety while Professor Brian Ó Gallachóir and Dr. 
Paul Deane provided guidance and reviewed drafts. 
• Chapter 3 is based on a paper submitted to a peer-reviewed international journal of 
which I am the lead author. I wrote this chapter in its entirety while Professor Brian Ó 
Gallachóir and Dr. Paul Deane provided guidance and reviewed drafts. 
• Chapter 4 is based on a published peer-reviewed journal paper for which I was the lead 
author. I developed the power system model and post-processing excel-based macro-
enabled model which were subsequently validated by Dr. Paul Deane and Dr. Seán 
Collins. I wrote this chapter in its entirety while Professor Brian Ó Gallachóir, Dr. Paul 
Deane and Dr. Seán Collins provided guidance and reviewed drafts. 
• Chapter 5 is based on a paper submitted to a peer-reviewed international journal of 





subsequently validated by Dr. Glenn Drayton. Dr. Drayton also provided cloud 
computing services to expediate the simulation process which involved a high number 
of scenarios, each of which taking up to 20 hours simulation time. I wrote this chapter 
in its entirety while Professor Brian Ó Gallachóir, Dr. Paul Deane and Dr. James Glynn 
provided guidance and reviewed drafts. 
• Chapter 6 is based on a paper submitted to a peer-reviewed international journal of 
which I am the lead author. I developed the power system model which was 
subsequently validated by Dr. Paul Deane. Dr. Stefan Pfenninger and Dr. Iain Staffell 
provided generation profiles for wind and solar generation capacities. Dr. Padráig Daly 
provided invaluable knowledge around the technical issues regarding the testing of an 
operable 100% renewable power system. I wrote this chapter in its entirety while 
Professor Brian Ó Gallachóir, Dr. Paul Deane, Dr. Padráig Daly, Dr. Stefan Pfenninger 
and Dr. Iain Staffell provided guidance and reviewed drafts. 
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Over the past century, Ireland’s electricity sector has undergone a significant transformation.  
This chapter documents the nation’s struggle to build an electricity system, to improve security 
of electricity supply through portfolio diversification and to promote indigenous energy 
sources.  This was a challenge for an electrically isolated island with little natural resources.  
Here, we identify the ineffective policy decisions that left Ireland exposed to the 1970s energy 
crises.  The crises did, however, provide a clear impetus for focusing Irish energy policy going 
forward.  The successful deployment and integration of large-scale wind power was due to 
strong national and supranational policy decisions.  In 2015, Ireland had the third highest wind 
energy share of national electricity demand (22.8%) of all IEA Wind Member Countries.  The 
chapter also traces Ireland’s transition through market reform, regional fragmentation and 
looks onwards to the EU internal market for electricity.  This chapter provides a holistic view 
of the implications of various policy decisions on the electricity sector along with the stresses 
of external factors on the electricity market and should be useful for policy makers elsewhere 
faced with similar decisions.1 







1 Published as: Gaffney, F., Deane, J. & Gallachóir, B. Ó. A 100-year review of electricity policy in Ireland (1916–






Over the past 100 years, Ireland’s electricity sector has experienced significant change.  
Through the foundation of the State, World Wars and Energy Crises, the sector has continually 
expanded, bringing affordable electricity to the most rural parts of the country.  The 
establishment of a national organisation to bring together small undertakings under one roof to 
build, maintain and continually develop the sector is common across developed countries.  The 
struggles of many to improve security of supply during and after the 1970s oil crises is also 
well documented.  Ireland’s evolution over the last century differs however to that experienced 
in many other countries due to its geographically isolated position on the periphery of Europe, 
its lack of fossil fuel resources and its own geopolitical unrest.  Historical reviews of this type 
can deliver key learnings surrounding the establishment and continuous development of a 
sector.  In other words; distilling the knowledge gained over an extended period to help decision 
makers in countries under development.  Reviews carried out by FitzGerald et al. (2005) and 
FitzGerald and Malaguzzi Valeri (2011) have previously focused on Irish energy policy in the 
broader context, opting for an entire energy sector view.  Both papers view modern-policy 
decisions (generally starting around the 1970s oil crises) and provide an insightful assessment 
of the entire energy sector, mainly focusing on aspects such as: Security of Supply; Energy 
Needs of a Growing Economy; Competitiveness; Drivers of Change and Renewable and 
Environmental Policy.  While O'Riordan (2000) published a review outlining the development 
of Ireland’s power system between 1927 and 1997, it did not elaborate on the policy measures 
in place during the time.  International review papers based on the electricity sector also tend 
to be theme related, with numerous papers concentrating on market liberalisation (Apt, 2005; 
Bye and Hope, 2005; Cameron and Cramton, 1999; Erdogdu, 2011; ESB National Grid, 2004; 
Fabrizio et al., 2007; Florio, 2014; Gratwick and Eberhard, 2008; Harris, 2011; Hattori and 
Tsutsui, 2004; Heddenhausen, 2007; Hyland, 2016; Jamasb and Pollitt, 2005; Joskow, 2008b; 
Karan and Kazdağli, 2011; Markiewicz et al., 2004; Nagayama, 2007, 2009; Nepal and Jamasb, 
2012a, b; Newbery, 2002, 2005; Newbery and Pollitt, 1996; OECD, 2001; Parker, 2002; Sen, 
2014; Sen et al., 2016; Sencar et al., 2014; Sioshansi, 2006; Sioshansi, 2008; Thomas, 2004; 
Williams and Ghanadan, 2006; Woo et al., 2003), climate mitigation (Australian Energy 
Market Operator, 2011; Buchan, 2013; Burke, 1989; Clancy et al., 2015; Cleary et al., 2016; 
Deane et al., 2014; Deane et al., 2015b; Deane et al., 2010; Doherty and O'Malley, 2011; ESB 
International and ETSU, 1997; Global Wind Energy Council & International Renewable 





2013; O’Gallachoir et al., 2009; Saidur et al., 2010; Sensfuß et al., 2008; Staudt, 2000; Strachan 
et al., 2009; Tuohy et al., 2009; Yan, 2015) and market dynamics (Agency for the Cooperation 
of Energy Regulators, 2011, 2013; Barroso JM, 2006; Barroso et al., 2005; Booz & Co. et al., 
2011; Botterud and Doorman, 2008; Bower and Bunn, 2001; Cini and Borragán, 2016; CREG, 
2012; Deane et al., 2015c; EURELECTRIC, 2016; European Commission, 1996, 2003, 2009b, 
2014a, 2016a; Glachant and Ruester, 2014; Gore et al., 2016; Gorecki, 2013; International 
Energy Agency, 2016a; Keay, 2013, 2016; Meeus et al., 2005; Midttun, 1997; Raineri et al., 
2006; Robinson, 2016; Vazquez et al., 2002; Walsh et al., 2016), while others can be 
infrastructure and technology specific (Booz & Co. et al., 2011; O’Gallachoir et al., 2009; 
Passer, 1950; Saidur et al., 2010; Solangi et al., 2011; Tuohy et al., 2009).  This chapter, on the 
other hand, begins before the foundation of the state and examines the different stages of 
development in the electricity sector over 100 years, with a clear focus on the role of policy.  
From the early infrastructure-related decisions surrounding generation capacity and network 
development, to the lack of policy decisions pre-energy crises that left the nation exposed and 
resulted in a renewed focus on energy policy domestically that led to improved security of 
electricity supply through diversification of the generation portfolio with coal, peat, natural gas 
and later, wind power being promoted.  Here, we examine the role of electricity market 
liberalisation and regulation in the founding of the all-island single electricity market, in what 
was a significant step closer to the long-term plan; establishing the European internal market 
for electricity.  The role of climate mitigation policies is likewise explored, which prompted 
the rapid growth of wind power in Ireland.  And finally, some residual effects from the 
numerous energy policies on market dynamics are highlighted, raising concerns over modern-
day market structures and their ability to host the anticipated future generation portfolio. 
The chapter is structured as follows.  Section 2.3 summarises the establishment and 
development of the electricity sector along with the diversification of the generation portfolio 
over the past century.  Section 2.4 focuses on market liberalisation and regulation, outlining 
the phases that the Irish electricity market went through, from monopolistic control to 
complying with the EU Target Model.  Section 2.5 describes the role of climate mitigation 
policies played in electricity generation, while Section 2.6 concludes the chapter by 





 Development of the electricity sector 
The electricity industry had been in operation for more than 40 years before Ireland’s first 
nationwide electricity market was established in 1927.  The industry started small and was 
primarily based around the capital, Dublin, where local authorities and private companies 
generated and supplied electricity.  Ireland was a political constituent of the United Kingdom 
(UK) until 1922, and as a result, the electricity sector developments in Ireland reflected that of 
the UK, albeit at a slower pace.  The development and progress of the sector was both slow 
and uncoordinated due to the high number of small undertakings without any common long-
term policy-driven plans (Shiel, 1984).  
In the early 1900s, locally generated electricity from either small-scale hydro or coal spread 
across Ireland to the main municipalities.  During the First World War, when coal rations were 
implemented, a paradigm shift in electricity generation occurred when the British Board of 
Trade investigated all indigenous sources of energy in the UK (Russell et al., 1929).  During 
this period plans to generate energy from large-scale hydroelectric plants located on Ireland’s 
waterways were presented.  One such proposal played a defining role in the development of 
Ireland’s electricity sector; harnessing the River Shannon.2  
 The Shannon hydroelectric scheme, 1925 
Harnessing the energy of Ireland’s longest river, the Shannon, was one of the first major 
developments of the newly formed Irish Free State.3  Spear-headed by the Irish engineer Dr. 
Thomas McLaughlin while employed by German company Siemens-Schuckert, the Shannon 
hydroelectric scheme utilised a 30-metre head height on the river to deliver an electrical output 
of 85 MW.  McLaughlin’s plans also included a supply network to distribute the electricity 
nationwide.  Once commissioned the Shannon hydroelectric plant, referred to as Ardnacrusha 
 
 
2 Sir Robert Kane had previously proposed to harness the hydropower from the Shannon in 1844. The potato 
famine halted any further developments on the project (Kerr, 1943) 
3 The Republic of Ireland (referred to hereafter as Ireland) was initially known as the Irish Free State from its 





due to its geographical proximity, was adequately sized to meet the entire national electricity 
demand in its early years of operation and to make Ireland’s electricity sector 100% renewable. 
After visiting the United States where, at the time, the electricity sector was more advanced, 
Ireland’s newly formed first government decided that a public body should be formed to 
generate, manage and distribute the electricity generated under the Shannon scheme 
nationwide.  Once passed into statutory law the Shannon Electricity Act, 1925 changed the 
outlook of the sector immediately as electricity was soon to be transmitted around the country 
(Shiel, 1984). 
 Establishing the Electricity Supply Board, 1927 
The state-owned Electricity Supply Board (ESB) was established under the Electricity (Supply) 
Regulation Act, 1927 and placed in charge of operating, managing and maintaining the 
Shannon scheme, and distributing the electricity countrywide.  In a move, which would have a 
profound effect on the future of the sector, the ESB turned down the option of selling electricity 
in bulk to other distributors, as allowed under the aforementioned Act and instead opted to 
deliver electricity directly to consumers on a non-profit-making basis.  While the decision was 
strongly opposed by local authorities, it was made on the basis that local politics and municipal 
boundaries should not hamper the development of a national electricity network (Shiel, 1984).  
The decision removed the issues that caused slow developments in the past and instead 
presented a unified approach; aiming to create a nationwide electricity network.  
The newly formed ESB, with the backing of the government, decided to acquire all existing 
electricity undertakings operated by local authorities, private companies, and small 
entrepreneurs.4  As many of these undertakings employed different standards and voltages, this 
decision effectively harmonised the electricity supply nationwide.  The result was a state-
owned vertically integrated company that enviably gained the complete market share.5  Once 
 
 
4 Prior to the Electricity (Supply) Regulation Act in 1927, there were 160 undertakings generating and supplying 
electricity in Ireland (Manning and McDowell, 1984) 
5 It must be noted that evidence shows ESB providing electricity at a fraction of the price other companies charged 





the last of the undertakings was acquired Ireland’s electricity market became internalised 
within the confines of the ESB – something that would not change until 2000. 
 Sector development and rural electrification, 1930-1960 
By the time Ardnacrusha was commissioned in 1929, the ESB had a transmission and 
distribution network (110/38kV) ready to transfer electricity nationwide, see Figure 2.1.  This 
was a major development for Ireland and the first step in rural electrification.  In 1930, 
Ardnacrusha and the coal-fired plant at Pigeon House, Dublin were synchronised for the first 
time, in what was a significant step to ensuring a stable electricity supply.  Over the next decade 
generation capacity increased and electricity generation became more fuel diversified and 
geographically dispersed.  New hydroelectric plants were commissioned, and peat was 
considered as an alternative fuel source for electricity generation, in parallel with the pursuance 
of rural electrification policies.  However, priorities changed once the Second World War 
commenced.  With coal rationed, peat was promoted as a viable alternative;6 one that included 
the benefits of being indigenous, widely available and, from a socio-economic point of view, 
advantageous to rural Ireland (Tuohy et al., 2009).  Plans for rural electrification suffered a 
setback during this period of unrest and it was not until the Rural Electrification Scheme (1946) 
and the Electricity Supply Amendment Act (1955) were passed that the electricity network 
started to reach the most rural and isolated communities in the country. 
 
 
6 The First Development Plan was passed in 1946, calling for two peat-fired ESB power stations to be 
commissioned and 24 bogs developed. In 1950 the Second Development Plan forced ESB to commission four 






Figure 2.1: Ireland’s transmission system in 1930. Source: Development of Ireland’s Power System 1927-1997 
(O'Riordan, 2000). 
 The 1970s oil crises 
After the rural electrification policies were implemented post-Second World War, the national 
electricity demand steadily grew and the ESB increased the generation capacity of the portfolio 
with new hydro, peat and oil plants commissioned.  By 1970, 46% of Ireland’s installed 
generation capacity was indigenous (peat and hydro) with the remainder being oil-based 





indigenous oil resources, this level of dependency left Ireland in an exposed position for the 
1970s oil crises. 
Both oil crises that occurred in the 1970s resulted from geopolitical instability.  In each case, 
the sharp reduction in oil availability manifested themselves in the price of oil.  The first in 
1973/74 was triggered by American involvement in the Yom Kippur War, also known as the 
Arab-Israeli War.  This caused the Organisation of Arab Petroleum Exporting Countries to 
declare an oil embargo which, over the following months, increased the price of oil globally 
from $3 per barrel to $12 (Post et al., 1990).  The embargo was lifted in March 1974; ending 
the period known as the First Oil Shock.  The second was a by-product of the Iranian revolution 
in 1979 and the Iran-Iraq War the following year.  Iranian oil production was severely reduced 
over this period, causing panic and economic recessions around the world.  Taking cognisance 
of the fact that global oil supply only decreased by 4% during this period, the price doubled to 
$39.50 per barrel (Lee and Ni, 2002).  After these events, it was widely considered that the era 
of cheap oil was over. 
In the decade spanning both oil crises, Ireland’s reliance on oil for electricity generation 
continued to increase.  Oil represented 50% and 64% of primary energy used for electricity 
generation in 1970 and 1980 respectively (O'Riordan, 2000).  Even with approximately 45% 
generation capacity fuelled by indigenous sources, the price spikes from oil had a telling impact 































































































































Figure 2.2: Evolution of global oil price and domestic electricity price in Ireland. Source: Oil prices retrieved 
from British Petroleum, Statistical Review of World Energy 2015 (British Petroleum, 2015); Domestic electricity 
price retrieved from ESB Archives, Dublin (ESB, 2016). 
 Diversifying the generation portfolio 
In the 1950s the ESB had alerted the government to the exposure risk associated with over-
dependence on a limited number of sources for electricity generation (Manning and McDowell, 
1984).  At first, the warnings related to hydro and peat but later, in the 1960s when the ESB 
had again raised concerns, the conversation had changed to oil.  Unfortunately, the ESB were 
correct to voice concern in both instances according to Manning and McDowell (1984).  In 
1958/59 and again in 1963/64, Ireland experienced particularly wet weather conditions in one 
year and dry conditions in the following which affected peat harvesting and water levels in the 
hydro plants respectively, reducing the ability for peat-fired and hydro-based electricity 
generation.  While in the late 1960s/70s, oil was affected by multiple events such as the Six 
Days War (1967), the cutting of the Trans-Arab pipeline (1970) and both previously mentioned 
oil crises. 
It was not until a series of events in the 1970s that energy policy in Ireland became focused 
and began to shape the electricity sector for years to come.  First, the oil crises proved to the 
government that over-dependence on a single fuel source, especially a non-indigenous fuel 
susceptible to geopolitical instability, heightened risk exposure, Second, natural gas of 
commercial quantity was found off the south coast in 1973 which would lower Ireland’s import 
dependency and third, nuclear power became an option for providing base load power 
(FitzGerald et al., 2005). 
During his description of Modern Portfolio Theory, Markowitz (1952) explains how effective 
diversification can reduce or even avoid risk exposure completely.  Applying this theory to a 
generation portfolio, as FitzGerald et al. (2005) point out, means installing a number of fuel 
types with uncorrelated fuel prices to protect against any future price uncertainty – effectively 
acting as a hedging mechanism.7  Over this period, the Irish government started to implement 
 
 





Markowitz’s theory by looking further afield at alternative energy sources to diversify the 
nation’s generation portfolio. 
 Assessing the alternatives 
Alternatives to oil-based electricity generation were examined to address concerns surrounding 
the nation’s over-dependency on the commodity.  It was found that hydropower was limited 
for further expansion,8 peat offered little scope for development, coal was expensive compared 
to oil due to its labour-intensive nature, and other technologies such as solar, wind power, tidal, 
and wave energy were not far enough developed to be considered a viable alternative.  It 
appeared that nuclear power was the only serious alternative to oil for providing base load 
power in Ireland (Manning and McDowell, 1984). 
Over this period, gas-fired plants became more widely used in Ireland.  Stemming from the 
newly developed indigenous gas resource along with advancements in gas combustion 
technology many oil-fired units were retrofitted to gas.9  However, in the aftermath of the first 
oil crisis, actions were taken to ensure sufficient capacity margin was maintained for security 
of supply reasons.  First, to meet short-term needs the ESB commissioned in excess of 500 
MW oil-fired capacity that was already in planning; further increasing the nation’s reliance on 
the commodity (O'Riordan, 2000).  Second, and much to the dislike of ESB, new peat-fired 
stations were commissioned through the Third Development Plan for security of supply 
reasons.10 
 Nuclear power 
In the late 1960s, the ESB began gathering specifications for a nuclear plant with the support 
of the government who, at the time, indicated their openness to nuclear energy (Manning and 
McDowell, 1984).  While the Nuclear Energy Act was enacted in 1971, establishing a Nuclear 
 
 
8 The only hydro plant of any significant size commissioned to this day was a 292 MW pumped hydro energy 
storage plant in 1975. For more details, see: (O'Riordan, 2000) 
9 New combined cycle gas turbines achieved greater efficiencies than the widely used open cycle gas turbines 
operating at ~30%. 
10 In the early 1970s ESB stated that they did not regard peat-fired generation as a long term solution and instead 





Energy Board and permitting the use of nuclear energy in Ireland, one of the main concerns 
was the minimum generating capacity of the plant.  At 500 MW the capacity was seen as too 
large for the Irish system at the time (Manning and McDowell, 1984).  In short, the government 
did not want to commit to a major capital-intensive project that could be oversized and 
therefore, under-utilised and seen as a waste of taxpayer's money.  Increasing demand through 
interconnection with Northern Ireland (NI) was a key component of this plan.  However, this 
would prove difficult as the two existing transmission lines were regularly targeted for attack 
due to political instability in the region and as a result out of commission (Manning and 
McDowell, 1984; O'Riordan, 2000). 
By 1974, the ESB had drawn up plans and submitted technical and economic studies to 
establish a nuclear plant at five possible sites.  The government appeared to agree with the ESB 
on the most suitable location of the project (Carnsore Point, Co. Wexford) and were looking to 
move forward with the project.  Environmental concerns relating to nuclear energy were 
increasing across Europe, and in Ireland, as a growing opposition emerged targeting 
demonstrations at the various proposed sites around the country, prompting a negative public 
perspective towards the project.  Acknowledging the growing discomfort around nuclear, the 
ESB drew up plans for alternatives.  Coal was now the leading choice.  The outlook for coal 
had changed since previous studies were carried out, mainly due to the opening of an 
international market which broadened the supplier base, increasing competition.  In addition to 
alleviating the concerns regarding nuclear, coal plants could also be built more quickly and in 
smaller unit sizes (Manning and McDowell, 1984). 
In 1978 a ‘Green Paper’ on energy policy was published.11  This consultation document put the 
question of Ireland’s future direction on energy policy to the public.  However, before 
discussions could take place the second oil crisis triggered a global recession.  With electricity 
demand expected to decrease due to the economic downturn and with the nuclear disaster in 
Three Mile Island in 1979, all nuclear plans were put on hold indefinitely.  This informed the 
decision to build a large coal-fired base load plant at Moneypoint; originally one of the 
proposed sites for a nuclear plant.  Two 300 MW generating units were initially approved for 
 
 
11 Energy-Ireland: discussion document on some current energy problems and options (Department of Industry 





the site but this increased to three at a later date, with the potential for a fourth (O'Connor et 
al., 1981).  The emphasis on energy supply security was evident in the provision of plans for 
expansion to a fourth unit, along with the fuel storage capacity of up to 2 million tonnes of coal 
(approx. one year’s supply).  Figure 2.3 shows the evolving generation portfolio in Ireland over 
almost a century. 
 Moneypoint coal plant, excess generation capacity and high electricity prices 
Moneypoint, Ireland’s first large scale coal-fired power plant, was commissioned between 
1985-1987.  The plant added substantial capacity to the generation portfolio with a maximum 
output of 915 MW (3 x 305 MW units) at an investment cost of IEP £700 million12 (ESB, 
2016).  The capacity margin (the difference between installed capacity and peak demand) 
increased from the mid-1970s due to the commissioning of Moneypoint, as seen from Figure 
2.3.  For example, peak demand in 1977 was 71% of installed capacity compared to 56% in 
1987.  The excess generation capacity was considered a consequence of economic instability 
in the 1970s, a time when governments could not agree on macroeconomic forecasts, making 
long-term planning difficult.  As a result, the ESB modelled future generation capacity needs 
using their own assumptions regarding; economic growth, fuel prices, and inflation (Manning 
and McDowell, 1984; O'Riordan, 2000). 
The forecasting errors and the timing of the extra capacity commissioned at Moneypoint was 
unfortunate as the economy performed poorly as alluded to by FitzGerald et al. (2005).  
FitzGerald et al. (2005) also associate the high electricity prices experienced in the 1980s to 
this spare capacity which may not be completely accurate as the ESB, still to this day, cannot 
begin recovering capital costs from a project until after commissioning.  Instead, from the 
evidence provided on the evolution of oil prices (Figure 2.2) coupled with the nation’s over-
dependence on the commodity over the same period (Figure 2.3) suggests fuel costs were a 




12 Irish pound was the currency in Ireland until 2002. Equivalent to €890 million. 
13 Interest earned during construction contributed to repaying the capital required for the construction of 





Over the next decade after Moneypoint was commissioned, electricity prices steadily decreased 
as a result of numerous factors working simultaneously, including excess generation capacity; 
no significant investment in new plant or infrastructure was required as assets were “sweated” 
according to Deane et al. (2015c), and portfolio diversification; more gas and coal generation 
and a global reduction in oil and gas prices.14  
The electricity systems of NI and Ireland synchronised for the first time in two decades in the 
mid-1990s as the transmission lines re-energised.  Expanding the system proved a major 
success for Ireland in terms of security of supply.  Not alone could electricity be imported from 
NI but it could also be generated on mainland Great Britain (GB) and transmitted across the 
interconnector at Moyle.15  It was not until 2012 that Ireland’s electricity system became 
directly connected to GB when a 500 MW interconnector was commissioned.16 
 The development of wind power in Ireland 
The sector continued to develop and further diversify throughout the 1990s and into the 21st 
century.  The history of modern-day wind power in Ireland is an example of this development 
when it began with the first major demonstration project at Bellacorick, County Mayo.  The 
project, funded through European Commission under the VALOREN programme (Council 
Regulation (EEC) No. 3301/86), contained 21 Nordtank turbines with a combined capacity of 
6.45 MW (Burke, 1989).  After performing “very well with an average load factor of 30%” 
according to Staudt (2000), the Irish government began supporting alternative energy sources 
in 1994 through a range of schemes and policy measures that aimed to encouraged investor 
 
 
14 In the wake of the oil crises Ireland, along with many other countries, reduced their reliance on oil. This resulted 
in over-supply worldwide and the price of oil reducing for the first time since the second oil crisis. The overall 
decline in oil price continued over the following 20 years (even with the third oil crisis occurring in 1990) in what 
is referred to as the ‘1980s Oil Glut’. Gas prices also decreased during this period, dropping ~40 % between 1985 
and 1995 (British Petroleum, 2015) 
15 The Moyle interconnector was commissioned in 2001. Owned and operated by Mutual Energy the 
interconnector connects NI with Scotland using two 250kV DC lines which can transfer a maximum capacity of 
250 MW each. For more information, see: http://www.mutual-energy.com/  
16 The East-West interconnector was commissioned in 2012. This project was developed and is owned by the 





buy-in and lower the institutional barriers facing the technology.  This aspect of Irish wind 
power is addressed in Section 2.5 which discusses climate mitigation policies. 
Through focused energy policy over the last three decades, the Irish wind power industry has 
grown significantly.  For instance; at the end of 2015, the installed wind power capacity in 
Ireland was 2455 MW according to the International Energy Agency (2015), producing the 
third highest contribution to national electricity demand (22.8%) of all IEA Wind Member 
Countries.  However, fulfilling ambitious policy measures can often depend on physics and the 
ability of the electricity system to absorb this variable energy.  Any power system operating 
with high levels of variable energy yet limited interconnection or storage capacity must adapt 
quickly in order to maintain system stability.  Ireland’s electricity sector has done so in reaching 
instantaneous penetration levels upward of 55% (one of the highest levels for a synchronous 
island system globally), and continues to adapt with a new market structure that promotes 
flexibility through a new energy market design, improved system services and redesigned 
capacity mechanism, all to be implemented in 2018.17  Notwithstanding the fact this 
transformation in Ireland’s electricity sector is needed to comply with the EU energy packages 
(see Section 2.4 for further details), it is also necessary for the marketplace to adapt to the 
changing generation portfolio which requires flexibility and reliability to complement variable 
energy sources, maintaining a stable power system.  The story of Ireland’s market evolution 
from monopolist control to participating in the European internal market for electricity is 










Figure 2.3: Total installed generation capacity and annual peak demand in Ireland Source: Sustainable 
Energy Authority of Ireland, Energy Balance, Dublin (Sustainable Energy Authority of Ireland); ESB Archives, 





 Market liberalisation and regulation  
Liberalising the energy markets of Europe has long since been a goal for the European Union 
(EU) and the European Economic Community that existed beforehand (Karan and Kazdağli, 
2011).  Since joining in 1973, Ireland has been a member of the various regional organisations 
that aim to increase economic integration between Member States (Hourihane, 2004).  The 
long-term plan was to create a single internal market for free movement of goods, capital, 
services and people across the Member States (European Commission).  As such, the 
establishment of competition laws to promote liberalisation within the internal market was a 
key aspect of EU policy–a paradigm shift away from the monopolistic market framework to a 
competitive alternative.  For the electricity sector, this came in the form of EU Directive 
96/92/EC,18 known as the First Energy Package. 
 Market liberalisation 
The First Energy Package implemented a new regulatory framework for the electricity sector 
across the Member States based on the three pillars of EU energy strategy: securing an 
expanding supply of energy; developing a more competitive internal energy market; and 
encouraging, supporting and developing renewable energy sources (Barroso JM, 2006).  
Through market liberalisation the Directive planned to restructure (unbundle) vertically 
integrated monopolies, increase market competition and allow consumers choose between 
suppliers, to make the energy sector more cost effective and, from a strategic point of view, to 
best manage Europe’s risk exposure to imported fossil fuels and the associated geopolitical 
concerns that lie therein (Heddenhausen, 2007).  The primary aim of the energy package (and 
liberalisation on the whole) was to improve social welfare across Europe (Möst, 2008; Yan, 
2015).  The First Energy Package initiated the most extensive energy market reform anywhere 
in the world according to Jamasb and Pollitt (2005). 
Most developed countries started to liberalise their infrastructural sectors from the 1980s 
onwards.  Early movers such as Chile (1982), UK (1989) and Argentina (1992) led the way in 
 
 
18 European Union 1996 Directive 1996/92/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 19 December 





energy market liberalisation (Bye and Hope, 2005; Karan and Kazdağli, 2011; Sen et al., 2016).  
While the motivation behind market reform differed between countries, they generally showed 
a desire to make the energy sector more cost effective by increasing efficiency within the 
wholesale and retail markets through the privatization of previously state-owned assets and 
introducing competition19 (Harris, 2011).  Other drivers of market reform also exist, such as a 
political ideology based on the faith of market forces and a dislike for resilient labour unions,20 
and the wish to attract foreign investment (Green and McDaniel, 1998; Joskow, 2008b; 
Newbery, 2002; Woo et al., 2003).  Nevertheless, in a sector with high capital costs and long 
lead-times, questions remain as to whether a fully open and competitive market provides the 
necessary incentives for companies to invest in new plants when infra-marginal rents are 
continually being squeezed.21  Ambiguity also remains as to whether reform leads to lower 
prices at all, as alluded to by (Apt, 2005; Erdogdu, 2011; Hattori and Tsutsui, 2004; Hyland, 
2016; International Energy Agency, 2016a; Nagayama, 2007, 2009; Sioshansi, 2006; Thomas, 
2004; Woo et al., 2003).  Consequently, the suitability of the textbook model approach to 
market reform has been discussed extensively by (Gratwick and Eberhard, 2008; Nepal and 
Jamasb, 2012a, b; Sen, 2014; Sen et al., 2016; Tuluy and Salinger, 1993; Williams and 
Ghanadan, 2006). 
 Market reform in Ireland 
Prior to reform, the ESB operated an electricity market in Ireland that was completely 
internalised within the organisation.  With ESB Power Generation generating to meet the 
demand of its supply arm; ESB Customer Supply, in what could be described as a monopolistic 
state.  When examined by the EU Competition Commission it was concluded that “The current 
structure of the Irish electricity market is not favourable to competition.” (OECD, 2001, p.27).  
This draws attention to the fundamental concern of a monopoly where in theory, a legacy firm 
 
 
19 Norway is a notable exception to this statement as they implemented market reform based on environmental 
policy rather than to make their energy sector more cost efficient. (Newbery, 1997) 
20 Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher’s support for restructuring the state-owned Central Electricity Generating 
Board in England and Wales (Green and McDaniel, 1998) 





can pass the true cost between its generation and supply departments allowing possible perverse 
behaviour.22  Moreover, FitzGerald et al. (2005) highlight that Ireland has a history of 
promoting the interest of producers over consumers, an observation that endorses the 
Commission’s findings.  
On the other hand, a report compiled by IPA Energy Consulting (2001) for the Northern Ireland 
Department of Enterprise Trade and Investment and the Republic of Ireland Department of 
Public Enterprise concluded that Ireland’s electricity prices (in real terms) were “probably too 
low to support new, independent generation.” (IPA Energy Consulting, 2001, p.14).  However, 
these low prices may be explained by the legacy monopolist improving its overall generation 
efficiency in anticipation of market reform through the Cost and Competitiveness Review 
programme that yielded net annual cost savings of IEP £90 million (€114 million) per annum23 
(ESB, 2000). 
 Electricity Regulation Act, 1999 
The First Energy Package was transposed into national legislation as the Electricity Regulation 
Act, 1999 (ERA 1999).  ERA 1999 transformed Ireland’s electricity sector by outlining plans 
to: establish a national regulatory authority to oversee the transition to a liberalised market, 
Commission for Electricity Regulation (CER);24 form an independent system operator 
responsible for operating the transmission network, EirGrid and; open the wholesale and retail 
markets to competition.  These changes provided the backbone of market reform in Ireland; 
aiming to create an environment conducive to competition in the near future (OECD, 2001). 
 
 
22 It should be noted that there was “no significant market power exercised” in Ireland as report by Cambridge 
Economics Policy Associates (2010), however it has occurred elsewhere. For details of the case brought against 
E.ON AG by the European Commission for the strategic withdrawal of capacity in German electricity market, 
see: http://ec.europa.eu/competition/elojade/isef/case_details.cfm?proc_code=1_39388  
23 This behaviour from incumbents was also seen in Brazil, US, and the UK (Bridgman et al., 2011; Gorecki, 
2013; Markiewicz et al., 2004; Newbery and Pollitt, 1996). 





 Market changes 
Since February 2000 Ireland’s electricity markets, both wholesale and retail, have been open 
to competition.  The ESB’s market share went from owning and operating 95%25 of the 
installed generation capacity in Ireland to 51% in 2015.26  This was assisted by independent 
power producers entering the market and a CER-ESB agreement to sell off generation assets 
(Commission for Energy Regulation, 2007; Commission for Energy Regulation & Electricity 
Supply Board, 2007).  The retail market also experienced change as approximately 400 large 
users27 of electricity could choose between suppliers in the first year.  The ERA 1999 also 
provided third party access to the electricity network to ‘green’ (wind power and other sources 
of renewable energy) electricity suppliers to sell directly to all final customers, irrespective of 
the customer’s consumption (O’Gallachoir et al., 2009), unlike ‘brown’ (fossil fuel based) 
electricity suppliers who could initially sell only to the aforementioned large users.  This market 
opening for green suppliers was particularly important for the sections of the market that pay 
most for electricity (commercial and domestic customers).  This provided wind farm 
developers with an alternative to the government support scheme route to the market.  
In 2002 and 2004 the ‘brown’ electricity market was opened further, increasing to 40% and 
56% respectively with full liberalisation occurred in 2005.  The CER decided to regulate the 
ESB Customer Supply electricity price to reduce their market share to or below 60% in the 
Domestic and 50% in Business markets.  Full deregulation of the retail electricity market was 
achieved in 2011 (Commission for Energy Regulation, 2010). 
The structure of the wholesale market also changed with reform.  While ESB Networks retained 
ownership of the transmission and distribution networks (operating the latter), complete control 
of the transmission network was afforded to the Transmission System Operator (TSO) with the 
 
 
25 The remaining 5% was made up of small scale generation (OECD, 2001) 
26 Installed generation capacity information retrieved from the CER’s validated PLEXOS® model, available at: 
http://www.cer.ie/ 





enactment of the ERA 1999.28  In terms of the market mechanism, the TSO continued to operate 
a bilateral contracts model as pre-liberalisation except with an interim electricity trading 
arrangement called a Top-Up and Spill mechanism included.  Top-Up and Spill was a means 
of balancing long or short markets.  Under this type of arrangement, the incumbent provides 
Top-Up and Spill services within their jurisdiction.  The price of top-up services over the year 
was regulated by the CER based on the estimated cost of a Best New Entrant.29  The spill costs 
reflected the incumbent’s avoidable fuel cost. 
Policy and regulatory responsibility in the market were shared by the Department of Enterprise, 
the Competition Authority, and the CER.  The Department outlined policies to be implemented, 
which were often passed down from the EU, the Competition Authority analyses the market 
for instances of market power exertion or predatory behaviour,30 and the CER governed the 
day-to-day running of the sector.  The Trading and Settlement Code was an important 
document published by the CER during this period which outlined rules for market operation 
as well as for trading and settlement that underpinned the transparency and credibility which 
Ireland’s electricity market is, still to this day, known for31 (FitzGerald and Malaguzzi Valeri, 
2011; Lyons et al., 2007). 
 Transitioning towards an EU internal electricity market 
Once the Second Energy Package, EU Directive 2003/54/EC,32 was adopted in June 2003 the 
pathway for a European internal electricity market became more crystallised (Karan and 
 
 
28 The Act obliged the asset owner to maintain and expand the transmission network as the TSO requires, pending 
approval from the CER. 
29 Best New Entrant is calculated based on the infra-marginal rent necessary for a unit to recoup their capital costs. 
30 In 1998 the Competition Authority objected to an ESB lead ‘Optisave Contract’ initiative (for large customers) 
which required the customer that wanted to switch suppliers (due to lower prices) to provide details of the offer 
and allow an opportunity to match the offer. The contract stipulated that the customer would only be allowed 
leave if ESB CS could not match their competitors offer, and then only after six months’ notice of termination 
(OECD, 2001) 
31 The CER also approved the TSO-lead implementation of Grid Code requirements for market participants 
relating to the material technical aspects of their plants. 
32 European Union 2003 Directive 2003/54/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2003, 





Kazdağli, 2011).  Where its predecessor had shortcomings relating to market dominance and 
the possibility of perverse gaming behaviour, the Second Energy Package sought to implement 
a level playing field for all participants alike by ensuring non-discriminatory rights of access 
to the network and the publication of the basis for tariffs (European Commission, 2003).  After 
liberalisation, the next step was regional fragmentation; a mid-step on the path to full 
implementation of an internal market which involved grouping markets based on their 
geographical proximity to one another.  The concept was supported by the European 
Commission as it acknowledged the reduced complexity in coupling regional markets rather 
than on an individual, market by market basis (Karan and Kazdağli, 2011). 
Electricity market coupling started in the Nordic region with Sweden and Norway creating the 
first multinational electricity exchange in 1990.  This exchange expanded further when Finland 
and Eastern Denmark joined what is known as the Nord Pool four years later (Olsen, 1995).  
On mainland Europe, electricity market coupling first took place in 2000 with the formation of 
the European Energy Exchange, which later expanded outside of Germany when the French 
and Austrian markets joined to form the EPEX Spot market (European Energy Exchange, 
2010).  After Ireland’s electricity market was reformed, a steering group was set up with 
representatives from Ireland and NI to assess the possibility of coupling the two markets.  In 
2004 the respective Regulatory Authorities33 (RAs) from both jurisdictions signed a 
Memorandum of Agreement relating to a new market structure which, in 2005, was followed 
by legislation to underpin the All-island Single Electricity Market.34 
 Regional fragmentation 
The All-island Single Electricity Market (SEM) was established in November 2007 as the 
central trading platform for electricity on the island of Ireland.  Costing approximately €110 
million, this cross-jurisdictional centrally-dispatched gross pool market with dual-currency is 
 
 
33 Consisting of CER from Ireland and the Northern Ireland Authority for Utility Regulation from Northern 
Ireland. 
34 The Electricity Regulation (Amendment) (Single Electricity Market) Act 2007 in Ireland and the Electricity 





fully liquid, due to its mandatory nature for generators and suppliers (Single Electricity Market 
Committee, 2012). 
All generators above the ‘De Minimis’ 10 MW capacity level bid into the day-ahead market 
using their short run marginal cost which accounts for fuel, carbon and variable operation and 
maintenance costs, for delivery the following day.  Bids are stacked and dispatched based on a 
merit-order curve that commits the lowest cost generators first, followed by more expensive 
units until the demand is met.  The market employed a ‘pay-as-clear’ or ‘marginal pricing’ 
model, therefore the last successfully cleared generator in a trading period sets the System 
Marginal Price (SMP) which all dispatched plants receive, and suppliers pay.35  Dispatch 
schedules can change after the economic dispatch has been complete due to transmission 
constraints and ancillary service requirements.36 
For generators in the SEM, it offers a platform to sell their product with little or no risk 
exposure.  For example; if a generator is constrained on but cannot recoup their fixed costs, 
then an adder called an ‘Uplift’ is included in the SMP to cover their costs.  Similarly, if a unit 
has not earned enough infra-marginal rent to cover their fixed costs then a ‘Make Whole 
Payment’ is made to the generator to ensure a net balance of zero over a week-long period.  
Make Whole Payments, constraint payments, and imbalance charges are recovered from 
suppliers through an Imperfection Charge that is passed on to the end-user.  There is also 
insurance on fixed cost recovery over the longer term through a capacity payment mechanism 
which as with its predecessor–the capacity margin scheme37–was introduced to ensure adequate 
 
 
35 Suppliers also pay other system charges and levies for network and obligatory requirements as judged necessary 
by the CER. 
36 For details of network constraints and ancillary service requirements, along with information on constraint 
payments, see: http://www.eirgridgroup.com  
37 The capacity margin scheme was introduced in 2001 as the margin between installed generation capacity and 
peak demand had eroded, as shown in Figure 3. Over this period, Ireland experienced large economic growth and 
forecasts showed continuous increases in demand over the following years. To ensure adequate levels of 
generation capacity were installed a capacity mechanism was introduced in 2001 to encourage new investment in 
Ireland’s electricity sector by increasing the certainty of recouping capital costs (Commission for Energy 
Regulation, 2005) Generators benefitted from the scheme if their unit was available when capacity margins were 
tight. In these instances, the generator received an additional revenue stream that was mutually exclusive to any 
infra-marginal rent earned (Leahy and Tol, 2011) The associated cost was recouped from customers through the 
Transmission Use of System charge; a new addition to the standard electricity bill under the ERA 1999 





installed generation capacity.  The annual capacity ‘pot’ is set by the RAs using the previously 
mentioned Best New Entrant methodology.38 
In terms of market structure and overall governance, some changes occurred with the 
introduction of SEM.  For example, the RAs introduced the Bidding Code of Practice to restrict 
bidding strategies and eliminate opportunities for predatory behaviour by market participants.39  
This, along with other existing market codes such as the Trading and Settlement Code and Grid 
Code were monitored through the Market Monitoring Unit to ensure compliance and that no 
market power was exerted. Implementing market rules and general market operations are 
carried out by the single electricity market operator which is a joint venture between both 
TSOs.40  Otherwise, the structure remained the same as pre-SEM with ESB Networks41 
retaining ownership of the transmission and distribution networks, operating the latter with the 
TSO controlling the former.  
 The EU Target Model 
The EU Target Model for electricity emerged from the Florence Forum process in 2009 as a 
blueprint with both top-down and bottom-up guidance on the future market design deemed 
necessary to facilitate the EU integrated internal market for electricity (Booz & Co. et al., 
2011).  Aligned with the three energy packages,42 the model outlines the necessary approach 
 
 
38 Revenue earned by generators in SEM from energy, capacity and constraint payments between 2008-2015 was 
75 %, 20 %, and 5 % respectively (Eurostat, 2016) 
39 Cambridge Economic Policy Associates when reporting on market power and liquidity on behalf of the RAs, 
found that the Bidding Code of Practice has been an effective mitigating factor of market power (Cambridge 
Economics Policy Associates, 2010) 
40 EirGrid in the Republic of Ireland and their counterpart System Operator of Northern Ireland in NI. EirGrid 
acquired their Northern Irish counterpart in March 2009. 
41 ESB Networks along with ESB Electric Ireland (replaced ESB Customer Supply) and ESB Generation and 
Wholesale Market (replaced ESB Power Generation) became legally separate entities in February 2009 as part of 
the unbundling process outlined in the EU energy packages. 
42 The Third Energy Package: European Union 2009 Directive 2009/72/EC of the European Parliament and of the 






to full market integration using clear rules for implementation (network codes43), market 
coupling initiatives (multi-regional coupling) along with structuring the necessary power 
exchanges and systems to operate the various power markets (i.e. forward, day-ahead, intra-
day, balancing markets) (ENTSO-E, 2014).  
The primary aim of the Target Model is to maximise social welfare gain for all market 
participants, i.e. maximise consumer and supplier surpluses.  Using the “copper plate” effect 
outlined by Barroso et al. (2005), the internal market is based on a principle where electricity 
generated in one area is consumed in another without geographical or market-based constraints; 
causing a price equilibrium across the region.  It was acknowledged by the European authorities 
that for this to transpire, full utilisation of interconnection capacity between price zones was 
vital for any future integration plans.  This barrier was addressed in the Capacity Allocation 
and Congestion Management44 network code that promotes economically-driven power flows 
on interconnectors which, as pointed out by McInerney and Bunn (2013), has not always 
occurred.  By lowering technological and institutional barriers, such as the previous example, 
electricity markets across Europe could be fully coupled as has been the case in the Nordic 
region since 1990 (Olsen, 1995). 
 The Integrated Single Electricity Market 
The SEM is known for its transparency and as a highly functional, effective pool-based market 
that works in the interest of consumers according to Gorecki (2013).  Nevertheless, it must 
transform to comply with the Third Energy Package.  After receiving various derogations on 
implementing the Target Model due to its unique situation of being an “island system with 
central dispatch” (Agency for the Cooperation of Energy Regulators, 2011, Section 1.2), SEM 
must become compatible with the greater European electricity market in 2018. 
 
 
43 Network codes were developed by the European Commission, Agency for Energy Regulators and the European 
Network of Transmission System Operators to provide guidelines for the internal energy market to trade energy 
(ENTSO-E, 2014). 
44 For more details, see the Capacity Allocation and Congestion Management Report from the European Network 
of Transmission System Operators for Electricity (ENTSO-E) which outlines Network Codes for use in the 





Transforming SEM to become compatible with electricity markets across Europe involves 
restructuring its forward, day-ahead, intra-day, and balancing markets.  Notwithstanding the 
fact that the new version of SEM, known as the Integrated Single Electricity Market (I-SEM), 
will remain centrally dispatched, it will also be more onerous on market participants in terms 
of hedging risk exposure through forward contracting and implementing bidding strategies.  In 
I-SEM the aforementioned safeguards to risk exposure, i.e. Uplift and Make Whole Payments, 
will no longer exist, therefore participants need be more active in both forward and intra-day 
market trading; neither of which are currently very liquid in SEM.  Add in a new suite of system 
services45 along with the latest iteration of a capacity mechanism based on financial options,46 
and Ireland’s electricity market is set to evolve from what was a straightforward bilaterally 
traded energy market into the multidimensional, complex instrument.47,48 
 The role of climate mitigation policy 
In addition to the EU energy packages, EU climate mitigation policies on renewable energy, 
greenhouse gas emissions reduction and air pollutant limits also impacted on the electricity 
sector as the Member States were required to make a concerted effort to be sustainable.  For 
instance, the EU Directive 2001/77/EC49 established a target for Ireland to achieve 13.2% of 
gross electricity consumption from renewable energy sources by 2010.  Similarly, the 2020 
 
 
45 The “DS3 - Delivering a Secure, Sustainable Electricity System” programme strengthens, and doubles the 
number of, ancillary services in place to fourteen. DS3 aims to facilitate increased levels of variable renewable 
generation on the island of Ireland to ensure compliance with Article 16 of Directive 2009/28/EC (duty to 
minimise curtailment of renewable electricity), helping to reach binding Member State renewable energy targets 
by 2020. For more information, see: (EirGrid & SONI, 2011) 
46 The Capacity Remuneration Mechanism as it is known, will take the form of a volume-based reliability options 
mechanism that operates in a similar way to a financial call option or one-way contract for difference. For more 
information, see: (Single Electricity Market Committee, 2015c, 2016a, b) 
47 See the following decision papers from the RAs for further details: (Single Electricity Market Committee, 2013, 
2015a, b, c, 2016a, b) 
48 This market evolution may turn out to be a big winner for software development houses as was the case in 
Britain with the implementation of the New Electricity Trading Arrangements in 2001 which ended up far over 
budget costing approximately US$2 billion, according to Thomas (2004) 
49 European Union 2001 Directive 2001/77/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council on the Promotion 





Climate and Energy Package set three targets for 2020 for the EU: to achieve a 20% renewable 
energy share of gross final consumption; to reduce greenhouse gas GHG emissions by 20% 
compared to 1990 levels and; to improve energy efficiency by 20% compared to 2005 levels.  
The renewable energy target from the Climate and Energy Package was subsequently 
transmitted into individual Member State targets in EU Directive 2009/28/EC.50  To achieve 
Ireland’s 16% target, the government set individual sectoral targets for renewable electricity 
(40%); renewable heat (12%) and renewable transport (10%). The 2010 and 2020 targets for 
renewable electricity have driven the acceleration of wind farm deployment in Ireland, 
supported through market support mechanisms. 
The EU greenhouse gas emissions target was separated into two separate targets.  EU Directive 
2009/29/EC51 on emissions trading set a target of 21% reduction by 2020 relative to 2005 levels 
for large point source emitters who are in the EU Emissions Trading Scheme (ETS) and a 10% 
reduction by 2020 relative to 2005 levels for those outside of the ETS, i.e. the non-ETS sectors.  
Electricity generation falls within the ETS, as most power plants are considered large point 
source emitters.  The ETS price has been lower than anticipated and questions have been raised 
about its effectiveness by Muúls et al. (2016).52  However, the ETS may have led to higher 
investment in carbon-neutral generation capacity.  The non-ETS target has no direct impact on 




50 European Union 2009 Directive 2009/28/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 April 2009 
on the promotion of the use of energy from renewable sources 
51 European Union 2009 Directive 2009/29/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 April 2009 
amending Directive 2003/87/EC to improve and extend the greenhouse gas emission allowance trading scheme 
of the Community. 
52 ETS reform is currently underway. The aim is to raise the price to a “cost-effective emission reductions” level 
that would impact on fossil-fuel based generating plants and their marginal cost of generation. ETS reform could 
bring about the goal of the ETS and introduce a carbon tax that will reduce the amount of emissions gradually 
over time, eventually leading to decarbonisation. For more information, see: (European Commission, 2015c) 
53 European Union 2009 Decision No 406/2009/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 April 
2009 on the effort of Member States to reduce their greenhouse gas emissions to meet the Community’s 
greenhouse gas emission reduction commitments up to 2020. 
54 An air pollution target was published in the EU National Emissions Ceiling Directive (Directive 2001/81/EC) 





 National climate mitigation policies 
Support for renewable electricity in Ireland was first introduced in the 1990s.  While the 
Alternative Energy Requirement (AER)55 support scheme was started in 1994, it was not until 
a government policy in 1996 entitled “Renewable Energy – A Strategy for the Future” that a 
framework was implemented to address climate mitigation measures.56  This policy played a 
large role in developing the Irish wind energy sector due to the inclusion of wind energy targets 
up to 2010 (Department of Transport Energy and Communications, 1996).  Furthermore, in 
1997 ESB International estimated the potential from wind power in Ireland to be in the range 
of 345 TWh per year or in other words, more than 19 times the national demand of the time 
(ESB International and ETSU, 1997).  This provided a clear impetus for policy support 
surrounding wind power as it could increase the nation’s security of supply.  
Climate mitigation policies continued to support the development of Ireland’s wind energy 
sector, showing year-on-year growth.  For instance, the “Green Paper on Sustainable Energy” 
published in 1999 set an ambitious target to install 500 MW of renewable energy capacity 
nationwide between 2000-2005.  The paper outlined plans to reform the AER scheme, improve 
measures supporting the deployment of renewable energy, while also providing concrete 
proposals for market liberalisation and becoming a central feature in Ireland’s greenhouse gas 
abatement strategy (Global Wind Energy Council & International Renewable Energy Agency, 
2013).  This was followed by the introduction of Renewable Energy Feed-in Tariff (REFiT) in 
2006 to replace the AER scheme to further expand the sector.  Through centrally administered 
price setting, the REFiT programme sought to increase the profitability of wind power which, 
according to Global Wind Energy Council & International Renewable Energy Agency (2013), 
 
 
limits to 2020) of the four pollutants responsible for acidification, eutrophication and ground-level ozone pollution 
(sulphur dioxide, nitrogen oxides, volatile organic compounds, and ammonia). This prompted investment in flue 
gas desulphurisation (reducing SO2) and selective catalytic conversion (reducing NOx) at the Moneypoint power 
station in 2010. 
55 The AER was a competitive bidding process supporting alternative energy sources through a power purchase 
agreement of up to 15 years in duration (Global Wind Energy Council & International Renewable Energy Agency, 
2013; Staudt, 2000) 
56 The main justification for the strategy was for ‘security of supply’ purposes. It was estimated that without 
developing renewables, the electricity generated from indigenous energy sources would drop from 43% in 1994 





had led to many projects not being developed as a result of low prices received under the AER 
competitive bidding process.  Figure 2.3 demonstrates the success both support schemes 
achieved in terms of promoting wind power in Ireland. 
 Pecuniary externalities influencing market dynamics 
In Ireland, the AER and REFiT support schemes are funded through a Public Service 
Obligation (PSO) levy that was introduced in 2003 as a means of ensuring ‘security of supply’ 
and supporting indigenous and renewable fuel sources outside of the market57 (Commission 
for Energy Regulation, 2002).  The levy affords units qualifying under the indigenous fuels or 
renewable sources categories priority dispatch in the energy market and is a prime example of 
a ‘pecuniary externality’ directly affecting the electricity market in Ireland.  The three 
categories eligible to receive a power purchase agreement under the levy are as follows: 
• Indigenous fuels: Three peat-fired plants with a combined installed capacity of 378 MW58  
• Renewables: The renewables capacity supported in the 2015/16 PSO levy was 2210 MW 
• Security of supply: Over 200 MW of open cycle gas turbine “peaking” capacity was 
afforded power purchase agreements. A 400 MW combined cycle gas turbine plant and 160 
MW combined heat and power plant were awarded agreement in 2005, referred to as “Cap 
‘05” (Commission for Energy Regulation, 2016)  
Figure 2.4 shows the distribution of the total PSO levy costs (€1.59 billion) from its 
introduction in 2003 to the forecasted levy for the 2015/16 PSO year.  The indigenous fuels 
category (peat) accounts for the largest share of 48%, with renewables accounting for 28% and 
 
 
57 The RAs forecast the overall PSO cost for the following year and set the consumer levy accordingly. Ex-post 
calculations are carried out after the PSO year (Oct 1st to Sept 30th) has concluded to quantify any variances 
between forecasted and actual costs, and if necessary, reconciliation is performed when calculating the levy for 
following year. 
58 The International Energy Agency estimated the cost of generating electricity from peat in 1999 to be 50% higher 
than if using coal. It was also pointed out that subsidies in Ireland for peat were far lower than for coal in other 
EU Member States, such as Germany or Spain (International Energy Agency, 1999). Supporting peat for 
electricity generation also has socio-economic advantages in terms of local employment in areas of Ireland which 





Cap ’05 accounting for 17%.  Peaking and Others (administration costs) account for the 
remainder. 
 
Figure 2.4: Disaggregated total cost of the PSO levy between 2003 and the 2015/16 PSO year (€millions). 
Source: Commission for Energy Regulation, PSO Levy Annual Reports, Dublin. 
Implementing a competitive market should, ideally, limit external influences on the market, 
leaving costs directly associated with the product the only driver of market price, i.e. fuel and 
variable operation and maintenance costs.  However, as awareness of environmental concerns 
become more prevalent and the realisation that security of supply and reliance on imported 
fuels are vital to economies, this may fail to materialise as some external costs are not 
internalised in the price of electricity.  The PSO levy is a prime example of a pecuniary 
externality and when taken along with other external influences such as the 1970s oil crises or 
issues around the public acceptance of nuclear energy for example, have influenced change in 
the generation portfolio, as described in Section 2.3 and illustrated in Figure 2.3. 
Moreover, from a market perspective, some externalities can distort entry and exit market 
signals.  Take for instance a market based on economic dispatch; priority dispatch and 
renewable energy support are two influencers that can destabilise the foundations on which the 
market functions (Keay, 2016).  When a market contains high levels of zero-marginal-cost 
power sources (e.g. wind or solar-based generation), the resulting SMP would be lower than if 
these were not included due to the ‘merit order effect’ as shown by (Clancy et al., 2015; Cleary 
et al., 2016; Sensfuß et al., 2008).  Generally, lower SMPs do not affect zero-marginal-cost 
power sources in the same way as it would for other plants due to support mechanisms in place.  
However, if infra-marginal rent cannot be obtained for a ‘traditional’ thermal unit then fixed 
costs cannot be recouped without some addition mechanism such as an Uplift, Make Whole 
Payment or capacity payment mechanism as occurs in SEM.  This aspect of market design has 





outline a range of issues that face modern day electricity markets.  Keay (2016) concludes that 
electricity markets in Europe may effectively be broken and questions how they must evolve 
to be fit for purpose again, while Sen et al. highlights the need for “renewed thinking, or a shift 
in focus – in other words, a ‘reform’ of electricity reform” (Sen et al., 2016, p.39).  This concern 
goes beyond the borders of this chapter and therefore not addressed in further detail. 
 Outlook for Ireland’s electricity sector 
A recently published government policy called “Ireland’s Transition to a Low Carbon Energy 
Future 2015-2030” may shape the electricity sector of the future in Ireland (Department of 
Communications Energy & Natural Resources, 2015).  Aiming to transition towards a low 
carbon energy system while maintaining the three core objectives of sustainability, security of 
supply, and competitiveness, the focus of the chapter is on achieving the optimal benefits at 
least cost to consumers through new frameworks and pathways, consumer interaction and by 
promoting innovation and enterprise opportunities.  From a broader perspective, the ETS 
reform may have the desired effect and increase the marginal cost for fossil-fuel based units in 
Ireland and across Europe to generate power.  And finally, the various out-of-market payments 
made possible through EU energy policy will continue to affect market dynamics; raising 
concerns around its suitability to the generation portfolio of the future. 
 Conclusion and policy implications 
This chapter highlights the role of policy in Ireland’s electricity sector over the past 100 years.  
Numerous key transitions occurred over the period that were directly associated with policy 
decisions.  For example, the decision to create a state-owned entity to operate, manage and 
maintain the sector and distribute electricity nationwide on a non-profit-making basis.  In a 
move that would have a significant effect on the future of the sector, the ESB turned down the 
option of selling electricity in bulk to other distributors, instead opting to deliver electricity 
directly to consumers to reduce the effects of local politics and municipal boundaries on the 
development of a national electricity network. 
Another example was the lack of policy direction in the 1950s/60s that left the nation exposed 
to the 1970s energy crises; exposure which resulted in a renewed focus in Irish energy policy.  
With the aim of increasing security of supply, Ireland attempted to reduce its reliance on 
imported commodities (i.e. oil) by diversifying the generation portfolio through the promotion 





and renewable energy targets that stemmed from climate mitigation policies and security of 
supply ambitions, Ireland used energy policy to achieve one of the highest penetrations of 
variable renewable generation (wind power) in the world.  Therefore, poor policy direction in 
one period of time provided the impetus for strong energy policy afterward. 
Ireland is subject to EU legislation and through the energy packages enacted in 1996, 2003 and 
2009, three distinctive phases of market transformation were initiated.  First, market 
liberalisation occurred and had an immediate, even a pre-emptive, effect as the legacy 
monopolist improved overall efficiency in its preparations for the open market.  Second, a new 
cross-border, multi-currency electricity market was created.  Referred to as the all-island single 
electricity market (SEM), this market was found to work in the interest of consumers due to its 
open and transparent nature.  Then again, it could also be said that the new market worked well 
for market participants, specifically generators, as mechanisms were in place to ensure cost 
recovery.  Third, the final market transformation to comply with the EU Target Model; joining 
Ireland’s electricity market to the rest of Europe.  This market overhaul created I-SEM, a 
version of the previous pool-based market that had been shoe-horned to ensure compatibility 
with the regional alternative.  However, as described by Gorecki; “Aligning SEM with the 
Target Model appears very much to be a matter of fitting a square peg into a round hole.” 
(Gorecki, 2013, p.687).  I-SEM may be described as a complex multi-dimensional instrument 
that exposes market participants to heightened financial risk when compared to its 
predecessors. 
EU climate mitigation policies on renewable energy, greenhouse gas emissions reduction and 
air pollutant limits have changed the electricity sector significantly as the Member States were 
required to make a concerted effort to be sustainable.  The various pecuniary externalities, such 
as out-of-market payments for example, will continue to affect market dynamics; raising 
concerns around the suitability of the modern-day market to adapt to the generation portfolio 
of the future.  However, this concern goes beyond the boundary of this chapter and may require 
further research later. 
Broadly speaking, the evolution of Ireland’s electricity sector was synonymous with 
developments in other countries.  Increasing security of supply was key after the ‘awakening’ 
provided by the oil crises.  In Irelands situation as an island state with little (electrical) 
interconnection, the learnings provided by this chapter regarding policy decisions surrounding 





of wind power should be useful for policy makers in developing nations faced with similar 
decisions as the ‘barriers/mistakes/shortcomings’ that confronted Ireland over the 100 years of 








The integration of variable generation challenges electricity systems globally. Using Ireland’s 
electricity sector as a case study, we highlight multiple challenges in reconciling ambition for 
variable renewable integration with market economics and system operation. Ireland has the 
highest share of non-synchronous variable renewable electricity on a single synchronous power 
system. This case study examines the strategy being implemented to optimally balance between 
efficiency, flexibility and adequacy while maintaining a fully functional system that strives to 
adapt to evolving conditions. The transition that the Single Electricity Market underwent to 
comply with the EU Target Market was a major overhaul of what made the all-island market a 
success. Volume-based reliability options have distinct advantages over capacity payments. 
System services are critical for system stability and 14 separate system services are being 
developed. These actions, when taken together, provide an insight into the lengths to which 
this electricity market must go to transform from its cost-based nature to a value-based 
alternative that rewards flexible and reliable capacity with the ability to evolve with market 
conditions of the future.1 
Keywords: EU Target Model; I-SEM; Electricity market transformation; System services; 




1 Published as: Gaffney, F., Deane, P., Ó Gallachóir, B. 2019. ‘Reconciling high renewable electricity ambitions 
with market economics and system operation: Lessons from Ireland's power system.’ Energy Strategy Reviews 





 Introduction  
In many parts of the world, the electricity sector is in the midst of technological change. 
Generation portfolios today are different to those of the past and will continually evolve into 
the future. Consequently, electricity markets are also experiencing change, a change that 
partially stems from the sectors’ failure to effectively internalise the external costs associated 
with electricity generation in the past, regarding emissions. While many modern-day societies 
have policies in place to curtail the effects of climate change through the promotion of 
renewable energy and the reduction of greenhouse gas emissions (GHG), this was not always 
the case. 
Scientists worldwide agree that global warming is occurring, and that anthropogenic 
greenhouse gas emissions are a leading cause. To mitigate the effects of climate change, policy 
measures are in place to diversify and lessen the global dependency on GHG-emitting sources. 
Representing the majority of all GHG emissions released globally since industrialisation, the 
energy sector has a large part of play in the reversal of the trend witnessed in recent decades. 
In the electricity sector, these climate mitigation policies can often encourage zero-marginal-
cost generation (generally non-dispatchable2 and non-synchronous3) through support 
mechanisms while discouraging fossil-fuel based capacity (typically dispatchable and 
synchronous) with increased marginal costs through carbon taxation; displacing the latter. 
When the level of displacement escalates, it can create system stability challenges for the 
system operators in terms of inertia, frequency and voltage response requirements (Foley et al., 
2013). This can also create issues for market participants who fail to recover sufficient revenue 
to service debts related to fixed costs associated with dispatchable capacity; capacity which is 
considered important for long-term system generation adequacy (Deane et al., 2015d). In short: 
this situation occurs when policy measures promoting variable renewable generation push up 




2 Non-dispatchable means capacity that cannot adjust its output at will. Instead, external conditions such as wind 
speed or solar radiance play a defining role. 






In this chapter we use Ireland’s wholesale electricity sector as a case study to demonstrate the 
effects of the previously mentioned displacement that results from climate mitigation policies, 
focusing on the planned actions/strategy to maintain a fully functional, balanced system which 
promotes flexibility from its market participants while remaining cost efficient and within 
system adequacy limits. The Irish system is an intriguing choice of case study due to its 
uniqueness in European terms insofar as it is an isolated system with limited storage or 
interconnection and yet, one of the highest levels of variable renewable generation in the 
region, thereby making it one of the most challenging to operate within Europe. This chapter 
maps out the approach taken by the Irish authorities to adapt their market and overall system 
to the evolving conditions, attempting to remain ‘fit for purpose’ in a time when many are not 
– a perspective shared by (Gaffney et al., 2018; Keay, 2016). 
The chapter is structured as follows. Section 3.3 outlines the transformation Ireland’s electricity 
market underwent to align its trading platforms, ex-ante pricing structures, and other aspects to 
ensure compatibility with the European integrated internal market for electricity and comply 
with the European Union’s Third Energy Package.4 Section 3.4 overviews the redesign of the 
capacity payment mechanism to address concerns surrounding the lack of entry or exit signals, 
the potential for over-compensation and the absence of a competitive edge that exist in its 
current form. Section 3.5 describes how the current ancillary service arrangements will be 
restructured to facilitate up to 75% system penetration of variable renewable generation, 
creating one of the most complex system service arrangements used in the electricity sector 
worldwide. Section 3.6 concludes the case study with some final remarks. 
 Transforming an energy market 
Ireland transformed its electricity market to become compatible with the greater European 
regional market and remain compliant with the EU Third Energy Package. After receiving 
derogations on implementing the EU Target Model (TM)5 due to its unique situation of being 
 
 
4 European Union 2009 Directive 2009/72/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 July 2009, 
concerning common rules for the internal market in electricity and repealing Directive 2003/54/EC.  
5 The EU Target Model for electricity emerged in 2009 from the Florence Forum process as a blueprint with top-
down and bottom-up guidance on the future market design that was deemed necessary to facilitate the EU internal 
market for electricity (Booz & Co. et al., 2011). Fully aligned with the three energy packages (Dir. 1996/92/EC, 





an “island system with central dispatch” (Agency for the Cooperation of Energy Regulators, 
2011, Section 1.2), the all-island electricity market became compatible with the regional day-
ahead market on 1st October 2018 (Agency for the Cooperation of Energy Regulators, 2011; 
European Commission, 2015a). It may also be suggested that Ireland’s electricity market 
needed to adapt to remain ‘fit for purpose’ as conditions within the sector evolve, both naturally 
and as a consequent of policy influence. 
For instance, in additional to the EU Third Energy Package which primarily focuses on the 
internal market for both electricity and gas, EU climate mitigation policies focused on 
increasing renewable energy and reducing both greenhouse gas emissions and air pollution 
limits, also impact the electricity sector. Policies such as the 2020 Climate and Energy Package 
for example, set binding targets for the EU to achieve regarding the renewable energy share of 
gross final consumption, reducing greenhouse gas emissions and improving energy efficiency. 
Once transmitted into individual Member State targets via EU Directive 2009/28/EC (European 
Commission, 2009a), Ireland was assigned a 16% renewable share of gross final consumption 
target for 2020. To reach the national target, individual sectoral targets were established for 
renewable electricity (40%), renewable heat (12%) and renewable transport (10%). As a result, 
it is estimated that 5.3 GW of wind power capacity must be installed (EirGrid, 2016a), 
representing 33% of the anticipated total generation portfolio for the entire island to achieve 
the renewable targets of both jurisdictions. 
 The all-island electricity market 
The all-island Single Electricity Market (SEM) was established in 2007 as the main trading 
platform for electricity on the island of Ireland. The cross-jurisdictional, dual-currency market 
was built on a centrally dispatched gross pool model that was the sole route to market for 
generators and suppliers alike.6 The transition SEM underwent to comply with the TM was a 
major overhaul of what made the all-island market a success, both in terms of mitigating market 
 
 
integration applying clear rules for implementation (network codes), market coupling initiatives (multi-regional 
coupling) as well as restructuring the necessary power exchanges and the necessary systems to operate the power 
markets (forward, day-ahead, intra-day, balancing markets) (ENTSO-E, 2014). The model also involved 
harmonising information models, developing a central information platform, and actively adjusting the TM for 
better performance. 
6 There is a De Minimis threshold of 10 MW for generators. Units below this level could arrange bilateral contracts 





power through full transparency of data and also providing a market that “worked well for 
consumers in Ireland” according to Gorecki (2013, p.677).  
However, gross pool markets are often used as an intermediary step between a monopoly and 
a fully open bilateral market – akin to a fully open, liberalised market on training wheels 
according to Harris (2011). In the SEM, the ‘training wheels’ reference referred to the lack of 
risk exposure for market participants which has wider effects on the system. For example, SEM 
did not provide sufficient exit signals for old, inefficient capacity nor did it encourage the entry 
of units that added value to the system through flexibility. In other words, SEM lacked a 
competitive edge. This is an argument that reoccurs numerous times throughout the chapter 
when describing different aspects of the overall market transformation. 
From a high level, Ireland’s electricity market did not need to change from a pool-based design 
to bilateral contracts based alternative to comply with the TM, instead it needed to develop the 
market framework in which it occupied to be more dynamic, i.e. relying less on the ‘training 
wheels’ aspect of a pool market and introduce competition for increased system efficiency. For 
this development to take place, several issues needed to be addressed before any alignment 
could be achieved. For example, system marginal prices in SEM were set (4 days) ex-post 
rather than ex-ante, suppliers could not submit a demand curve, and there was no continuous 
intra-day market or forward market liquidity of any significance. Coupled with the knowledge 
that SEM was centrally dispatched as opposed to self-dispatched markets in the rest of Europe 
(except Cyprus), the scale of the task is evident. As summarised by Gorecki; “Aligning SEM 
with the Target Model appears very much to be a matter of fitting a square peg into a round 
hole.” (Gorecki, 2013, p.687).  
 Market transformation 
With guidance (and the previously mentioned derogations) provided by the Agency for the 
Cooperation of Energy Regulators (ACER), the Regulatory Authorities (RAs)7 laid out plans 
for the transition to become TM compliant. Through a number of decision papers, bilateral 
meetings, workshops and various working groups, the RAs put a programme in place to 
 
 
7 The Commission for Energy Regulation in the Republic of Ireland and the Northern Ireland Authority for Utility 





transition to the new electricity market for the island of Ireland, known as Integrated Single 
Electricity Market (I-SEM) (Single Electricity Market Committee, 2012). The RAs made key 
decisions relating to market operations when they announced the current transmission system 
operator (TSO)8 as the Nominated Electricity Market Operator, a requirement under the 
capacity allocation and congestion management network code,9 and on the issue of centrally- 
versus self-dispatched models when it was decided there would be no change on the current 
stance. The decision to retain the centrally-dispatched model was taken as the RAs considered 
self-scheduling inappropriate for SEM due to the ‘lumpiness’10 of the system and therefore 
believed central dispatch to be a core requirement of the all-island system (Single Electricity 
Market Committee, 2012).  
One of the largest differences between where SEM was and where it needed to be was the 
design of its trading platforms. Implementing a liquid forward market, a day-ahead market with 
ex-ante pricing, continuously traded intra-day market and cross-border balancing market was 
all new territory for the all-island market. Each different market had to become acquiescent to 
supplier participation, along with the centrally dispatched model to be retained under the new 
structure. Furthermore, importing a trading platform structure compatible with the TM was 
only part of the task, instilling market confidence that each platform would operate ‘as per 
design’ was equally important for market success. This was especially relevant when one 
considers that certain platforms (i.e. forward and intra-day) may require levels of liquidity not 
experienced in SEM. For instance, the forward market in SEM was not utilised to its full 
potential for hedging medium to long-term fuel prices as witnessed in other markets around 
 
 
8 EirGrid and the System Operator of Northern Ireland (SONI) are the TSOs in the Republic of Ireland and 
Northern Ireland jurisdictions respectively. 
9 The capacity allocation and congestion management network code has been an important network code 
implemented to-date. The code promotes economically-driven electricity flows on interconnectors which, as 
alluded to by McInerney and Bunn (2013), does not always occurred. By lowering technological and institutional 
barriers around interconnectors, European electricity markets could be coupled in a similar way to that in the 
Nordic region since 1990 (Olsen, 1995). The code was essential when one considers the main aim of the TM is to 
maximise social welfare gain, i.e. maximise consumer and supplier surpluses (Newbery et al., 2016). Employing 
the “copper plate” effect as alluded by Barroso et al. (2005), the TM is based on the principle that electricity 
generated in one area can be consumed in another without constraints, causing a price equilibrium. 
10 This refers to the ratio between the largest generating unit on a system and system demand. In SEM, a large 





Europe. Similarly, if one considers that all market participants (including non-dispatchable 
generators) must be balance responsible in I-SEM as outlined by the Single Electricity Market 
Committee (Single Electricity Market Committee, 2014a, 2015b), then trading in the intra-day 
time frame needed to occur continuously compared to SEM’s twice daily intra-day auctions – 
a function that helps all market participants to reduce their risk exposure. Figure 3.1 illustrates 
the market timelines in I-SEM.  
 
Figure 3.1: I-SEM market frame timeline.(EirGrid & SONI, 2017) Trading participants submit bids and offers 
in the day-ahead market for a specific day between 11:00 D-19 (19 days before delivery) and 11:00 D-1 (1 day 
before delivery). The market is cleared with schedules are published at 13:00 D-1. Intra-day trading opens at 11:45 
D-1 and closes an hour before delivery. Balancing market timeline overlaps with the intra-day and set the 
imbalance price for actions taken by the TSO. SEM, on the other hand was a cost-based market that included a 
market schedule dispatch D-1 which set the market price. This was followed by a second dispatch schedule which 
accounted for system constraints and system services.  
The retention of the centrally dispatched model in Ireland’s new electricity market also had a 
bearing on how market participants approach the newly designed market platform structure. 
For instance, notwithstanding the fact that there will be a forward market available for hedging 
medium- to long-term prices, this will be financial only. To physically trade electricity, the ex-
ante markets (day-ahead and intra-day) and the balancing market are the exclusive routes to 
market in their respective timeframes, therefore generators need to be successfully dispatched 
to meet any financial contractual obligations agreed in the forward market. While this does not 
occur in other European markets due to their ability to bilaterally trade contracts between 





makes the approach important for mitigating against market power exertion from legacy firms, 
according to the RAs11 (Single Electricity Market Committee, 2012). This introduces an 
additional level of risk for vertically integrated companies that may have hedged forward to 
reduce risk exposure around commodity prices for their thermal units for example, yet if their 
generation capacity does not get dispatched the company is fully exposed to market prices from 
their supply-side. 
For market participants, transforming the pool-based energy market to become compatible with 
the TM provides greater financial risk exposure, especially electricity producers. Gaffney et al. 
(2017) allude to the ‘comfortable’ position in which market participants in SEM have 
experienced to-date in such a risk adverse market design. Through an ‘uplift’ adder on shadow 
prices, ‘make whole payment’ and capacity payment mechanism, both short and long run costs 
are likely to be recovered, which provides an attractive incentive for potential new entrants 
investing in the sector. Under the new market structure, a capacity payment mechanism will 
remain in place for a select number of participants to recoup fixed costs12 while the other ‘safety 
nets’ disappear. Therefore, I-SEM will be more onerous and complex for market participants 
as financial risk management comes into focus. Hedging risk exposure through forward 
contracting along with implementing bidding strategies will be taken to a higher level than 
currently being applied. In other words, for the first time since market liberalisation in 2000 
the electricity sector in Ireland will operate without ‘training wheels,’ leaving market 
participants open to risk, as is the case in a fully liberalised, dynamic, open energy market 
(ElectroRoute, 2016).  
With this new, heightened level of risk exposure burdening market participants, along with the 
anticipated increase in zero-marginal-cost generation in Ireland to reach mandatory renewable 
energy targets, revenues earned outside of the energy market, such as capacity payments and 
auxiliary revenues, become even more in focus and critical for long-term economic survival. 
 
 
11 Cambridge Economics Policy Associates (2010) noted that there was “no significant market power exercised” 
in Ireland. However, market power exertion has taken place elsewhere. Details of the case against E.ON AG by 
the European Commission for the strategic withdrawal of capacity in German electricity market, see: 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/elojade/isef/case_details.cfm?proc_code=1_39388 





Table 3.1 outlines the main changes addressed in this paper regarding the market 
transformation in the all-island electricity system, the focus of the case study.  
Table 3.1: Summary of the main changes in the new market design that are addressed in this paper 






Liquidity in the forwards market and continuous intra-day 
trading platform is expected. Ex-ante market prices will be 
published before delivery of power instead of the ex-post 
pricing used in SEM. 
Cost Recovery 
No uplift mechanism or make whole payments to ensure full 
cost recovery in I-SEM. Introduces risk exposure for market 





Auction-based financial call options, akin a one-way contract 
for difference, provides suppliers with a full hedge against 
market prices. Incentivises reliable capacity. 
Administrative 
Scarcity Pricing 
Incentivises flexible capacity to generate when a scarcity event 





Increasing from seven to fourteen products. Provide greater 
operational control when a frequency or voltage event occurs. 
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Questions surrounding the inclusion of capacity payment mechanisms in the energy sector have 
long since been a hotly-debated topic as alluded to by Di Cosmo and Lynch (2016). From a 
European electricity sector context, with future generation portfolios set to contain high levels 
of zero-marginal-cost variable renewable energy to achieve national and supranational targets, 
concern surrounding the ‘missing money’ problem and the overall structure of modern-day 
electricity market design is becoming increasingly pronounced, see publications by (Agency 
for the Cooperation of Energy Regulators, 2013; Buchan, 2013; European Commission, 2016a, 





2013, 2016; Sen et al., 2016).13 Based on the merit-order approach and economic dispatch of 
units, the effect of high levels of zero-marginal-cost sources is shown to reduce system 
marginal prices. Consequently, lower prices mean less inframarginal rent is received by 
generators and marginal plants may fail to service debts related to fixed costs without some 
additional support; resulting in the ‘missing money’ problem and possibly leading to future 
concerns over generation adequacy. 
The European Commission (2016a) recently launched an investigation into the area 
surrounding levels of financial support granted to electricity producers and consumers by the 
EU Member States to maintain sufficient generation adequacy levels. The purpose of the 
inquiry was to identify any unduly favourable capacity payments to providers that may have 
an impact on competition in the internal market and to ensure guidelines on state aid for 
environmental protection and energy 2014-2020 are adhered to14 (European Commission, 
2014a, 2016a, b). The interim report associated with the investigation stated that “In principle, 
wholesale electricity markets (the ‘energy-only’ market) should be able to provide the price 
signals necessary to trigger the necessary investments provided wholesale prices allow fixed 
costs to be recovered.” (European Commission, 2016a, p.9). The report continues on to show 
awareness of the practicality or even the relevance of the previous statement in modern-day 
electricity markets where “…[Electricity markets] are characterised by uncertainties as well 
as a number of market and regulatory failures which affect wholesale market price signals.” 
(European Commission, 2016a, p.9). To combat these ‘regulatory and market failures’ along 
with the associated generation adequacy concerns, capacity mechanisms have increased in 
 
 
13 Keay (2016) suggests that European electricity markets may be broken and discusses how they must evolve to 
become fit for purpose again. Sen et al. (2016) outlines the need for a ‘reform of electricity reform.’ Glachant and 
Ruester (2014) believe the future EU electricity market may derail greatly from the effects of a large push to 
renewables, even leading to possible re-fragmentation without some coordinated policy frameworks around 
renewable supports and capacity mechanisms. Glachant and Ruester (2014) also allude to the European 
Commission’s ability to use its power for policing state aids to only approve capacity mechanisms if the Member 
State devotes funds to improving its interconnection with neighbouring states. 
14 The capacity mechanism recently implemented in Britain was the first capacity mechanism to pass EU State 
Aid guidelines outlined in the Guidelines on State aid for environmental protection and energy 2014-2020 
(‘EEAG’) (European Commission, 2014c). Since then France have received clearance to introduce a market-wide 
capacity mechanism (European Commission, 2016e) while Germany have also been granted permission for a 
Network Reserve in the southern part of the country to ensure security of electricity supply (European 





popularity across Europe with eleven EU Member States either using or planning to use some 
form of capacity payment (CREG, 2012; European Commission, 2016a). 
However, concerns must be raised surrounding this un-unified market-by-market approach 
regarding capacity mechanisms which will create cross-border trade distortions where coupled 
markets use different approaches, e.g. an ‘energy-only’ market coupled with an ‘energy-plus-
capacity’ market, or different types of capacity markets coupled. This concern is especially 
relevant to this case study as the GB capacity mechanism was recently suspended due to the 
outcome of an anti-competitiveness case taken by Tempus Energy15. Analysis by Gore et al. 
(2016) expands on this concern and quantifies, using empirical analysis, the difference between 
energy-only market and energy-plus-capacity markets. While the analysis finds that coupled 
markets work in principle, it also highlights that distributional effects are evident on 
interconnection flows when different capacity markets are accounted for. With the issue 
expected to magnify in the future as an increasing number of markets implement capacity 
mechanisms, a more coordinated approach throughout Europe may be necessary to help avoid 
negative effects on the internal market as highlighted by Gaffney et al. (2018).  
 Early capacity payments in Ireland 
In Ireland, the first capacity payment scheme was introduced in 2001 to ensure adequate levels 
of generation capacity was in place to meet the growing demand for electricity resulting from 
large economic growth during the period. The Capacity Margin Payment Scheme, as it was 
known, supported open cycle gas turbine capacity in the Republic of Ireland, demand reduction 
schemes offered by the supply arm of the dominant firm and contracted capacity from a 
generation unit in Northern Ireland (Commission for Energy Regulation, 2005). In 2007, this 
was replaced by the Capacity Payment Mechanism (CPM), which, like its predecessor, was 
introduced to encourage new investment in the sector, thereby stimulating competition and 
easing generation adequacy concerns. As the first ‘energy-plus-capacity’ market in Ireland, the 
 
 
15 Tempus Energy Technology Limited, a UK-based demand response service provider, took a legal case against 
General Court of Justice of the EU related to the decision to afford certain market participants (generation units) 
contract lengths up to 15 years but not demand side response technologies as being anticompetitive, and therefore 







CPM was a ‘Capacity Pot’ type mechanism set annually by the RAs using the Best New Entrant 
methodology to calculate the revenue required to recoup capital costs (net of anticipated 
inframarginal rent) for a hypothetical unit that represented the lowest cost per megawatt of 
installed capacity. Over the period 2007-2016, the pot averaged €551 million per annum16 and 
broadly speaking, was distributed monthly to all generators depending on their availability for 
generation. 
Described as a ‘market-wide price-based capacity payment mechanism’ by both the European 
Commission (2016a) and Agency for the Cooperation of Energy Regulators (2013), the CPM, 
along with all other mechanisms within this category, have inherent advantages and 
disadvantages. Di Cosmo and Lynch (2016) draw attention to a significant strength of the CPM 
related to the determination of the capacity pot size and its independence from any possibility 
of market power exertion. Since market liberalisation in 2000 mitigating against market power 
in a market described by Walsh et al. as “an oligopolistic market with a competitive fringe” 
(Walsh et al., 2016, p.4) has been a high priority. On the other hand, market-wide price-based 
capacity payment mechanisms risk over-compensating capacity providers as they rely 
primarily on administrative price setting and lack a competitive edge to reduce the level of 
remuneration received. Moreover, when a financial instrument, or specifically in the case of 
the CPM ‘a contract for physical availability’, rewards all market participants on an equal basis, 
it contains an innate flaw – it distorts market exit signals for old, inefficient capacity.  
 The capacity remuneration mechanism 
Ireland’s capacity payment mechanism has been redesigned and implemented alongside I-SEM 
to “help deliver secure supplies for consumers in the all-island market, particularly with increasing 
variable generation” according to Single Electricity Market Committee (2014a). The Capacity 
Remuneration Mechanism (CRM), as it is known, is based on volume-based reliability options 
(ROs) mechanism, operating in a similar fashion to a financial call option or one-way contract 
for difference. The quantity of each RO is set centrally and allocated through a competitive 
auction. The RO length can differ depending on levels of investment made by the RO holder, 
 
 
16 Available from SEM’s annual market revenues available at http://www.sem-o.com/Pages/default.aspx or the 





ranging from 1-10-year contracts.  Successful RO holders, who must have the physical capacity 
to back-up an option, will receive an annual payment. In exchange, RO holders must refund 
the difference between the market reference price17 and a pre-determined strike price18 to 
suppliers via the TSO if the strike price is breached, as illustrated in Figure 3.2. Suppliers 
initially fund the ROs through a capacity charge levied as a fixed price per MWh of 
consumption during a pre-defined set of hours (Single Electricity Market Committee, 2015c). 
This type of mechanism allows suppliers a full hedge against market prices above the RO strike 
price. The principles behind reliability options are discussed in detail by Vazquez et al. (2002) 
and Agency for the Cooperation of Energy Regulators (2013), while specific details associated 
with the mechanisms’ introduction in Ireland can be found in Single Electricity Market 
Committee (2015c, 2016a, 2016b).  
 
Figure 3.2: Reliability option difference payments(EirGrid & SONI, 2017) 
 
 
17 The price obtained by the RO holder in selling their power in either the day-ahead, intraday or the balancing 
markets (Single Electricity Market Committee, 2015c). 
18 The Single Electricity Market Committee (2015c) propose that a hypothetical low-efficiency peaking unit using 





 Market participant eligibility 
The Single Electricity Market Committee (2015c) stated that all capacity providers in I-SEM, 
including those receiving support, are eligible to partake in the CRM once qualification 
requirements outlined in the Capacity Market Code (Single Electricity Market Committee, 
2017b) are adhered to. All capacity entering auctions must also apply a de-rating factor to their 
installed capacity that has been calculated for each specific technology type and account for 
the impact of plant size (Single Electricity Market Committee, 2016c). De-rating factors are 
based on historical performance data and under certain circumstances allow evidence for 
expected changes in future performance to be taken account of. Dispatchable capacity must 
enter the auctions while non-dispatchable capacity, once qualified to participate, can choose 
(Single Electricity Market Committee, 2015c). In each of the categories, de-rating factors 
provide reliable capacity with an advantage as higher de-ratings are associated with higher 
reliability, meaning a larger share of a unit’s installed capacity can enter the CRM auctions. 
For variable capacity where outage patterns are highly correlated, such as solar or wind power, 
de-rating factors are calculated based on the entire class instead of individual units. The 
authorities decided to include capacity receiving support to maximise competition in the CRM 
auctions and to remain compliant with European Commission guidelines on State Aid 
guidelines for environmental protection and energy which requires preference be given to 
capacity with lower carbon intensities in a situation where capacities are of equal technical and 
economic circumstances (European Commission, 2014a). While the de-rating factors may be 
low for variable capacity such as wind power, in Ireland’s situation with a large share of 
installed wind power relative to the system size, the authorities expect wind power to 
substantially add to the competitive auction. 
 Administrative scarcity pricing 
The CRM also includes administrative scarcity pricing in the I-SEM balancing market to 
provide a floor price when available capacity is lower than expected demand (plus the 
associated reserve requirements). It is expected that introducing scarcity pricing will increase 
system security through strong incentives, encourage economic efficiency, provide entry and 
exit signals, promote demand response and finally align with the approach taken in the British 
market for consistent price signals when margins are tight (Single Electricity Market 
Committee, 2015c). It is also hoped that implementing this type of pricing will address an 





have occurred but were not successfully conveyed in the system marginal price; an issue also 
experienced in the French and Great Britain (GB) electricity markets in recent times.19 These 
situations may have transpired for several reasons, for example; due to the risk adverse nature 
of SEM, generators might not have the awareness of such events or even the ability to adapt 
the output of their unit over a short timeframe. Through the overall restructuring of Ireland’s 
electricity market, it is anticipated that market participants will play a more influential role in 
the future (due to new level of financial and dispatch risk exposure) and, therefore, may be 
better positioned to react to scarcity events. In addition, the balancing market price ceiling will 
increase to €10000/MWh while the day ahead market cap increases from €1000 to €3000/MWh 
as the RAs implement the day-ahead price cap used in the majority of TM compliance 
markets20 (Single Electricity Market Committee, 2015b, 2016a). 
The Single Electricity Market Committee (2015c) expect scarcity pricing to incentivise new, 
flexible and reliable peaking generation units entering the market using the potential for high 
market prices at times of system stress and therefore high revenues for those in operation, as a 
lure. For old unreliable thermal capacity, scarcity pricing (and the reliability option approach 
in general) make capacity payments a riskier revenue stream for the reasons previously alluded 
to and also shown in Figure 3.2 where the strike price must be repaid for the volume in receipt 
of reliability option payment whether generating or not. 
Under the new market arrangements, scarcity pricing applies when a point has been reached 
where available capacity is insufficient to meet demand, as illustrated in Figure 3.3. The 
scarcity price will start from the reliability option strike price and increase using a simple piece-
wise linear function until demand is met using the operating reserve capacity or a ‘lost load’ 
event occurs21 (Single Electricity Market Committee, 2015c). 
 
 
19 Further details available from Single Electricity Market Committee (2015c, p.49) 
20 The Iberian day-ahead electricity market maintained its existing price range (€0–€180.30) after entering the 
European internal market (Henriot et al., 2013). 
21 Scarcity pricing along with other details of the CRM operational arrangements will be “captured in and 
governed through, an updated Trading and Settlement Code” which market participants must comply to according 






Figure 3.3: Parameterised administrative scarcity price function. Source: Capacity Remuneration Mechanism 
Detailed Design Decision Paper 2, SEM-16-022, Dublin. (Single Electricity Market Committee, 2016b) 
 Effects of the CRM 
The CRM may benefit dispatchable generators over their variable counterparts. Under SEM 
arrangements, capacity payments were rewarded to all generators based on their availability to 
generate. Under the CRM, a generator must first bid for the RO, and if successful, must be 
available to generate when margins are tight otherwise face refunding the entire market 
reference price for the RO volume. Considering this, it is difficult to see the advantage for 
variable generators who receive out-of-market support payments bidding into CRM auctions 
when traditionally capacity payments were not mutually exclusive.  
From a broader market perspective, changing capacity payments in Ireland to an RO style 
mechanism will address the previously mentioned concerns over ‘pot’ type approach regarding 
distorted exit and entry signals and possible over-compensation. Other benefits of pre-defined 
volume-based capacity auctions include the promotion of competition – providing the best 
value for consumers through a competitive edge, and the non-dilution of revenues when new 
capacity is commissioned as occurs to-date (Single Electricity Market Committee, 2016b).  
 Restructuring system services 
Managing the all-island electricity system is a challenging task for the TSO due to the nature 
of the system with low levels of storage and interconnection, and yet one of the highest 





heavily depends on reserve capacity in the form of ancillary service products as a means of 
ensuring system stability if the delicately balanced supply and demand relationship falters. 
Furthermore, with future generation portfolios expected to include increased levels of variable 
energy sources, this enhances the technical challenges for the system operators in terms of 
maintaining sufficient system inertia to preserve system stability, along with the more 
commonly known concerns around frequency and voltage response. The scale of the challenge 
faced by the Irish TSO was analysed in a suite of studies called the “Facilitation of Renewables” 
report (EirGrid & SONI, 2010). The findings were further refined in the “Ensuring a Secure, 
Reliable and Efficient Power System in a Changing Environment” report which outlined the 
redesign and overall strengthening of ancillary services necessary to facilitate a significant rise 
in the level of variable generation capacity proposed for the island of Ireland (EirGrid & SONI, 
2011). The learnings from these studies are important for regions with ambition for high levels 
of variable renewable generation and are expanded on in Section 3.5.2 after a comparison of 
global systems which display similarities to that of the all-island system are discussed in 
Section 3.5.1. 
 Comparable system conditions 
Compared to other systems worldwide, the goal of the DS3 programme regarding the 
facilitation of 75% instantaneous non-synchronous generation appears unprecedented on an 
island system with low levels of asynchronous interconnection and little energy storage. 
Electricity systems in New Zealand, Tasmania, and Singapore for example all have certain 
similarities to that of Ireland in terms of market or geographical scale. They also have either 
limited or no interconnection to neighbouring systems. However, none of the aforementioned 
have comparable levels of variable generation in their portfolios and even if this was the case, 
all three contain ideal technologies to accompany/facilitate variable generation with hydro-
dominant portfolios in New Zealand and Tasmania and an almost exclusively gas-fired 
portfolio in Singapore (Energy Market Authority, 2017). For instance: New Zealand is 
completely electrically isolated, yet has a hydro-dominant generation mix that represented 55% 
of generation in 2015, providing vast amounts of flexible storage (International Energy 
Agency, 2017a); Tasmania has the equivalent of 16 months’ worth of hydro storage capacity 
according to a publication by KEMA (2011), making it rather unique; while Singapore 
generated 95% of electricity from gas in 2016 (Energy Market Authority, 2017). Other systems 





variable generation akin to Ireland, rely heavily on hydro in the former and interconnection in 
the latter to facilitate variable generation. In Spain for example, approximately 20% of 
generation capacity is hydro-based while Denmark has nearly six times the interconnection 
capacity to that of the all-island system yet is of a similar size (Energinet.dk, 2016).  
Notwithstanding the fact of having a much greater system size, more diversified generation 
mix and higher levels of interconnection, some level of comparison can be drawn to the GB 
electricity system in terms of frequency and voltage management, along with balancing and 
flexibility issues recently outlined in a National Grid (2016) publication. In recent years, the 
GB system has started witnessing the impacts associated with high levels of variable generation 
as balancing services are being utilised to a greater extent as capacity increases according to 
National Grid (2016). Consequently, reviews have been (or soon to be) carried out relating to 
numerous aspects of the overall approach to providing system services, such as; RoCoF 
requirements, frequency response, active network management, regional network voltage 
protection systems (National Grid, 2016). Other studies, such as a recent report from the 
SmartNet22, that compare ancillary services from Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, Italy, 
Norway and Spain only further exemplify the unique conditions that the all-island system deals 
with on a daily basis (Merino et al., 2016). While some of the previously mentioned systems 
have similarities to the all-island system, none endure the same rigor in terms of facilitating 
high variable generation with no synchronous interconnection capacity, low levels of 
asynchronous interconnection and little storage. Therefore, the learnings from this paper and 
particularly from the DS3 programme may be important for systems with ambition for high 
levels of variable renewable generation. 
 The DS3 programme 
The “DS3 - Delivering a Secure, Sustainable Electricity System” programme was launched by 
the TSOs in 2011 to facilitate increased levels of variable renewables on the island of Ireland. 
An overview of the programme is shown in Figure 3.4, identifying the three key pillars on 
 
 
22 The SmartNet project is funded through the European Union’s Horizon 2020 research and innovation 





which the programme is constructed; System Policies, System Performance, and System Tools. 
The figure also outlines the work streams contained in each pillar. 
 
Figure 3.4: DS3 programme structure. Source: DS3 System Services Procurement Design and Emerging 
Thinking Decision Paper, SEM-14-108. Dublin. (Single Electricity Market Committee, 2014b) 
Strengthening the existing ancillary service products while doubling their number to fourteen 
is a significant feat. To facilitate this transformation, the DS3 programme included the system 
tools and system policies pillars as key contributors to the overall system service arrangements. 
System tools provide control over the programme through the various means outlined in Figure 
3.4 and the system policies pillar ensures the correct level of regulation is in place to support 
the success of DS3 through policy control. While remaining cognisant that both pillars are 
integral to the success of the programme, this section will concentrate on the system 
performance pillar and the technical aspects of the DS3 programme that may provide a 
financial opportunity for market participants to increase auxiliary revenue streams, thereby 
encouraging flexibility in the system – a characteristic which is considered essential in a system 
with high levels of variable generation capacity (Deane et al., 2015d).  
 System Performance 
System performance relates to monitoring and managing the performance of all units connected 
to the all-island electricity system. Maintaining the performance level necessary to reach 





this category such as Grid Code modifications,23 developing new practices in performance 
monitoring and increasing the level of participation from demand side management 
participants. From a technical perspective, there are two critical aspects of system operation 
that must change for the successful adoption of the DS3 programme (Single Electricity Market 
Committee, 2014b). First, the Rate of Change of Frequency (RoCoF) standard that a thermal 
unit must ‘ride-through’ without disconnecting from the grid and second, the restructuring of 
system service products in the all-island electricity system. 
 Rate of change of frequency 
The RoCoF standard will increase from the current 0.5 Hz per second to 1 Hz per second 
measured over 500 milliseconds for all conventional plants to comply with Grid Code 
(Commission for Energy Regulation, 2014). For synchronous generation capacity, this means 
their plant must stay synchronised with the system through a change of frequency of up to 1 
Hz per second measured over 500 milliseconds. Increasing the RoCoF standard is not unheard 
of as both Spain and Denmark, two fellow Member States with significant levels of variable 
renewable energy, have implemented 2 Hz/s and 2.5 Hz/s RoCoF standards respectively 
(Australian Energy Market Operator, 2011; Energinet.dk, 2008). However, a significant 
difference between what Ireland aims to do compared to Denmark or Spain, is enforce the 
updated RoCoF standard on all existing thermal units, not just newly commissioned plants.24 
In changing the RoCoF standard, the TSO anticipate that higher instantaneous penetration 
levels of variable renewable energy can be facilitated in the system (EirGrid & SONI, 2010). 
The parameter used by the TSOs to measure the instantaneous penetration of variable 
renewable generation is called the System Non-Synchronous Penetration (SNSP) limit. SNSP 
limit is calculated based on the volume of non-synchronous energy source generated plus 
interconnector imports as a percentage of the overall demand plus interconnector exports. In 
Q2 2019, at the time of writing, the SNSP limit is 65% non-synchronous energy sources 
 
 
23 Grid code is a set of standards for all plant to adhere to that are connected to the system. For more details, see: 
http://www.eirgridgroup.com/  
24 This aspect of RoCoF created unrest between market participants in SEM and the authorities, i.e. the TSOs and 
RAs, leading to an open consultation followed by a recommendations paper on a remuneration mechanism to 
contribute towards costs associated with the generation studies necessary to ascertain whether a unit can meet the 





(EirGrid, 2019). By introducing the updated RoCoF standard along with the other DS3 work 
streams, this limit is anticipated to reach 75% – reducing curtailment of renewable energy and 
therefore, helping to achieve binding EU Member State renewable energy targets. Figure 3.5 
illustrates the SNSP limits anticipated by the TSO over the period 2015-2020. The figure also 
shows the benefit of introducing the various new/updated standards and work streams on the 
system in terms facilitating non-synchronous generation. 
 
Figure 3.5: Operational capability outlook. Source: DS3 Programme Operational Capability Outlook 2016, 
EirGrid (EirGrid, 2016b) 
 System services 
Maintaining a stable electricity system with as little as 580 MW25 of asynchronous 
interconnection and less than 300 MW of pumped hydro energy storage is a difficult feat, 
especially if one considers that in 2020, the installed capacity of variable generation (i.e. wind 
and solar PV) is expected to be 5600 MW (EirGrid, 2016a). For comparative purposes, the 
peak system demand in the same year is expected to be approximately 7000 MW according to 
the median demand forecast for the all-island electricity system (EirGrid, 2016a). Where other 
 
 
25 The long-term view assumed by the TSOs regarding the Moyle asynchronous interconnector is that it may have 





systems across Europe are not as geographically isolated, interconnection with neighbouring 
systems is a means of increasing security of supply and thus requiring fewer system services. 
Similarly, EU Member States such as Spain, Germany, France, Italy, and Austria have large 
pumped hydro energy storage capacity which is ideal for storing energy when wholesale 
electricity prices are low, for providing system services and for facilitating variable generation 
(Deane et al., 2010). Recognising that no new interconnection or storage capacity is expected 
in Ireland before 2025 when a proposed 700 MW interconnector to France may come online 
(ENTSO-E, 2015), system services remain critical for system stability.  
Once the system services work stream of the DS3 programme is fully implemented in 2019, 
the number of system service products will increase from seven under the current arrangement 
to fourteen to create one of the most complex system service arrangements used in an electricity 
system worldwide. In October 2016, eleven of the fourteen system services became operational 
using regulated tariffs and volumes set by the TSOs. The three products not yet in operation 
are fast frequency response, dynamic reactive response, and fast post-fault active power 
recovery. Details of new and existing system service products are outlined in Section A of 
Table 3.2 while Figure 3.6 and Figure 3.7 show which of the products relate to frequency 
control or voltage control. The figures also allude to the ‘activation order’ timeline of products 






Table 3.2: Summary of DS3 system services products 
Section A Section B 





Short Description Tariff Rates (€) 
Synchronous Inertial Response SIR MWs2h New (Stored kinetic energy) * (SIR Factor - 15) 0.0050 
Fast Frequency Response FFR MWh New MW delivered between 2 and 10 seconds 2.16 
Primary Operating Reserve POR MWh Existing MW delivered between 5 and 15 seconds 3.24 
Secondary Operating Reserve SOR MWh Existing MW delivered between 15 and 90 seconds 1.96 
Tertiary Operating Reserve 1 TOR1 MWh Existing MW delivered between 90 seconds and 5 minutes 1.55 
Tertiary Operating Reserve 2 TOR2 MWh Existing MW delivered between 5 minutes and 20 minutes 1.24 
Replacement Reserve (De-
Synchronised) 
RRD MWh Existing MW delivered between 20 minutes and 1 hour 0.56 
Replacement Reserve 
(Synchronised) 
RRS MWh Existing MW delivered between 20 minutes and 1 hour 0.25 
Ramping Margin 1 Hour RM1 MWh New 
The increased MW output that can be delivered with a 
good degree of certainty for the given time horizon. 
0.12 
Ramping Margin 3 Hour RM3 MWh New 0.18 
Ramping Margin 8 Hour RM8 MWh New 0.16 
Fast Post-Fault Active Power 
Recovery 
FPFAPR MWh New Active power >90% within 250ms of voltage >90% 0.15 
Steady-state Reactive Power SRP MVArh Existing 
MVAr capability * (% of capacity that capability is 
provided) 
0.23 
Dynamic Reactive Response DRR MWh New MVAr capability during large (>30%) voltage dips 0.04 
Sources: Section A: DS3 System Services Technical Definitions Decision Paper, SEM-13-098. Dublin. (Single Electricity Market Committee, 2013) Section B: DS3 




Figure 3.6: Frequency control services. Source: DS3 System Services Technical Definitions Decision Paper, 
SEM-13-098. Dublin. (Single Electricity Market Committee, 2013) 
 
Figure 3.7: Voltage control services. Source: DS3 System Services Technical Definitions Decision Paper, SEM-
13-098. Dublin. (Single Electricity Market Committee, 2013) 
Figure 3.6 and Figure 3.7 demonstrate how the new system services complement the existing 
products in order to improve system frequency and system voltage control respectively. Each 
figure shows that additional products have been introduced between the time an incident occurs 
and when the existing products activate which allows greater operational control over the 
system, in turn increasing the system’s ability to facilitate variable generation. For example, 
SIR and FFR provide an inertial and fast-acting MW response from 0-5 seconds of a frequency 
event occurring. Similarly, dynamic reactive response is important for system stability when 
there are high levels of variable generation online to deliver a reactive current response for 
voltage dips in the period before the existing steady-state reactive power product becomes 





represented on either Figure 3.6 or Figure 3.7. The FPRAPR product provides a positive 
contribution to system stability and security through its ability to mitigate against the impact 
of large frequency disturbances through fast power recovery response.1   
Prospective providers of one or more system services outlined in Table 3.2 are required to 
complete a qualification trial process to 1) assess their technical ability to provide the product 
in question, 2) advise authorities on the level of competition for each product, and 3) establish 
the current capabilities within the system (Single Electricity Market Committee, 2014b). The 
qualification trials are carried out to assess the ability of a range of technologies to provide the 
various products, as described by EirGrid & SONI (2016b). All technologies, including wind 
power, demand side, and other technologies such as battery storage, solar PV, flywheels, etc., 
along with conventional generation are admissible to the trials. Once qualified, prospective 
providers must enter successful bids for each system service at product auctions to become a 
provider. Contracts for each product will be awarded on an annual basis except in the case 
where investment is necessary to provide a service where on a case-by-case basis contracts of 
up to 20 years may be bestowed on the participant2 (Single Electricity Market Committee, 
2014b). The volume of each product described in Table 3.2 will be determined annually by the 
TSO (EirGrid & SONI, 2016d).  
In the event of low market participation or where the possibility for market power exertion 
exists, the contract price may be defined via a TSO set regulated tariff. The authorities suggest 
that applying regulated tariffs will not be the enduring solution in I-SEM, instead expect a 
competitive process to be in place in the long-term. Regulated tariffs will be calculated using 
a “cost-plus” approach which incorporates the previously defined Best New Entrant approach 
and a regulated rate of return aspect as described by EirGrid & SONI (2016a). Bearing in mind 
the need to send the correct investment signals to market participants, the authorities will set 
all regulated tariffs for a period of five years once the system services are fully implemented 
 
 
1 For further details on the technical characteristics of FPFAPR and the other products, see (Single Electricity 
Market Committee, 2013). 
2 A potential conflict of interest was raised by market participants relating to the TSOs’ ownership of a 500 MW 
interconnector to Great Britain that can provide system services. The SEM committee found that as the 
interconnector was financed by the Irish energy consumer, it should therefore be used in a means that maximises 
the value to the consumer. Therefore, the interconnector will not participate directly in any auctions and will be 
treated as a price taker for its volume. Effectively the volumes to be auctioned will be net of the provision the 





(Single Electricity Market Committee, 2014b). In a move that is intended to provide greater 
certainty for the industry, the authorities stated that “[Regulated tariffs may] provide guidance 
on the prices that may result from the competitive process.” (Single Electricity Market 
Committee, 2014b, p.35) 
Section B of Table 3.2 outlines the regulated tariffs for the operational DS3 system services 
along with the products yet to be implemented, i.e. fast frequency response, dynamic reactive 
response, and fast post-fault active power recovery. These tariffs allow an insight into the 
potential revenue to be earned by generators for providing system services. The price received 
by market participants for providing system service products is also subject to scalars in an 
attempt to increase performance of the procurement design by rewarding providers who ‘turn 
up’ in times of most need. The scalars are based on performance, scarcity, product and volume 
(Single Electricity Market Committee, 2014b). 
 Revenues from DS3 programme related activities 
While the updated RoCoF standard will be a requirement for thermal units under Grid Code, 
there is no direct revenue to be earned from having the ability to “ride-through” a frequency 
event. Indirectly, however, achieving the standard may ensure that a unit has a higher number 
of operational hours over a unit still to comply with the standard change for system stability 
reasons. System services on the other hand, do provide a direct revenue stream as shown in 
Section B of Table 3.2. Through the DS3 programme and its associated 75% SNSP target, the 
TSO estimated the annual benefit of reducing variable renewable energy curtailment to be in 
the range of €177 million by 2020 – in other words, the TSO expects the overall energy market 
costs to reduce by that amount (Single Electricity Market Committee, 2014b). When taken 
along with the existing expenditure cap on ancillary services (€60 million), the total is rounded 
to €235 million and used as the annual ‘cap’ for system services from 2020 onwards (Single 
Electricity Market Committee, 2014b). From a high-level view, Figure 3.8 illustrates the 
anticipated redistribution of revenue streams estimated the RAs in the “DS3 System Services 







Figure 3.8: Rebalance of revenue streams. Source: own elaboration based on Single Electricity Market 
Committee (2014b) 
 Redistribution of revenue streams 
Participants in Ireland’s electricity market have already witnessed a change in their revenue 
streams over the past number of years and this trend is expected to continue through the 
transition to I-SEM and beyond while policy measures influence the generation portfolio. 
Between 2007 and 2016 for example, the total annual energy payments in SEM decreased by 
49% (€2.7 to €1.37 billion)3 while other payments, such as capacity payments, remained 
relatively constant (Single Electricity Market Operator, 2016). The RAs have shown awareness 
of the changing marketplace through their central involvement in the restructuring process to 
facilitate future generation portfolios in the new design for the island of Ireland. 
Notwithstanding the fact that revenue streams are naturally rebalancing as generation portfolios 
evolve, the transformation under I-SEM (including the capacity and system service elements) 
 
 
3 The 2016 annual energy market revenue is 32% below the nine-year average. It is recognised that fuel and 
emission costs have a part in this reduction; however, the effect of high levels of zero-marginal cost generation 
on lowering system marginal prices has been shown in numerous articles such as (Clancy et al., 2015; Cleary et 
al., 2016; Sáenz de Miera et al., 2008; Sensfuß et al., 2008). For more information on the annual market revenues, 





takes a significant step to what future electricity market designs may look like worldwide – 
optimally balancing efficiency, flexibility and system adequacy. 
As demonstrated in Figure 3.8, I-SEM consists of three primary revenue streams for market 
participants. With future energy payments expected to reduce because of large volumes of zero-
marginal-cost variable renewable energy being installed to meet renewable targets, thermal 
generators operating purely on the energy market may not receive sufficient inframarginal rent 
to service debts related to fixed costs, i.e. the missing money problem. Furthermore, as outlined 
by Deane et al. (2015d), many of these generators are vital for the long-term operation of the 
system, in terms of meeting system adequacy requirements, providing flexible generation, 
inertia requirements, voltage and frequency response. To address this concern, I-SEM is more 
value-based than its predecessor – rewarding generators that add flexibility and reliability to 
the system. Through the DS3 programme for example, flexible units benefit from the increased 
number of system service products that can be availed of, along with scalars based on 
performance, scarcity, product and volume. In the CRM both reliability and flexibility are 
rewarded as the former is a key characteristic of any such financial option-based mechanism 
and the latter, an advantageous characteristic when administrative scarcity pricing is in place. 
 Conclusion 
Climate mitigation policies are influencing generation portfolios. With technological change 
comes both, sectoral and market change. Pecuniary externalities such as support mechanisms 
and carbon taxes, introduced via policy measures, can distort market price formation and affect 
system operations. Through this case study, the other side of the coin is observed. The paper 
explores the strategy used by an isolated system with high levels of variable renewable 
generation to optimise the balance between efficiency, flexibility and system adequacy while 
maintaining a fully functional system that strives to adapt to the evolving conditions. 
This case study highlights several concerns that are soon to be or are already, relevant to a wide 
range of electricity markets. Technical issues relating to frequency and voltage control, market 
issues around decreasing system marginal prices – leading to the ‘missing money’ problem, 
and institutional issues concerning Ireland’s need to become compatible with the greater 
European internal electricity market, all offer an insight into both internal and external policy 





demonstrates the length at which Ireland will go to achieve ambitious energy-related policy 
decisions to curtail the effects of climate change. 
Implementing the energy market changes alluded to in Section 3.3 instils a competitive edge 
that entices market participants to play a more influential/central role in the future marketplace 
while attempting to reduce financial risk exposure. Withdrawing the reassurance of fully cost 
recovery creates a situation where the “training wheels” have been removed and competition 
can prosper. Redesigning the capacity mechanism also fosters competition through the 
auctioning of reliability options. The in-coming mechanism addresses concerns surrounding 
distorted entry and exit signals, over-compensation, and the dilution of revenues associated 
with new capacity being commissioned, through a pre-defined volume-based capacity auction 
that promotes flexible and reliable capacity. Restructuring system services increases the 
operational ability to control frequency and voltage during an event through additional system 
service products, a new RoCoF standard and a range of other inputs from the DS3 programme, 
as described in Section 3.5. In short; restructuring system services aims to increase operational 
control of the system which equates to heightened system stability, thereby improving the 
system’s capacity to facilitate higher levels of variable generation. The actions, when taken 
together, provide an insight into the lengths to which this electricity market must go, to 
transform from its cost-based nature to a value-based alternative that rewards flexible and 









The nexus between renewable electricity (RES-E) generation and interconnection is likely to 
play a large part in future de-carbonised power systems.  This chapter examines whether RES-
E shares should be measured based on consumption rather than production with a European 
case study presented for the year 2030.  The case study demonstrates the volume and scale of 
RES-E transfers and shows how countries have differing RES-E shares when comparing those 
derived based on the traditional production-based approach to the alternative.  The proposed 
consumption-based approach accounts for RES-E being imported and exported on an hourly 
basis across 30 European countries and highlights concerns regarding uncoordinated support 
mechanisms, price distortions and cost inequality.  These concerns are caused by cross-border 
subsidisation of electricity and this work proposes that an agency be appointed to administer 
regional RES-E affairs.  This agency would accurately quantify RES-E shares and remunerate 
producers from the country that consumed their electricity instead of where it has been 
produced – policy would be enhanced by enabling more equitable and optimal electricity 
decarbonisation.1 
Keywords: EU Target Model; Consumption-based renewable electricity quantification; 




1 Published as: Gaffney, F., Deane, J., Collins, S. & Gallachóir, B. Ó. Consumption based approach to RES-E 






Globally, power sector portfolios are undergoing a technology transformation with the 
ambition of achieving long-term carbon-neutrality.  The Paris agreement of 2015, signed by 
195 countries, is a significant driver of technological change as a concerted effort is needed to 
limit greenhouse gas emissions in order to keep global temperatures ‘well below’ 2°C above 
pre-industrial levels (European Commission, 2015b).  The European Union’s (EU) Emissions 
Trading Scheme (ETS) as well as various climate and energy packages are policy instruments 
that promote the decarbonisation of the energy system through incentivising emissions 
reduction, increasing energy efficiency and increased deployment of renewables.  Higher levels 
of variable renewable electricity (RES-E) can pose challenges for power system operation as 
they produce non-synchronous and non-dispatchable electricity (i.e. wind, solar, wave, tidal) 
(Schaber et al., 2012).  These challenges can be mitigated to a certain extend by interconnection 
to neighbouring systems (Booz & Co. et al., 2013; Denny et al., 2010).   Furthermore, as 
renewable generation grows, there is an increasing likelihood that RES-E may be exported to 
neighbouring countries during periods of excess power.  While the authors are cognisant that 
‘an electron is an electron’ no matter how it is generated, it is also recognised that RES-E 
targets in many regions do, in fact, differentiate between electrons – by source.  
EU Member States for example, must achieve renewable electricity targets based on “the 
quantity of electricity produced in a Member State from renewable energy sources” as a 
proportion of Gross Final Consumption (GFC),2 as stated in Article 5(3) of the Renewable 
Energy Directive (2009/28/EC) (European Commission, 2009a).  Applying a production-based 
approach is sensible in an isolated, closed system where electricity production must equal 
consumption; meaning all renewable electricity is consumed domestically.  However, 
interconnector transfers and planned increases in capacity3 are playing an increasingly 
 
 
2 The GFC of electricity is, for the purposes of RES-E calculations, defined as: “Gross electricity production from 
all energy sources (actual production, no normalisation for hydro and wind), excluding the production of 
electricity in pumped storage units from water that has previously been pumped uphill; plus total imports of 
electricity; minus total exports of electricity.” Eurostat (2015, p.10) 
3 Interconnection capacity targets for Member States are 10% and 15% of installed electricity production capacity 





important role in today’s European power system, i.e. making it easier to share renewable 
electricity surpluses and improving the operational control of a system.  Equally a patchwork 
of varying national support schemes for renewable generation has led to situations where 
renewables are built where support is the strongest, rather than where the most cost-effective.  
Consequently, transfers of renewable electricity across interconnectors can present situations 
where the costs of renewable electricity are subsidised in one country and consumed in another.  
This therefore begs the question whether a consumption-based accounting approach to 
quantifying renewable electricity, which considers these transfers, should be used? 
The Renewable Energy Directive already acknowledges that it is appropriate to facilitate the 
consumption of energy in one Member State which has been produced from renewable sources 
in another in order to meet defined targets in a cost-efficient manner.  The directive proposes 
flexibility measures in the form of statistical transfer and joint projects between Member States 
to facilitate this.  However, Member States have so far not engaged in these schemes with just 
two exceptions: Sweden and Norway (non-EU Member State); and Denmark and Germany 
(International Energy Agency, 2016b).  Uncoordinated financial support schemes have the 
potential to cause price distortions between neighbouring countries which can lead to electricity 
transfers that do not provide societal gain and potentially cause cost inequalities as RES-E 
supported in one country is consumed in another, raising questions around ‘who pays the 
difference between the market price and support scheme strike price?’  Viewing renewable 
generation from a consumption-based standpoint delivers a different perspective on the 
intricacies involved in electricity generation and transmission.  Identifying the movement of 
RES-E between countries opens ‘Pandora’s box’ in terms of accounting for RES-E shares, 
costs inequalities associated with transferred RES-E and potential price distortions, but it also 
sheds light on whether the current production-based approach is ‘fit for purpose’ in a future de-
carbonised electricity sector. 
In this chapter, a consumption-based approach for quantifying a country’s RES-E share is 
proposed and implications for renewable support schemes are discussed.  The methodology is 
based on the concept of measuring the RES-E that is physically consumed within a country’s 
boundary rather than what is produced.  Accounting for interconnector inflows and outflows is 
a fundamental part of the methodology that provides the key difference between this and a 
traditional ‘production-based’ approach.  The proposed consumption-based approach is 
demonstrated using the European internal market for electricity (hereafter; EU Target Model) 





consumption-based measurement of renewables is used for the transport and heating & cooling 
sectors. 
Using PLEXOS® Integrated Energy Model, a European electricity model for 2030 is created 
based on the recent European Commission’s Reference Scenario (Capros et al., 2016).  Once 
simulated, the results are post-processed to determine the country4 where RES-E is produced 
and more importantly, where it is consumed, on an hourly basis.  In doing so, issues associated 
with mass RES-E transfer across Europe are captured, such as uncoordinated support schemes, 
price distortions and cross-border subsidisation.  These insights allow an in-depth discussion 
on the challenges and the institutional structures that need to be addressed to achieve a low 
carbon power system. 
While many publications concentrate on topics such as the production-based versus 
consumption-based quantification question relating to embodied greenhouse gases in goods 
and services (Fan et al., 2016; Fowlie and Cullenward, 2018; Ji et al., 2016; Larsen and 
Hertwich, 2009; Peters, 2008; Shao et al., 2016; Simas et al., 2017; Wiedmann, 2009), the 
facilitation of RES-E in power systems (Cleary et al., 2016; Collins et al., 2017; Daly et al., 
2015; Deane et al., 2015b; EirGrid & SONI, 2010, 2011; Fraunhofer IWES, 2015; Gaffney et 
al., 2019b; Henriot et al., 2013; McGarrigle et al., 2013) and/or the importance of border trade 
(Bahar and Sauvage, 2013; Booz & Co. et al., 2013; Denny et al., 2010; EirGrid & SONI, 2010; 
EURELECTRIC, 2016; Fraunhofer IWES, 2015; International Energy Agency, 2016a) 
regarding their respective place in a future decarbonised electricity system, few publications 
focus on the quantification requirements when both RES-E integration and cross border trade 
are taken together. 
California’s carbon leakage issues bear similarity to those alluded to this chapter, where out-
of-state emissions are increasing due to cap-and-trade emissions scheme within state (Caron et 
al., 2012; Fowlie and Cullenward, 2018). The concept of resource shuffling caused by 
uncoordinated climate mitigation measures in California for example, is synonymous with the 
concerns expressed in this analysis.  Ji et al. (2016) also highlight concerns surrounding 
 
 
4 “Country” is preferred over “Member State” as not all countries in the model are part of the European Union, 





electricity traded between power systems and the characteristics associated with the transfer.  
Focusing on the greenhouse gas emissions aspect of traded electricity, Ji et al. (2016) outline a 
high-level proposal to account for both direct and in-direct emissions that widens the boundary 
under consideration when addressing the concern. This approach also aligns with that of 
California where imports were assigned an emissions factor depending on their source, or a 
default value if source was unknown (Fowlie and Cullenward, 2018).  
Building upon this concept of ‘broadening the boundary under consideration,’ we present a test 
case that highlights: 1) the short-comings of a production-based approach in interconnected 
systems with high levels of renewables; 2) challenges and potential solutions for the European 
internal market in 2030; and 3) concerns over pecuniary externalities caused by cross-border 
subsidisation and uncoordinated support schemes which can lead to issues surrounding effects 
on investment signals and long-term security of electricity supply problems.5 
The chapter is structured as follows.  Section 4.3 outlines the methodological approach and 
assumptions used during the analytical phase of the chapter.  Section 4.4 overviews the main 
results from the analysis, while Section 4.5 discusses various potential impacts associated with 
the proposal along with considerations related to its implementation.  Section 4.6 concludes 
the chapter with some final remarks. 
In an effort to promote transparency, the PLEXOS® model and the excel tool used to calculate 
renewable electricity flows, along with all associated data have been made freely available 
online for academic research here.   
 Methodology 
The methodology applied combines a soft-linking approach between energy system and power 
system models, as described by Deane et al. (2012), with a post-processing phase to ascertain 
the volume of RES-E that is both produced and consumed in each country included in the 
 
 
5 Mechanisms such as uniform carbon pricing and locational marginal pricing (LMP) for example, can offer 
solutions to issues akin to those alluded to in this chapter. Uniform carbon pricing for instance, can help solve 
carbon leakage-type issues by addressing the geographical element which is central to the problem. LMP can 
evaluate market power, reduce transmission constraints, et cetera, all within a single price setting region. However, 
with this specific concern, uniform carbon pricing is already in situ and LMP would not solve the concern alluded 





analysis.  First, the European Commission’s Reference Scenario is soft-linked to a power 
system model comprising of 30 European countries (EU-28 Member States,6 Norway and 
Switzerland) focusing on the year 2030.  Post-processing is carried out on an hourly basis, in 
line with the EU Target Model day-ahead market scheduling algorithm known as 
EUPHEMIA.7  This analytical phase will address the phenomenon known as ‘wheeling’, where 
electricity may be traded through one country to access another, based on wholesale market 
price differentials.  Through analysis of the data it is possible to separate the share of 
interconnector flows subject to ‘wheeling’ compared to that derived directly from the country 
in question.  
 Power system simulation 
PLEXOS® Integrated Energy Model (PLEXOS®) is a power system modelling platform used 
for power and gas market modelling (Drayton et al., 2004).  The software is a unit commitment 
and economic dispatch modelling tool that optimises at least cost the operation of the electricity 
system over the simulation period at high technical and temporal resolution whilst respecting 
operational constraints.  Version 7.4 (R02) of PLEXOS® was operated on a Dell Inspiron 
CN55905 laptop with a 6th Generation Intel® Core i7-6500U Processor.  The MOSEK solver 
was used to simulate the model with Rounded Relaxation unit commitment applying a 0.01% 
relative gap and 6-hour look-ahead8.  Using hourly dispatch, in line with the EU Target Model 
day-ahead market scheduling platform, 365 days were simulated to replicate 2030, taking 1.5 
hours to complete.  
 
 
6 At the time of writing, the United Kingdom remains a constituent of the European Union. 
7 Acronym: ‘EU Pan-European Hybrid Electricity Market Integration Model.’ For more information on the 
EUPHEMIA algorithm, see the developer (N-SIDE) or operator (EPEX Spot, 2016) 
8 A look-ahead period provides the user with a more optimal dispatch as decisions are made while taking into 
consideration system conditions ahead of time. In standard simulations, a 6- hour look-ahead is applied. This 
allows the dispatch decisions for one day, for example, to account for the demand/generation/interconnection 
conditions of the first 6 hours of the following day to be account for. This ability is particularly beneficial for the 
optimal operation of storage technologies where energy is stored today and used in the future. This aspect is 





 Scenario description 
The installed power generation capacities for the EU-28 Member States were outlined in the 
European Commission’s Reference Scenario by generation class, for example; Hydro, Oil, Gas, 
Solids, Biomass/Waste, et cetera.  The portfolios were disaggregated into individual power 
plant types by fuel class and assigned standard technical characteristics as shown in Table 4.1 
and Table 4.2 an approach used previously by Deane et al. (2015b).  Assumptions based on 
ENTSO-E (2015) Ten Year Network Development Plan – Vision 19  publication were used to 
represent the Swiss and Norwegian power systems. 
Table 4.1: The standardised generation characteristics applied. 
Fuel Type Capacity (MW) Start Cost (€/MW) Min Stable Factor (%) 
Biomass/waste 300 33.3 30 
Derived gas 150 80 40 
Geothermal heat 70 42.9 40 
Hydro (lakes) 150 0 0 
Hydro (run of river) 200 0 0 
Natural gas CCGT 450 177.8 40 
Natural gas OCGT 100 100 20 
Nuclear 1200 100 60 
Oil 400 187.5 40 
Solids 300 266.7 30 
 
Table 4.2: Fuel and carbon price assumptions 
Fuel Type / Carbon 2030 
Oil (€2010 per boe) €90 
Gas (€2010 per boe) €52 
Coal (€2010 per boe) €18 
Carbon - ETS (€2010 per Tonne) €40 
The model is simulated as a closed loop comprising of 30 European countries and 58 
interconnectors and overall regional generation must meet regional load in each hour simulated.  
Therefore, when all hourly interconnector flows (exports and imports) are summed, the result 
(net of interconnector transfer losses) must be zero, as shown in Eq. (1). 
 
 
9 Vision 1 was chosen over the other scenarios represented as it was the most conservative 2030 option and, 





0 = ∑ (𝐼𝐶𝑖)
58
𝑖=1   (1) 
where i represents interconnectors and IC is the flow of electricity on an interconnector. IC 
flow is positive for exports and negative for imports.  
Demand profiles: Hourly resolution demand curves were attained from historic ENTSO-E 
data (ENTSO-E, 2012) and linearly scaled to the overall demand estimates outlined in the 
European Commission’s Reference Scenario. 
Wind, solar and hydro profiles: Hourly generation profiles for wind power were sourced 
from Gonzalez-Aparicio et al. (2016).  Solar profiles were created from NREL’s PVWatts® 
calculator which estimated the solar radiance from assumptions around system location and 
basic system design parameters for each country (Dobos, 2013).  Hydro profiles are 
decomposed from monthly generation constraints provided by ENTSO-E (2012) to weekly and 
hourly profiles in the optimisation algorithm function in PLEXOS®. 
Pumped hydro energy storage is not simulated in this model for the reason being that it 
increases simulation time significantly but more importantly because under Article 5(3) of the 
Renewable Energy Directive “renewable energy sources shall be calculated as the quantity of 
electricity produced in a Member State from renewable energy sources, excluding the 
production of electricity in pumped storage units from water that has previously been pumped 
uphill.” (European Commission, 2009a, p.29). 
Interconnection: The interconnection capacities between countries represented in the model 
are based on projections from the ENTSO-E (2015) ‘Ten Year Network Development Plan 
2016’ publication, see Figure 4.1.10  Interconnection is limited to net transfers between 
countries and excludes interregional transfers in line with the EU day-ahead market schedule 
dispatch clearing algorithm, EUPHEMIA. Given that interconnection losses were included in 
the electricity demand profiles used already they were not represented as losses in the dispatch 
again but to account for their costs in terms of the economic dispatch, wheeling charges of 
€4/MWh were applied to the model for all interconnection lines. 
 
 






Figure 4.1: High-level view of interconnection capacity represented in the PLEXOS® model. Greece is also 
electrically connected to Cyprus. This interconnector is excluded from Figure 4.1 to maintain granularity around 
highest interconnection density areas. 
 Post-processing 
Post-processing is required to identify the RES-E flow across Europe’s interconnectors for each 
hour of a given year.  Due to the complexity associated with tracing wheeled exports to their 
source(s), this approach employs an iterative process to continually improve calculation 
accuracy until all RES-E transfer is accounted for.  The foundation of this approach lies with 
the identification of the true source(s) of wheeled exports in each hour.  Once known, the 
exported electricity is checked for any RES-E content.  While in most cases no RES-E exist, 
when it does however, it is possible to trace the energy to its point of consumption purely based 
on the economic dispatch of generation portfolios and the merit-order approach (Sáenz de 
Miera et al., 2008; Sensfuß et al., 2008). 
This approach functions on the assumption that all country-specific electricity markets within 





meet domestic load before any renewable exports can occur.  This is supported by the 
requirement under Article 16 of Renewable Energy Directive for transmission system operators 
to comply with their duty to minimise curtailment of renewable electricity and based on the 
knowledge that a high share of EU RES-E generation receive power purchase agreements 
through government backed support schemes, as demonstrated by RES Legal (2017).  
Therefore RES-E can bid in low, zero or negative bid prices to the energy market to reduce 
dispatch exposure.11  Furthermore, when RES-E flow has been identified as travelling between 
countries the same principal is used in the importing country in terms of economic dispatch.  
In other words, RES-E is only exported if the combined domestic RES-E and imported RES-E 
(if applicable) exceeds domestic load. 
 Components of interconnector flow 
In this methodological approach, electricity transferred via interconnection is considered a 
combination of two components.  The electricity is either a direct product of the country where 
the interconnector originates or an indirect product which is derived from another location and 
passes through one country to another, also referred to as ‘wheeling electricity’.  Henceforth 
the first is referred to as “Domestic Exports,” the second “Wheeled Exports.”  Domestic 
Exports (DE) occur when domestic generation exceeds domestic load, causing an export of 
electricity directly associated with the country in question.  Wheeled Exports (WE) are equal 
to interconnector flow net of Domestic Exports, see Eq. (2). 
𝐼𝐶𝑖 = ∑ (𝐷𝐸𝑖 + 𝑊𝐸𝑖 )
58
𝑖=1   (2) 
where, 
• DE = Domestic Generation – Domestic Load 




11 RES-E generation has the advantage of priority dispatch under the Renewable Energy Directive (2009/28/EC). 






• WE = Interconnector Flow 
where i represents interconnectors. 
 Calculating the RES-E share of interconnector flows 
To measure the RES-E share of Wheeled Exports across an interconnector, the true source of 
the electricity must first be determined by tracing interconnection flows back to their origin. In 
doing so, what is actually identified as the source of Wheeled Exports is the Domestic Exports 
of a country that is not importing electricity.  Therefore, to identify the source(s) of wheeled 
electricity in a given hour a country must export electricity and not import, as shown in Eq. (3).  
The RES-E share of electricity transfer is then assessed and if applicable, quantified using Eq. 
(4). Eq. (4) states that RES-E generation must first exceed domestic load for any renewable 
export to occur.  If RES-E export occurs, it is demonstrated as a percentage of domestic exports 
as shown in Eq. (4).  The percentage of RES-E flow in these domestic exports is assumed to 
be uniform across all exporting lines.  Finally, the results are tabulated to determine the RES-
E volume imported into each country in a given hour, thereby concluding Step 1 in what is an 
iterative process to ascertain the RES-E share of all interconnector flows.  
𝑇𝑟𝑢𝑒 =  ∑ (𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑗)
𝑛𝑗
𝑗=1
 > 0 & ∑ (𝐼𝑚𝑝𝑗)
𝑛𝑗
𝑗=1
 = 0 (3) 
𝑅𝐸𝑆_%𝑛𝑗 = (




• RES Genj - Dom Loadj > 0 
where j represents the country and 𝑛𝑗 is the total number of interconnections to country j.  Expj 
and Impj represents electricity exports and imports respectively from country j.  𝑅𝐸𝑆_%𝑛𝑗  is 
the renewable share of exports from country j across its total number of interconnections 𝑛𝑗. 
RES Genj and Dom Loadj represent renewable generation and domestic load respectively in 
country j. 
Figure 4.2 and the following explanation describes how each step in the post-processing phase 
relates to the next in terms of accounting for RES-E transfer across interconnector capacity.  In 
Step 1 the figure shows Country A as the only country to successfully meet the requirements 





exporting and not importing power, and 2) has total renewable electricity generation that 
exceeds its domestic consumption in the period considered.  Thus, it has domestic exports.  The 
renewable share of these domestic exports is determined as the proportion of renewable energy 
that is excess to demand divided by the total export on all country’s interconnector lines.  It has 
no wheeled exports because it is not importing on any of its interconnection lines which means 
that its total exports must equal its excess domestic generation.  As such, interconnector flow 
between countries ‘A – B’ and ‘A – S’ are represented by green unbroken lines to signify RES-
E flow in a given hour.  The main objective of Step 1 is to identify the sources of wheeled 
exports in each hour and assess what level of renewable energy is present, if any.  The following 
steps use this information as a foundation to trace the RES-E flows to their final location 
through multiple iterations. 
 
Figure 4.2: Illustrative example to explain the different steps undertaken. 
Step 2 sums the imported RES-E (from the sources as identified in the previous step) and the 
domestic RES-E in the country of focus to determine if renewable exports occur in a given 
hour.  This calculation must abide by the condition that RES-E generation fulfils domestic load 
before renewable exports are possible.  If under these conditions there are RES-E exports, the 
percentage RES-E flows on interconnector lines are then calculated for the period in 






𝑅𝐸𝑆 𝐺𝑒𝑛𝑗 + 𝑅𝐸𝑆 𝐼𝑚𝑝𝑗− 𝐷𝑜𝑚 𝐿𝑜𝑎𝑑𝑗
𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑗
)  (5) 
where, 
• RES Genj + RES Impj - Dom Loadj > 0 
where 𝑅𝐸𝑆_%𝑛𝑗  is the renewable share of exports from country j across its total number of 
interconnections 𝑛𝑗. RES Genj, RES Impj and Dom Loadj represent renewable generation, 
renewable imports and domestic load respectively in country j. 
To best illustrate Step 2 the central position of Figure 4.2 was developed. In this position, the 
transfer between countries ‘B – C’ and ‘S – B’ are recalculated to identify if the flows contain 
RES-E.  The figure shows the interconnection between ‘B – C’ in this step as a red broken line 
to indicate that no RES-E flow, therefore the combination of imported and domestic RES-E 
does not exceed domestic load in Country B.   
However, the RES-E flow between ‘B – C’ has not yet fully accounted for all RES-E flow up-
stream.  In Step 1, the interconnector from ‘S – B’ had no RES-E flow as imports from Country 
A were not yet accounted for in Country S.  In Step 2, this RES-E flow is accounted for and 
the interconnection between S – B is green – meaning the combination of imported and 
domestic RES-E exceeds domestic load and RES-E is exported.  However, the interconnector 
‘B – C’ has not yet taken account of this additional RES-E flow wheeled through Country S.  
This imprecision is corrected in Step 3 when the RES-E flow becomes fully accounted for 
across the interconnection ‘B – C’.  As a result, the interconnection changes to a green unbroken 
line which indicates RES-E flow - meaning that the combination of imported and domestic 
RES-E exceeds domestic load in Country B.  For this reason, this methodological approach 
employs an iterative approach to account for the numerous interconnector flows that occur in 
a meshed grid, such as the European electricity system represented in this chapter by 58 
interconnectors and 30 countries.  
Step 3-6: Steps 3-6 are identical to Step 2, with each using the table from the previous step to 
identify the RES-E volume of imported electricity, i.e. increasing accuracy with each step.  This 
methodology uses as many steps as necessary to account for all RES-E flows.  While 





were identical, therefore Step 5 was the final iteration.12  These values account for renewable 
electricity flows all the way back to their source and provide an insight into the locations where 
RES-E is consumed on an hourly basis for the year 2030.  
 Results 
 Wholesale electricity prices 
Figure 4.3 demonstrates wholesale price differentials with 26 countries inside ±10% of the 
€73.21 per MWh average.  Low price differentials are observed due to the increased level of 
interconnection capacity expected in 2030.  The Czech Republic has the highest wholesale 
price of any electrically interconnected country simulated, it also experiences the highest level 
of interconnector congestion (55%) over the year.  This congestion is caused by physical 
transmission capacity constraints and directly contributes to price formation as lower cost 
electricity from surrounding countries cannot be imported at a sufficient rate to further suppress 
the marginal price.  
 
 
12 The number of steps may change depending on a number of variables, such as installed renewable generation 






Figure 4.3: Wholesale electricity prices of the EU-28 and two non-EU countries; Norway and Switzerland. 
Due to the aggregated nature of the generation portfolio, Malta experiences a non-optimal dispatch which results 
in numerous hours of negative pricing. 
 RES-E interconnector flow 
The methodology outlined in Section 4.3.2 is applied to identify and also quantify the RES-E 
contribution of electricity transfer between countries on a high temporal resolution.  Figure 4.4, 





The figures outline the overall electricity flow and renewable electricity flow between countries 
along with the renewable share of the transferred electricity on an annualised basis. 
 












Figure 4.6: Interconnection activity between Norway, Denmark and the United Kingdom 
Figure 4.4, Figure 4.5 and Figure 4.6 highlight the unequal electricity transfer between a 
selection of countries over a year.  The figures also demonstrate the difference in RES-E share 
that is transferred over the same period.  However, it should be reiterated that both observations 
are contingent on assumptions surrounding generation portfolios and profiles used, demand 
curves, fuel costs, taxes, et cetera.  Figure 4.4 shows Portugal and Spain transferring a similar 
amount of total electricity back and forth over the year, yet 66% of exported electricity 
originating in Portugal is from renewable sources while only 2% of electricity returned is 
considered renewable.  Similarly, France exports high volumes of electricity to Spain but with 





nuclear power.  This can also be seen in Figure 4.5 where France is a net exporter to Germany 
but, again, with no RES-E share.  Figure 4.5 further highlights the issue regarding RES-E share 
of imports-exports when analysing the interconnections between Germany-Denmark and 
Germany-Poland where large differences between RES-E contributions are identified.  Figure 
4.6 is perhaps the most striking example to show the significance, where hydro based 
Norwegian power is exported to the Denmark and UK at 99% and 100% RES-E over the year 
respectively.  While Norway does not import significant quantities of electricity in the 
simulation, the volume that is imported has a much lower RES-E content.  Table 4.3 
demonstrates the net RES-E share transferred on each interconnector. Remaining cognisant of 
the conservative assumptions surrounding scenario selection, the analysis carried out as part of 
this chapter estimates that 60 TWh of renewable electricity is transferred across European 
interconnectors in 2030 or 19% of total cross-border flow. 
Table 4.3: Net renewable electricity flow transfer as a share of total electricity transfer. The table contains 
the electricity flows to and from the all island (AI) electricity system which consists of Ireland and Northern 
Ireland, along with Great Britain (GB). 
AI-GB AT-CZ AT-DE AT-HU AT-IT AT-SI BE-DE BE-FR BE-GB BE-LU 
46% 15% 12% 23% 25% 25% -10% 0% 0% -9% 
BE-NL BG-GR BG-RO CH-AT CH-DE CH-FR CH-IT CY-GR CZ-DE CZ-PL 
-1% -13% 0% -6% 6% 19% 24% 2% -2% 0% 
CZ-SK DE-DK DE-FR DE-LU DE-NL DE-PL DE-SE DK-GB DK-NL DK-NO 
0% -12% 10% 6% 10% 4% 9% 43% 37% -42% 
DK-SE EE-FI EE-LV ES-PT FI-SE FR-AI FR-ES FR-GB FR-IT FR-LU 
34% 0% -4% -64% 0% -18% -14% 0% -1% 0% 
GR-IT HU-HR HU-RO HU-SI HU-SK IT-SI LT-LV LT-PL LT-SE NL-GB 
20% -1% -1% -1% 0% -1% -3% 0% -1% 1% 
NO-DE NO-GB NO-NL NO-SE PL-SE PL-SK SI-HR    
79% 100% 98% 94% 0% 0% 0%    
 Country-specific renewable electricity shares 
Viewing renewable electricity in this alternative light opens ‘Pandora’s box’ in terms of 
accounting for the renewable electricity shares of each country.  Identifying where renewable 
electricity is produced, transferred to and finally, where it is consumed in high temporal 
resolution is an accurate means of assessing the share of the electricity sourced from renewable 
sources that is actually consumed within state.  Figure 4.7 compares RES-E shares of individual 
countries applying the current approach long used by the European Commission (RES-E 
production) to the alternative approach outlined in this chapter that accounts for renewable 






Figure 4.7: Comparing the RES-E share of 30 countries applying the traditional approach (RES-E 
production) and an alternative methodology proposed in this chapter (RES-E consumption). The simulation 
did not model generator “own use” or transmission and distribution losses, therefore Gross Final Consumption is 
unknown. In its place, the final electricity consumption is used to measure RES shares. For example, the RES-E 
Production is calculated using the renewable generation divided by the final electricity consumption of each 
country. RES-E Consumption uses the renewable generation plus renewable imports minus renewable export 
divided by final electricity consumption. It is recognised that this assumption is not aligned with the Renewable 
Energy Directive’s methodology, however it provides an insight into the relative difference between the two 
approach which is the main point of the figure. 
Using the approach outlined in this chapter, Figure 4.7 shows a higher number of countries 
with a different level of renewable electricity than what would otherwise be reported using the 
current production-based approach.  When wind generation is high in the Nordics and hydro-
power capacity in Norway is generating low-cost electricity, excess generation is exported out 
of the Nordic region.  While this electricity may be used elsewhere, it is still from a renewable 
energy source.  The same applies when solar capacity in the more southern, warmer parts of 
Europe is producing high levels of power and this is transferred to load centres across the wider 
region, and so on.  Applying the current approach used by the European Commission, while a 
simpler approach, does not account for this transfer.13  For example, Figure 4.7 demonstrates 
 
 
13 The authors recognise that ‘Statistical Transfers’ are allowed under the Renewable Energy Directive 
























































































that, when taken on an annualised basis, Norway has excess renewable electricity which is 
transferred to surrounding countries to meet their demand (if the correct price signals are in 
place.)14  The traditional approach to quantifying RES-E does not capture this transfer or where 
RES-E is consumed and therefore could be seen as a poorer approach in calculating RES-E for 
adjoining countries.  Denmark and Sweden are examples that show the inability of the 
traditional approach to account for the level of renewable energy actually consumed within 
state – which in both cases is higher than otherwise would be reported, as shown in Figure 4.7.  
For simplicity, measuring RES-E production is an easier option.  However, as electricity 
markets across Europe become more intrinsically linked and transition toward a complete EU-
wide internal market, the current approach may no longer be the correct strategy to capture 
where RES-E is consumed and importantly where it is paid for.  In Section 4.5 the case study 
results demonstrated thus far are expanded upon to discuss issues around cross-border 
subsidisation, price distortion and cost inequality. 
 Discussion 
Section 4.4 results demonstrate the difference between a consumption and production-based 
approach to quantifying RES-E in Europe.  This section examines several considerations and 
impacts associated with the findings and discusses the possible consequences. 
 What does a consumption-based approach offer? 
A consumption-based approach improves clarity, accuracy and awareness of where RES-E is 
produced and it is consumed.  The clarity of knowing where electricity is generated, how 
interconnector flows are determined and the effects of generation portfolios in neighbouring 
countries.  Improved accuracy through the accounting of imported renewable electricity 
generated outside of state boundaries yet consumed within, and the awareness of potential 
issues that can arise when the volume and scale of RES-E transfers across the region escalate.  
 
 
14 This assumption is supported by evidence available from Eurostat (2016) showing Norway producing 138 TWh 





A consumption-based approach also sheds light on issues of price distortion (caused by 
uncoordinated support schemes) and cross-border subsidisation (creating cost inequality). 
 Who pays the ‘true’ cost of transferred renewable electricity? 
The EU Target Model is designed to promote the free flow of electricity throughout Europe 
unaffected by network constraints or price distortions to achieve a price convergence across 
the region.  While Figure 4.3 shows the effects of this framework in terms of a relatively 
shallow price range, Figure 4.4, Figure 4.5 and Figure 4.6 reveal a different perspective on 
unconstrained electricity flow regarding renewable electricity transfer.  Acknowledging that 
significant volumes of RES-E capacity across Europe are supported outside of the energy 
market through support mechanisms, and yet interconnector flows are based on wholesale 
energy market prices, this creates a paradox.  As more RES-E capacity is installed, wholesale 
electricity prices reduce further due to the merit order effect, becoming more attractive to 
export at a price that is not truly reflective of the cost to generate the power being exported.  
Thereby leaving the country where the renewable electricity is produced to meet the 
stipulations of the support schemes in place, i.e. remunerate the RES-E capacity to the agreed 
terms and conditions while the energy is consumed outside of state borders. 
For instance, the simulation shows that the interconnection capacity from Denmark to Sweden 
exports (imports) approximately 1.8 (1.6) TWh over the year.  When Denmark exports to 
Sweden the electricity is 35% RES-E compared to 0.4% when flows reverse, as can be seen 
from Table 4.3.  Coupled with the examples shown in Figure 4.4, Figure 4.5 and Figure 4.6, 
this demonstrates that countries such as Denmark, Portugal, Norway and Germany for example 
are exposed to cost inequalities if 1) electricity is traded on interconnectors using its wholesale 
price (which it is and will continue to do so in line with the EU Target Model) and 2) RES-E 
capacity is supported outside of the energy market (which is currently the case in most 
European countries).  This longstanding concern around price distortion effects caused by 
pecuniary externalities is a well published topic, see (Buchan and Keay, 2016; Couture and 
Gagnon, 2010; Fouquet and Johansson, 2008; Glachant and Ruester, 2014; Gore et al., 2016; 
International Energy Agency, 2016a; Joskow, 2008a; Lehmann and Gawel, 2013; Meyer and 
Gore, 2015; Roques, 2008).  Nevertheless, with large volumes of RES-E capacity required to 
achieve the future goal of a decarbonised power sector, this challenge may be amplified and 
become a more widespread problem noting that this chapter demonstrates a conservative view 





Quantifying the financial implications for countries net-exporting RES-E is a challenging task 
as there has been little coordination between Member States when setting up RES-E support 
schemes across Europe over the years.15  Neighbouring countries may endure dissimilar levels 
of price distortion due to the differing support structures, remuneration levels and/or contract 
lengths.  Bearing in mind the current Member State specific RES-E targets for 2020, in simple 
terms this means if a country could not achieve the necessary uptake in RES-E capacity to meet 
national targets, the remuneration offered or scheme framework may be altered to increase its 
attractiveness through higher remuneration, longer contracts, or less risk-exposure.  Ireland for 
example, changed its RES-E support in 2007 from a competitive bidding process to a centrally 
administered price setting scheme to increase profitability for RES-E generation capacity.  
According to Global Wind Energy Council & International Renewable Energy Agency (2013), 
many projects awarded financial support through the competitive bidding process in Ireland 
had not been built due to “low bidding prices and lack of profitability” (p.100).16  In a similar 
vein to price distortions stemming from uncoordinated capacity mechanisms as discussed by 
Gaffney et al. (2019b); Glachant and Ruester (2014); Gore et al. (2016); Meyer and Gore 
(2015), uncoordinated RES-E support schemes may be viewed in the same light during the 
transition to a future regional market based on undistorted price signals.  However, equally as 
important is the need to implement a framework for remunerating renewable electricity 
transferred across boundaries that improves cost equality – paying the ‘true’ cost rather than 
market price. 
 How to address price distortion 
Viewing these concerns in the correct context is essential; meaning that the issue is borne out 
of a requirement for cross-boundary interactions, therefore the solution must also be viewed in 
the same geographical context.  Introducing a coordinated approach to RES-E support schemes 
 
 
15 While it must be recognised that the European Commission has used its “autonomous control power” regarding 
the policing of national state aids to shape support schemes in some way, as alluded to by Buchan and Keay (2016) 
and also having recently introduced a working document on guidance for the design of renewable support schemes 
(European Commission, 2013), it is recognised that support sharing and full coordination has not yet been 
achieved to date. 
16 For more information on the development of wind power in Ireland and the entire Irish electricity system 





through a European agency could provide the solidarity needed for cost equality to thrive, and 
thereby maximising societal welfare for all European electricity consumers.  An agency 
appointed to administer the renewable electricity affairs of the region that takes cognisance of 
individual economic, societal, technical and environmental conditions to create a level playing 
field, free of price distortion created by differing support structures.  This may not be an 
excessively unrealistic proposal, instead it could be recognised as a new, or an expansion of an 
existing, department within the Agency for the Cooperation of Energy Regulators (ACER) for 
example.  An agency which was created through the EU Third Energy Legislative Package 
(2009/72/EC) to ensure the smooth functioning of the internal energy market (European 
Commission, 2009b).17 
The chosen agency could also be responsible for accurately quantifying renewable electricity 
shares and remunerating producers from the country that consumed their electricity instead of 
where it has been produced – effectively socialising the cost of renewable electricity across 
state boundaries to improve cost equality during Europe’s transition to a decarbonised system.  
This approach could be seen as a reform or even an evolution of the ‘statistical transfers’ 
permitted between Member States in Article 6 of the Renewable Energy Directive and Article 
8 of the latest Renewable Energy Directive draft (European Commission, 2016c). 
Increasing the accuracy of cost distributions associated with the consumption of renewable 
electricity may also provide secondary gains.  Aside from reducing the level of revenue 
required to remunerate RES-E generation in an exporting country, this approach may lower the 
economic barriers surrounding the cost to consumers of developing higher levels of RES-E 
capacity.  If, for example, a country has the correct topography and climate for hydro-powered 
generation, then the cost as well as the benefit of this renewable energy source can be shared 
with neighbouring nations.  This may encourage further development in countries rich in 
potential renewable assets such as geothermal, solar, biomass, biogas, wave, tidal and wind 
energy by lowering the economic barriers which often add weight to institutional and 
organisational barriers as shown in publications by Byrnes et al. (2013); Foxon et al. (2005); 
 
 
17 This may be a timely suggestion as there is currently a proposal to strengthen ACER’s powers and 





Hvelplund et al. (2017); Lund et al. (2014); Lund and Quinlan (2014); Painuly (2001); Reddy 
and Painuly (2004); Scarpa and Willis (2010); Verbruggen et al. (2010).  
 Is there appetite for change? 
Buchan and Keay (2016) highlight that the European Commission “has twice tried, and twice 
failed, to persuade EU governments to adopt a harmonised EU-wide subsidy system.” (p.7).  
Therefore, an appetite appears to exist at EU level.  Furthermore, Article 5 of the latest 
Renewable Energy Directive draft the European Commission includes plans to open access for 
RES-E support schemes to installations located in other Member States (European 
Commission, 2016c).  However, legal conflicts such as the PreussenElekra case of 2001,18 or 
more recently the Ålands Vindkraft case in 2014,19 highlight the individual nature of EU 
Member States and the ‘parochial’ thinking that exists regarding environmental targets – albeit 
the very nature of individual targets encourages this behaviour.  
The issue is perhaps best epitomised by the Ålands Vindkraft case, where a windfarm situated 
in the Åland archipelago of Finland applied for a Swedish RES-E support scheme as it was 
directly connected to the Swedish system but not that of Finland.  The application was rejected 
on the grounds that it was unfair for Swedish consumers to remunerate a wind farm contributing 
to Finland’s RES target.  Once this occurred, the boundaries of environmental protection were 
clearly drawn by Sweden, even in the face of breaching European energy market law 
surrounding the free movement of goods, i.e. electricity.  While the European Court of Justice 
required justification from Sweden regarding the case, the ruling was in Sweden’s favour as 
the argument was successfully made that the Renewable Energy Directive does permit the 
trans-boundary RES-E support schemes but does not require it (European Commission, 2009a).  
Therefore, Sweden were found to have acted within the boundaries of EU law. 
Despite the European Court of Justice ruling, Durand and Keay (2014) believe that the Ålands 
Vindkraft case raises more questions than it answers regarding the relationship between 
environmental protection (and individual Member State targets) and its place within the 
 
 
18 For more information, see: http://curia.europa.eu/juris/liste.jsf?language=en&num=C-379/98  





European energy market law.  Durand and Keay (2014) highlight that other Member States 
have cited the Ålands Vindkraft case as a justification for discriminatory practices.  Germany 
for example, cited the case while attempting to introduce a surcharge on imported electricity 
through a new renewable energy law that would be used to finance domestic RES-E 
producers.20 
While it is the opinion of Buchan and Keay (2016) that cross-border subsidy sharing may be a 
bridge too far at the time of publication, it must be seen as progressive that Norway and Sweden 
introduced a joint support scheme that includes an international agreement between the 
countries to recognised ‘green energy’ produced in another jurisdiction,21 or that the German-
Danish cross-border solar photovoltaic electricity auction was launched in 2016 (International 
Energy Agency, 2016b), or indeed, when the European Commission included plans supporting 
(and requiring) subsidy sharing in Article 5 of the latest Renewable Energy Directive draft 
(European Commission, 2016c).  Remaining cognisant that the ‘green energy contributions’ 
conversation regarding joint, cross-border schemes will be ‘null and void’ post-2020 once 
national RES targets are relinquished for 2030, issues surrounding cross-border subsidisation 
of RES-E on a supranational scale will remain, and potentially increase due to heightened levels 
of both RES-E generation and installed interconnection capacity. 
 Considerations associated with a consumption-based alternative 
approach 
Complexity, complexity, complexity. This proposal ensures much of it.  Calculating the 
locations where renewable electricity is generated, how much is transferred, where it actually 
consumed, et cetera, is all involved work.  Nevertheless, the alternative is to continue to use a 
methodology which may not be fit for purpose.  Increasing the installed capacity of different 
renewable energies both in Europe and globally adds to the already multifaceted world of the 
electricity sector.  As the penetration of renewable energies increase, as does the need for 
 
 
20 For more information, see: http://www.reuters.com/article/eu-energy-idUSL6N0PE24C20140703 and 
http://curia.europa.eu/juris/liste.jsf?num=T-47/15  
21 The amount of ‘green energy’ contributed toward national RES targets would depend on the level of investment 





interconnection, support mechanisms, along with issues surrounding the ‘missing money’ 
problem, price distortions, and many more.  While this chapter does not provide the solutions 
to all these issues, it may be seen in a similar light to that published by Ji et al. (2016) as a 
‘thought-provoker’, one that tries to unearth a different way of thinking about the future 
electricity sector.  
Further research is necessary in numerous areas to add layers to this proposal.  For instance; 
the identification of regulatory and institutional barriers is essential for any movement towards 
a new approach for calculating RES-E shares and establishing a framework around the cost 
inequality issue, identifying how to best approach this redistribution of costs are two important 
areas of research. 
 Conclusion 
This chapter proposes an alternative approach for quantifying the RES-E share of individual 
countries based on the volume consumed rather than produced to address potential 
inadequacies associated with the modern-day approach.  As global power sector portfolios are 
undergoing a technology transformation to achieve carbon-neutrality over the long-term, 
renewable generation is fundamental to the cause along with high levels of interconnection to 
help facilitate the transition and remain as part of the enduring solution.  
While increased interconnection capacity adds to the operational aspect of system control as 
non-synchronous RES-E can be safely and securely managed without curtailment being the 
first option, it also exacerbates an underlying issue with price distortions stemming from out-
of-market financial support schemes that can decrease wholesale market prices. A paradox 
exists: as renewable generation (receiving out-of-market support) increases, wholesale 
electricity prices decrease, becoming more attractive to export at a price that is not truly 
reflective of the cost to generate that power.  Consequently, this price distortion creates a cost 
inequality as consumers are left to remunerate the renewable electricity producer while the 
energy is consumed out of state.  Using the EU Target Model as a case study, this chapter 
provides an awareness to the potential volume and scale of the issue in a sector aiming for long-
term de-carbonisation.  The chapter shows that even in a conservative 2030 scenario that 
significant volumes of renewable electricity is likely to be transferred on annual basis.  This 





applicable to any region with a similar nexus between renewable electricity generation and 
interconnection to surrounding systems. 
This chapter suggests that tackling price distortions associated with renewable generation 
support mechanisms may be best approached from a supranational perspective.  An agency, 
such as ACER within the EU, could provide the solidarity needed for cost equality to thrive, 
thereby maximising societal welfare for all electricity consumers in the region.  Appointed to 
administer the renewable electricity affairs of a region, this agency should take cognisance of 
individual economic, societal, technical and environmental conditions to create a level playing 
field, free of price distortion created by differing support structures.  An agency responsible for 
accurately quantifying renewable electricity shares and remunerating producers from the 
country that consumed their electricity instead of where it has been produced – effectively 
socialising the cost of renewable electricity across state boundaries to improve cost equalities 
during the transition to a decarbonised system.  
Increasing the accuracy of cost distributions associated with the consumption of renewable 
electricity may also provide secondary gains.  Aside from reducing the level of revenue 
required to remunerate RES-E generation in an exporting country, this approach may lower the 
economic barriers surrounding the cost to consumers of developing higher levels of RES-E 
capacity.  If, for example, a country has the correct topography and climate for hydro-powered 
generation, then the cost as well as the benefit of this renewable energy source can be shared 
with neighbouring nations – aligning with aspects present in the Renewable Energy Directive 
around subsidy sharing, joint projects and statistical transfers, improving investment signals 
and issues surrounding long-term security of electricity supply.  
The complexity associated with quantifying RES-E based on the proposed approach will be 
significantly higher than the status quo.  The alternative is to continue to use, what may be 
perceived as an increasingly inaccurate methodology.  Measuring RES-E by production may 
be viewed as a ‘quick and easy’ approach, however as electricity markets worldwide become 
more intrinsically linked and transition toward a de-carbonised sector with high renewable 








Emerging literature highlights the essential role played by decarbonised electricity generation 
in future energy systems consistent with the Paris climate agreement. This analysis compares 
the impacts of high levels of renewable electricity and negative emissions technologies on 
exploratory visions of the future EU power system in 2050 in terms of emissions reduction, 
technical operation and total system costs. We show that high renewable power system 
scenarios coupled with low levels of negative emissions technological such as biomass carbon 
capture and storage (approximately 2% of installed capacity) could deliver negative emissions 
for the Europe power system without breaching published sustainable biomass potentials in 
Europe (or requiring imports) or geological storage potentials. Direct air capture increases this 
further but with associated higher costs. While carbon capture and storage and bioenergy 
carbon capture and storage must overcome market, regulatory and social acceptance 
challenges, given their potential benefits to emissions reduction and system operation their role 
in a future power system should be further explored.1 
Keywords: Negative emissions; Direct air capture; Carbon capture and storage; European 





1 Submitted for review as: Gaffney, F., Deane, J., Drayton, G., Glynn, J. & Gallachóir, B. Ó. Comparing negative 






Decarbonising electricity generation is a key element in achieving the Paris climate agreement 
(UNFCCC, 2015) for limiting average global temperature rise to ‘well below 2ºC’ above pre-
industrial levels. Multiple analyses involving varied levels of effort, technological development 
and policy support have explored the roles of high levels of renewable electricity, low carbon 
nuclear power, increased energy efficiency, and carbon capture and storage (CCS) on power 
system decarbonisation in Europe (Capros et al., 2013; Capros et al., 2016; European Climate 
Fund, 2010; European Commission, 2011; International Energy Agency, 2017b; International 
Energy Agency. Office of Energy Technology, 2006; IPCC, 2014; Krey and Clarke, 2011). 
However, the ratification of the Paris agreement demands a radical decarbonisation of the 
energy system (Glynn et al., 2018) and may require certain sectors within the economy to 
achieve net negative emissions (Grubler et al., 2018; Kriegler et al., 2018; Rogelj et al., 2018; 
Rogelj et al., 2015; Strefler et al., 2018; van Vuuren et al., 2018). Furthermore, a recent report 
by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change highlights the importance of carbon dioxide 
removal and net negative emissions to achieving the goals of the Paris climate agreement 
(IPCC, 2018). Combining bioenergy with carbon capture and storage technology (BECCS) 
and/or the use of direct air capture (DAC) offers the prospect of electricity supply with large-
scale net negative emissions (Chen and Tavoni, 2013; Marcucci et al., 2017). There are 
challenges and risks associated with both CCS and DAC technologies, such as the availability 
and provision of the biomass required for BECCS, the storage of CO2 and the financing of such 
plants (Davis et al., 2018; Kapetaki and Scowcroft, 2017).  
Much analysis has been undertaken on understanding high variable renewable futures (Clack 
et al., 2017; Collins et al., 2017; Deane et al., 2015a; Esteban et al., 2018; Gaffney et al., 2018; 
Gils et al., 2017; Heard et al., 2017; Heuberger and Mac Dowell, 2018; IRENA, 2016; Jacobson 
et al., 2017; Jacobson et al., 2015; Jacobson et al., 2018; Liu et al., 2018; Maïzi et al., 2018; 
Pietzcker et al., 2017; Pleßmann and Blechinger, 2017; Rogelj et al., 2018; Song et al., 2018) 
using cost optimal capacity expansion models and unit commitment and economic dispatch 
(UCED) models (Brown et al., 2018b; De Sisternes et al., 2016; Després et al., 2017; Heuberger 
et al., 2017a; Heuberger et al., 2017b; Schlachtberger et al., 2018; Schlachtberger et al., 2017; 
Sepulveda et al., 2018), less analysis has been undertaken in comparing with negative emission 
power system scenarios. The use of cost optimal long term expansion tools to develop scenarios 





Trutnevyte (2016) shows that cost optimization may not approximate the real-world transition 
while near-optimal scenarios can encapsulate the real-world transition. Here we use three near-
optimal scenarios to examine and compare ‘negative emissions’ and ‘high renewables’ 
scenarios, in what may be described as a discrete scenario analysis for the year 2050. 
In this chapter we use a power system model with high temporal and technical resolution to 
investigate decarbonisation scenarios in terms of emissions reduction, technical operation and 
system costs. The analysis compares a power system with high levels of variable generation to 
one with negative emissions technologies (NETs), i.e. BECCS and/or DAC. These exploratory 
scenarios, with varying portfolios, meet the same electricity demand and use the same fuel 
price assumptions. This allows for direct comparative analysis and are not proposed to be 
optimal portfolios. Furthermore, this analysis limits the bioenergy resource availability (Ruiz 
et al., 2015) and geological storage potential of CO2 (Dooley, 2013; Lewis et al., 2009; 
Vangkilde-Pedersen et al., 2009) to within published potentials for Europe.  
In an effort to promote transparency, the PLEXOS® model with all associated data is freely 
available online for academic research here.  
 Methodology  
 Analytical approach 
We simulate a future pan-European electricity system containing 30 European countries (EU-
27 plus the United Kingdom, Switzerland and Norway) at 5-minute resolution using 
PLEXOS® Integrated Energy Modelling software (Energy Exemplar); a unit commitment and 
economic dispatch modelling tool that optimises, at least cost, the technical operation of a 
system while respecting operational constraints. Exploratory scenarios for 2050 are developed 
based on technology, cost and demand projections from three sources: 1) the European 
Commission’s ‘EU Reference Scenario 2016’ (Capros et al., 2016) report in particular the 
Reference scenario; 2) the European Commission’s ‘Energy Roadmap 2050’ (European 
Commission, 2011) report, specially the Low Carbon scenario and; 3) the International Energy 
Agency’s ‘Energy Technology Perspectives 2017’ report (International Energy Agency, 
2017b), specifically the Beyond 2ºC scenario. Hereafter, the scenarios are referred to as 





The Reference scenario acts as a benchmark for current policy and market trends in the 
European Union (EU) and as such, can help inform future policy making (Capros et al., 2016). 
Assuming binding greenhouse gas (GHG) and RES 2020 targets are achieved along with the 
successful implementation of supranational energy and climate policies adopted before 
December 2014, the Reference scenario projects the EU energy system, transport and GHG 
emissions developments to 2050. The Energy Roadmap 2050 report outlines several scenarios 
aiming to reduce GHG emissions by 85-90%, when compared to 1990 levels, by 2050. 
Attempting to discover a balance between decarbonisation, security of supply and 
competitiveness risks with economic, technical and market forces, the Energy Roadmap 2050 
High RES scenario provides the basis for the High VRE scenario in this analysis. While also 
aiming to decarbonise, the IEA’s ETP 2017 report provides a different perspective from that 
of the European Commission (EC) on the future European power system. The ETP report 
includes two scenarios associated with limiting the global temperature rise to 2ºC. One of 
which, results in a carbon negative power system (Beyond 2ºC Scenario) and hence is the basis 
for the Negative Emissions scenario in this analysis. An overview of the scenarios for the target 






Scenarios Fossil Fuel Generation with CCS Negative Emission Technology Enabling Technology Variable Generation 







REF X X           
REF – No CCS         
REF – DAC X X   X     
High VRE 
H-VRE X X     X X X X 
H-VRE – No CCS     X X X X 
H-VRE – DAC X X   X X X X X 
Negative Emissions 
NE     X      X   
NE – No CCS       X  
NE – DAC     X X    X   
Figure 5.1: Scenario overview for the EU-27 plus the United Kingdom.  a, b, c, Represent the installed generation capacity in the Reference, High VRE and Negative 
Emissions scenarios respectively. The patterned areas associated with Biomass, Natural Gas and Coal indicate their respective CCS capacities. The patterned area associated 
with Solar & Other RE represents the Other RE within the stack, while the patterned area in the Wind stack represents Offshore Wind. Solar includes both Photovoltaic (PV) 
and Concentrated Solar Power (CSP). d, presents an overview of the variants associated with the three main scenarios analysed in this chapter. Country-specific details of all 
installed generation capacities are available in Appendix B. Variable renewable capacity includes Onshore and Offshore Wind, Solar PV and Other RE (e.g. Ocean). Inputs and 
results will be shown throughout this chapter for the EU-27 plus the United Kingdom to align with the original sources of the scenarios. The Reference scenario demand 








































Electricity demand: 4063 TWh
Interconnection capacity: 111 GW
Variable renewable capacity: 655 GW
Total installed capacity: 1286 GW
High VRE Scenario
Electricity demand: 4063 TWh
Interconnection capacity: 156 GW
Variable renewable capacity: 1371 GW
Total installed capacity: 2003 GW
Negative Emissions Scenario
Electricity demand: 4063 TWh
Interconnection capacity: 111 GW
Variable renewable capacity: 896 GW







 Scenarios in focus 
While differing mainly in magnitude, overall system conditions in the High VRE and Negative 
Emissions scenarios have several similarities regarding the future power system. Both assume 
carbon capture technology and nuclear power will play a role in the future system, as will 
natural gas-fired generation. Scenarios differ with respect to VRE, specifically the amounts of 
wind and solar power. In the year 2050, VRE accounts for 56% of overall generation capacity 
in the Negative Emissions scenario compared to 68% in the High VRE scenario. Power-to-gas 
(PtG) plays an enabling role in variable renewable electricity integration in the High VRE 
scenario and is sized to alleviate any issues related to VRE curtailment. Mitigation scenarios 
also differ in terms of the primary fuel source that carbon capture technology is associated with. 
The Negative Emissions scenario for example, applies CCS to bioenergy generation capacity 
only, in contrast to the High VRE scenario which assumes natural gas- and coal-fired 
generation capacity alone utilise carbon capture and storage technology. Sensitivity analyses 
are carried out on several aspects of the mitigation scenarios, including complete removal of 
CCS, to achieve a greater understanding of their respective effects on overall power system 
decarbonisation, technical operation and total system costs. Regional bioenergy resource 
potentials restricts the amount of woody biomass available to 5.2 EJ (Ruiz et al., 2015) (median 
estimate, equates to 2-5% of the estimated total sustainable bioenergy potential globally (Smith 
et al., 2016)) and no imports are assumed outside of the European Union.  
This compares to a value of 2.3 EJ (Capros et al., 2016) used for power generation in 2015. 
This analysis does not consider any indirect land use change impacts or direct impacts. Limiting 
the regional biofuel resource potential did not result in a binding constraint in any scenario. 
Across the three core scenarios, 53-69% of the potential was consumed however competition 
for this resource from areas outside of power system is not considered. Equally the transport 
and storage of captured carbon is limited in some countries, such as Austria, Cyprus, Estonia, 
Finland, Malta, Portugal, Sweden where geological capacity for storage is negligible (Dooley, 
2013; Lewis et al., 2009; Vangkilde-Pedersen et al., 2009), consequently in this chapter, CCS 
capacity is not introduced in these Member States. Country-specific volumetric CO2 storage 
constraints sourced from Vangkilde-Pedersen et al. (2009) and Lewis et al. (2009) were 
included in the analysis. This did not result in a binding constraint in any scenario. For context; 





tonnes compared to estimates of 117-360 billion tonnes of storage by Vangkilde-Pedersen et 
al. (2009).  
Direct air capture (DAC) technology is also considered. While not initially incorporated into 
any of the three core scenarios, the technology is introduced as a ‘further step to 
decarbonisation’ across all scenarios. Designed to extract carbon dioxide directly from the 
atmosphere, DAC is introduced to evaluate the effects on systems with different CO2 intensities 
(Keith et al., 2018; Smith et al., 2016; Socolow et al., 2011). In the analysis, DAC capacity is 
limited to consume 1% of electricity demand in each individual country over the year. Further 
details are available in Appendix B. Although this is an arbitrary limitation, it does provide 
insights into both the carbon production increase associated with power generation and the 
carbon captured through the process. It is assumed that DAC operates using electricity and 
natural gas in unison, as per Keith et al. (2018). 
 Model simulation 
Using PLEXOS® Integrated Energy Modelling software (PLEXOS®), technical 
characteristics associated with thermal generation capacity, such as ramp rates or minimum 
generation levels for example, are all binding while an optimised dispatch of thermal, 
renewable and storage capacity is created (Deane et al., 2017; Deane et al., 2014; Drayton et 
al., 2004; Welsch et al., 2014). The software is transparent with all equations used in the 
optimisation available in the form of LP files in each simulation. In this analysis PLEXOS® is 
used to assess the technical feasibility of each scenario in addition to the level of 
decarbonisation achieved across the region within scope.  
While the input data such as wind, solar and demand is hourly in nature, PLEXOS® linearly 
upscales the data to 5-minute resolution. Sub-hourly temporal resolution offers the added 
benefit of examining the technical ability of generation portfolios to achieve different levels of 
power output in short temporal timeframes as shown by Deane et al. (2014). For example, there 
is a higher likelihood ramp rates and other technical aspects of thermal generation will bind at 
5-minute resolution compared hourly dispatch. Deane et al. (2014) show that increasing 






 Input Data 
The EC (Capros et al., 2016; European Commission, 2011) and IEA (International Energy 
Agency, 2017b) reports provide information on generation portfolios, electricity demand and 
observed trends on a supranational and/or national scale, where possible. ENTSO-E (2018b) 
and Delucchi et al. (2016) provided guidance on VRE installed capacities on a country level 
for the mitigation scenarios while all other capacities were scaled from the counterfactual. 
Applying this information facilitated our need to accurately replicate conditions assumed in 
each report. Calculating the average capacity factor of hydro, nuclear, or biomass for example, 
allows us to implement constraints in the model to achieve high correlation to each source. As 
the only two non-EU Member States when these reports were published, no data was available 
for Switzerland or Norway from the listed sources, thereby power system data was created 
using the best data available for each country (Albrecht, 2013; Albrecht et al., 2012; Delucchi 
et al., 2016; ENTSO-E, 2016c, 2018b; Swiss Federal Office of Energy, 2017). See Appendix 
B for more details. 
Generation capacities are categorised by class, e.g. hydro, oil, gas, solids, biomass/waste, et 
cetera. Portfolios are disaggregated into individual power plant types by fuel class and assigned 
standard technical characteristics as shown in Table 5.1, an approach previously used by 
Gaffney et al. (2018). Thermal generation efficiencies are aligned with International Energy 
Agency (2017b). Hourly generation profiles for wind power and solar photovoltaic were 
obtained from Gonzalez-Aparicio et al. (2016) and Pfenninger and Staffell (2016a) respectively 
for each country. Concentrated solar power with thermal storage was modelled using an 
approach outlined by (Denholm and Hummon, 2012; Denholm and Mehos, 2014; Denholm et 
al., 2013) with a 9-hour storage capacity aligning with the latest installations (National 
Renewable Energy Laboratory, 2017) and a 60% flat heat rate(Denholm et al., 2013). A solar 
multiplier of 2 was used, which as the literature (Denholm et al., 2013; National Renewable 
Energy Laboratory, 2017) explains is the ratio between the solar field and the power block 
output. A 20% start-up loss and minimum stable level set at 40% of max generation, as 
recommended by Denholm et al. (2013), were included. Other RE was assumed to be primarily 
ocean energy. Generation profiles and installed capacity distribution among European 
countries was carried out in alignment with Jacobson et al. (2018). Individual hydro profiles 
were decomposed from monthly generation constraints from ENTSO-E (ENTSO-E, 2012) to 
weekly and hourly profiles in the optimisation algorithm function within PLEXOS®. Pumped 





publication (International Energy Agency) with 9 hours of hydro storage assumed. CCS was 
modelled using the in-build functionality in PLEXOS® software to represent the technology – 
90% capture rate is assumed. To represent BECCS assumptions from the ‘2006 IPCC 
Guidelines for National Greenhouse Gas Inventories’ (Gómez et al., 2006) publication 
regarding the biogenic carbon content of biomass (100gCO2 kWh
-1 (Anderson and Peters, 
2016; Gómez et al., 2006)) are applied with a 90% capture rate applied to assess the amount of 
CO2 capture from the process which can offset emissions from other technologies. Generation 
capacity associated with CCS technology received priority dispatch over thermal power 
generation capacity. Details of the standardised generation characteristics are outlined in Table 
5.1.  
Table 5.1: The standardised generation characteristics applied for all 30 countries. Biomass/waste assumes 
biomass integrated gasification combined cycle (BIGCC) technology is in place, aligning with International Energy Agency 
(2017b) assumptions. * DAC installed capacity varies as it is based on consumed 1 % of country-specific demand. ** Power-
to-gas installed capacity varies by country based on each country’s level of VRES, i.e. level of low-cost power. See Appendix 
B for further details. *** Power-to-gas efficiency combines the process of converting power-to-gas in the first stage and then 











Biomass/waste 300 33.3 30 5 
51% (43% - 
CCS)(International 
Energy Agency, 2017b) 
Geothermal heat 70 42.9 40 5 - 
Hydro (lakes) 150 0 0 10 - 
Hydro (run of 
river) 
200 0 0 10 - 
Natural gas CCGT 450 177.8 40 20 
62% (54% - 
CCS)(International 
Energy Agency, 2017b) 
Natural gas OCGT 100 100 20 50 
40%(International 
Energy Agency, 2017b) 
Nuclear 1200 100 60 5 - 
Oil 400 187.5 40 5 
45%(International 
Energy Agency, 2017b) 
Solids 300 266.7 30 5 
48% (41% - 
CCS)(International 
Energy Agency, 2017b) 
Pumped hydro 200 0 0 30 
80%(Jacobson et al., 
2018) 
Demand response 200 0 0 30 90% 




N/A N/A N/A 36%*** 
Hourly resolution demand curves were attained from 30-year Member States level historic data 
from the EC’s Joint Research Centre and linearly scaled to the overall demand estimates used 
for each scenario (European Commission, 2017b). In the mitigation scenarios it is assumed that 
demand-side management capabilities for each Member State sized at 5% of peak demand with 





Climate Foundation (European Climate Fund, 2010) which investigated capabilities of up to 
20%. Power-to-gas is included in the High RES scenario to increase the level of storage in a 
system with significant levels of variable generation (Gahleitner, 2013; Götz et al., 2016; 
Jentsch et al., 2014; McKenna et al., 2018; Schiebahn et al., 2015). The process, outlined in the 
Energy Roadmap 2050(European Commission, 2011), converts excess power into hydrogen 
which is mixed, at max 30%, with natural gas which is converted back into power through 
natural gas thermal generation capacity. The ETS carbon price is not applicable to the share of 
natural gas derived from power-to-gas. Power-to-gas is included in PLEXOS® as a demand 
that purchases low cost power which is converted into gas assuming a conversion efficiency of 
60%. The balance between the volume of power purchased and the amount converted back into 
power at max 30% dilution with natural gas is maintained through post-processing, i.e. multiple 
simulations and calibration. DAC is included in variant scenarios to assess the technologies 
overall impact if adopted. It is assumed DAC captures 2.73 tCO2 MWh
-1 (Socolow et al., 2011) 
with a capacity factor of 90%. The latter has a bearing on the installed capacity assumptions 
and therefore the CAPEX calculations. Energy requirements for each tonne of CO2 capture 
from the atmosphere are 0.366 kWh of electricity and 5.25 GJ of natural gas. The fuel and ETS 
carbon costs related to the natural gas used with DAC are accounted for in the total system 
costs calculations.  
ENTSO-E’s ‘Ten Year Network Development Plan’(ENTSO-E, 2016c) provided the basis for 
transmission capacity assumptions between countries. The High RES scenario deviates away 
from this assumption as per Attachment 2, Energy Roadmap 2050 part 2 (European 
Commission, 2011). Interconnection is limited to net transfers between countries and excludes 
interregional transfers in line with the EU day-ahead market schedule dispatch clearing 
algorithm, EUPHEMIA (EPEX Spot, 2016; N-SIDE). Malta is the only electrically isolated 
country modelled. See Appendix B for more details. 
Coal, oil, natural gas and biomass prices remain consistent across all scenarios at €24, €109, 
€65 (Capros et al., 2016) and €31 (Ruiz et al., 2015) per barrel of oil equivalent respectively 
(€2015). Biomass price is based on the average assumed for dedicated perennial biomass crops, 
forest products and primary forest residues from Tables 11 & 14, Ruiz et al. (2015). Emissions 
Trading Scheme carbon price is assumed €88 per tonne in the Reference scenario and €264 per 
tonne in the Negative Emissions and High RES scenarios, aligning with assumptions made by 
the European Commission (Capros et al., 2016). To contain the level at which Norwegian hydro 





Europe, the annual capacity factor for hydro was restricted to 50% of its potential generation 
capacity which is based on observed system trends over recent years (ENTSO-E, 2016a, 2017b; 
Eurostat, 2016; Swiss Federal Office of Energy, 2017).  
 Total system cost assessment 
Total system costs are calculated using data from multiple sources (Capros et al., 2016; 
Carlsson, 2014; ENEA Consulting, 2016; Grosse R et al., 2017; McDonagh et al., 2018; Rubin 
et al., 2005; Tsiropoulos et al., 2017). Technical lifetime, capital expenditures, fixed and 
variable operation and maintenance costs were all taken from the listed sources using the 
central option where possible, see Table 5.2 for specifics. This analysis aligns with its use of 
the term ‘total system costs’ with that of the European Commission (2014b), meaning that 
carbon-related costs are not accounted for in the calculation since they are not seen as an “extra 
cost” from a societal perspective. Total system costs are annualised, undiscounted costs (i.e. 
no interest rates applied) where the CAPEX is spread over the technical lifetime of the 
technology with variable costs also included. 50% of transmission capacity between the EU-
27 plus the United Kingdom connected to Norway and Switzerland is accounted for in cost 
calculations, representing bilateral arrangements in place to build and maintain 
interconnection. 
Table 5.2: Cost assessment assumptions for the various aspects to be considered (€2015). References: [1] 
(Tsiropoulos et al., 2017), [2] (Grosse R et al., 2017), [3] (Carlsson, 2014), [4] (Keith et al., 2018), [5] (ENEA 
Consulting, 2016), [6] (McDonagh et al., 2018), [7] (Rubin et al., 2005). *VOM (€ per tCO2 captured). ** DAC 
CAPEX was reverse calculated from values used in Keith et al. (2018), i.e. CAPEX equalling $694mn per million tonnes of 












Biomass/Waste [1] 25 4,070 2   
Biomass-CCS [1] 25 5,800 2.3   
Geothermal heat [1] 30 6,030 2   
Hydro [1] 60 1,400 0.5   
Natural Gas [2] 30 1,000  4 5.00 
Natural Gas-CCS [1] 30 1,510 2.5   
Nuclear [3] 60 5,324 2   
Oil [2] 30 1,810  7 0.60 
Other RE [1] 20 3,675 4.45   
Solar PV [1] 25 560 2.5   
Solar CSP [1] 30 4,200 1.7   
Solids Fired [2] 35 2,200  6 5.00 
Solids Fired-CCS [1] 40 2,580 2.1   
Wind Onshore [1] 25 1,190 3   
Wind Offshore [1] 30 2,710 2   
PHES – Upgrade [3] 60 276  4 0 
Interconnection (€/km) [3] 60 452,070 3.5   
Direct Air Capture [4] 25 16,571**   21.28* 





Carbon Transport & Storage [7]     17.53* 
 Results and discussion 
 Operational conditions across different decarbonisation pathways 
Error! Reference source not found.(a) gives an overview of electricity generation by fuel 
share and projected VRE curtailment levels. The figure shows curtailment levels increasing 
with greater reliance on VRE generation, however one can also see the dependency on PtG 
technology to manage VRE curtailment in the High VRE scenario. Reducing VRE curtailment 
further through PtG is not addressed in this analysis. Error! Reference source not found.(a) 
shows dispatchable RE generation remaining between 22-24% across each scenario while low 
carbon generation (renewables plus nuclear power) exceeds 88% and 92% in the High VRE 
and Negative Emission scenarios respectively. Consequently, fossil fuel-fired generation 
decreases in the mitigation scenarios which reduces Europe’s fossil fuel import dependency, 
and therefore contributes to increased security of supply for the region. Compared to the 
counterfactual (75%), the Negative Emission and High VRE scenarios consume 34% and 51% 
fossil fuels respectively.  
Error! Reference source not found.(b) shows thermal power plants experiencing reduced 
capacity factors in the mitigation scenarios when compared to the counterfactual. While we 
would expect unabated generation to decrease, Error! Reference source not found.(b) also 
shows that capacity factors for abated generation (Natural Gas-CCS and Coal-CCS) are 
relatively low, ranging between 44-47%, while BECCS is operates at full capacity in the 
mitigation scenarios. This analysis, by means of Error! Reference source not found.(b), 
shows that unabated generation (biomass, coal and natural gas) has a dispatched capacity factor 
from 18-35% depending on the mitigation scenario.  
Error! Reference source not found.(b) also alludes to another noteworthy point associated 
with system dispatch. The figure shows low capacity factors for dispatchable capacity in the 
High VRE scenario compared to the Negative Emissions scenario. This reduction in 
synchronous generation capacity impacts on a system’s kinetic energy level, otherwise known 
as inertia; a necessary element for maintaining secure, reliable power through frequency 
stability(Daly et al., 2015). Synchronous dispatchable generators such as nuclear, coal, natural 
gas and biomass that contain mass mechanical components whose rotation is synchronised with 





generating units synchronised in the power system, allowing the system to deal effectively with 
fast changes in frequency(ENTSO-E, 2016b). Batteries, demand response and fast frequency 
response technologies are, in theory, able to provide active power in very short (sub-second) 
timescales and can partially substitute for mechanical inertia (Vivid Economics and Imperial 
College London, 2018). Furthermore, the behaviour of large electricity system under very low 
levels of inertia, coupled with the volume of frequency response needed to stabilize a large 
power system are not well understood.  
 
Figure 5.2: Power generation characteristics for the EU-27 plus the United Kingdom. a, Represents the 
disaggregated total generation share and system-wide variable RE curtailment. b, Represents the capacity factor and 
availability for a selection of generation classes. Dispatchable RE accounts for biomass, hydro and solar CSP. Variable RE 
generation accounts for onshore and offshore wind, solar photovoltaic, geothermal and other RE. VRE curtailment (No PtG) 
in (a) is associated with the High VRE scenario only as others do not include power-to-gas technology. 
 Decarbonisation and the impact of NETs 
The gross CO2 production and CO2 capture for the main scenarios, with and without DAC, is 
shown in Figure 5.3(a). The figure contextualises the CO2 produced versus that which is 
captured through CCS, BECCS and/or DAC across the scenarios. The Negative Emissions 
scenario achieves a CO2 intensity of -7.5 kgCO2 MWh
-1 (31 million tonnes of CO2 (MtCO2) 
sequestered) compared to 21.5 kgCO2 MWh
-1 (92 MtCO2 emitted) for the High VRE 
alternative across the year. The figure shows a small increase in gross CO2 production 
associated with the inclusion of DAC when compared to the additional emissions captured 
from the technology. Furthermore, this analysis finds that the average ‘CO2 capture to CO2 
gross emissions’ ratio was 10:1 across the three scenarios. With respect to the role CCS 
technology plays in each scenario, Figure 5.3(a) demonstrates the level of decarbonisation for 
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scenario on negative emission technologies to achieve projected levels of decarbonisation. In 
summary, Figure 5.3(a) identifies 1) the system-wide CO2 intensity differential between 
scenarios, 2) the reliance of all three scenarios on CCS technology, specifically the switch with 
respect to CO2 intensity between the decarbonisation scenarios when no CCS is included (i.e. 
High VRE having a lower CO2 intensity) and 3) the potential CO2 intensity gains from 
including DAC. 
As a sensitivity on the High VRE scenario, the possibility of BECCS replacing Coal-CCS 
generation capacity in the portfolio is considered (referred to as ‘High VRE - BECCS’). From 
a decarbonisation perspective alone, our analysis shows that promoting BECCS over Coal-
CCS could potentially save an extra 74 MtCO2, yielding a further 17.4 kgCO2 MWh
-1 reduction 
in CO2 intensity, as shown in Figure 5.3(b). Further details are available in Appendix B. 
 
Figure 5.3: Gross CO2 production, CO2 capture and CO2 intensity for the scenarios. a, Represent the main 
scenarios. b, Represents High VRE sensitivity regarding BECCS replacing Coal-CCS, for more details see Appendix B. The 
Gross CO2 Production w. DAC represents the additional carbon emissions produced due to increased demand from DAC. In 
alignment with technology assumptions from the IEA ETP 2017 publication(International Energy Agency, 2017b), BECCS 
sequesters 90ktCO2 GJ-1. For more details see Methods. 
The influence of DAC is best appreciated from viewing the CO2 intensities of each scenario in 
Figure 5.3. Assumed to capture 2.73 tCO2 MWh
-1 of input electricity(Keith et al., 2018), and 
recognising that the technology is best-optimised when powered by low carbon sources of 
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decarbonisation in the scenarios where the CO2 intensity is low to begin with, see Table 5.3
1. 
For a net-negative scenario the CO2 production increase can potentially be larger than the 
alternatives yet remain CO2 net-negative. Assigning captured emissions from DAC to a specific 
sector in the economy remains an open question – we assume here it is attributable to the power 
sector.  
Table 5.3: An overview of the energy requirements, gross CO2 production increase, captured CO2 and CO2 
intensities associated with using DAC for each of the main scenarios in 2050. System-wide CO2 intensity is shown 
without DAC first, then with DAC but excluding CO2 abatement from the technology because strictly speaking, it is not part 
of the power system. Finally, the CO2 intensity is illustrated with the abated emissions from DAC included. 
 REF – DAC 
H-VRE – 
DAC 
NE – DAC 
Electricity Requirement (TWh) 40.6 40.6 40.6 
Natural Gas Requirement (PJ) 583 583 583 
Gross CO2 Production Increase (Million tonnes) 15.1 .1    6.1 8.0 
CO2 Capture Increase (Million tonnes) 94.9 102.9 100.6 
CO2 Intensity without DAC (kgCO2 MWh-1) 112.3 21.5 -7.5 
CO2 Intensity with DAC, excl. CO2 Capture (kgCO2 MWh-1) 115.1 23.2 -4.9 
CO2 Intensity with DAC, incl. CO2 Capture (kgCO2 MWh-1) 88.1 -2.6 -32.0 
. 
 Total system costs and the effect of carbon-related costs 
This analysis aligns its use of the term ‘total system costs’ with that of the European 
Commission (2014b), meaning that carbon-related costs are not accounted for in the calculation 
since they are not seen as an “extra cost” from a societal perspective. Total system costs are 
shown as annualised, undiscounted costs where CAPEX is dispersed over the technical lifetime 
of the technology and variable costs are included. Carbon-related costs will be shown 
separately, as is the case in Figure 5.4(a). It must be noted that this analysis assumes issues 
highlighted by Zakkour et al. (2014) regarding current GHG emission frameworks not fully 
facilitating negative emissions technologies are resolved, thereby making negative emissions 
tradable to other carbon-intensive sectors that fall under the European ETS. In summary, Figure 
5.4(a) illustrates that 1) the High VRE scenario is more expensive in terms of total system costs 
 
 
1 This alludes to an important assumption in this analysis where DAC is a constant demand across the horizon. If 
the technology was assumed flexible it could have greater effect on lowering its carbon intensity further by 
utilising low carbon electricity generation which would have a positive effect on system operations, i.e. flexible 
dispatchable demand that can help facilitate high levels of variable generation. This analysis explores DAC as a 
possible means to further decarbonise the sector. Further, in depth, analysis would be needed to create a business 
case for DAC which would account for the benefits of incorporating flexibility into the operational strategy. This 





and also carbon-related costs that the Negative Emissions scenario and 2) the Negative 
Emission scenario is cost-comparable to the counterfactual scenario when viewed on total 
system costs alone. The second point is interesting as it is an unexpected outcome of this 
analysis. In summary, the economics show that while the Negative Emission scenario costs 
approximately €51 billion more in annualised CAPEX terms for the entire European power 
system, the operational cost savings are similar; primarily due to fuel cost savings. The fuel 
cost savings for both decarbonisation scenarios compared to the reference scenario is 
approximately €50 billion. 
When calculating an incremental cost that encapsulates the expense of generating electricity in 
each scenario, carbon-related costs are included since, in practice, these are passed directly to 
the consumer, see Figure 5.4(b). While excluding taxes/levies, the electricity costs shown in 
the figure are represented with and without carbon-related costs to isolate and illustrate the 
effect on the end-user. It is interesting to view the difference carbon-related costs make on the 
incremental cost of electricity for all the scenarios shown, along with the effect of including 
DAC technology to the core scenarios. To explore this further, Figure 5.4(c) reveals the change 
in total power system costs across the main scenarios when sensitivity analyses (±20%) are 
carried out on several cost elements of the power system. Of the categories under investigation, 
the analysis shows RE generation capacity CAPEX is the most sensitive to change, followed 






Figure 5.4: Disaggregated total system costs and electricity costs.  a, Represents disaggregated total system 
costs (top) and carbon-related costs (bottom). For further data on total system costs see Appendix C. b, Represents 
the electricity cost per MWh delivered to the consumer across the year. These costs are effectively the total power 
system costs plus carbon-related costs relative to power consumed without any discounting included. c, highlights 
total system cost change via error bars when applying a ±20% cost sensitivity on various aspects of the system. 
Error bars on “±20% Fuel & ETS Price” sensitivity reflects the largest change from biomass, natural gas and ETS 
price assumption sensitivities modelled individually. 
 Average abatement costs 
We do not calculate marginal CO2 abatement costs in our analysis but instead calculate the 
average CO2 abatement cost across the entire power system. Using the difference in total 
system costs and CO2 emissions compared to the baseline, the cost associated with reducing 
each tonne of CO2 released into the atmosphere, referred to here as average abatement cost, is 
calculated and presented in Figure 5.5(a). To expand on this concept of an average abatement 
costs using values from the analysis;  
• REF: total system costs equal €174.7bn, producing 456.3 million tCO2;  
• H-VRE: total system costs equal €217.5bn, producing 91.7 million tCO2; 





Therefore, the H-VRE scenario cost €42.8bn more than the REF to reduce emissions by 362 
million tCO2, equating to an incremental average abatement cost of €118/tCO2. The NE cost 
€0.5bn less than the REF to reduce emissions by 487 million tCO2, equating to an incremental 
average abatement cost of €-1/tCO2. In summary, for every tonne of CO2 not released in the 
Negative Emissions scenario there is a €1 total system cost saving compared to the baseline. 
Alternatively, Figure 5.5(b) demonstrates the findings in terms of CO2 emitted per million-euro 
total system cost expenditure. From a decarbonisation perspective one can see for every 
million-euro spent in the Negative Emissions scenario results in net-negative emissions, in 
contrast to both the Reference and High VRE scenarios. 
  
Figure 5.5: Average abatement cost for the mitigation scenarios (a) and carbon emissions released per 
€billion investment (b). 
 Conclusion 
This chapter shows that a High VRE scenario can achieve very high levels of decarbonisation 
(21 kgCO2 MWh
-1). We also show that a Negative Emissions scenario bound by regional 
biomass potentials and national CO2 storage potentials can achieve a power system-wide CO2 
intensity reduction relative to the baseline scenario while remaining cost-comparable. 
Furthermore, converting less than 2% of the EU’s installed generation capacity to BECCS 
consumes 69% of the projected available sustainable biomass while enabling the power system 
to achieve net-negative emissions (-7.5 kgCO2 MWh
-1).  
However, both technology readiness and technological choice play definitive roles in the 
results shown in this chapter. From a system decarbonisation perspective, we show that the 
state of readiness for CCS technology dictates whether the High VRE or Negative Emissions 





sensitivity, where BECCS replaced Coal-CCS capacity, the importance of technological choice 
was highlighted. In the High VRE scenario, the European Commission assumed that CCS 
technology would be an option in the year 2050 but do not associate the technology with 
biomass, instead opting for natural gas and coal. And finally, as a ‘further step to 
decarbonisation’, DAC technology was included to assess the potential benefits of the 
technology, even if readiness was an issue. It was found that an average CO2 capture to gross 
emissions ratio of 10:1 across the three main scenarios was achieved using DAC, therefore 
highlighting the potential for meaningful contributions to achieving a decarbonised power 
system (once captured CO2 is attributable to the power sector). The benefits of DAC shown 
here do not account for additional gains attributable to the technology being flexible and 
therefore only consuming electricity from low carbon sources. The concept of flexibility would 
also help facilitate more variable generation in a power system which would have operational 
benefits the system operator. 
Notwithstanding the potential benefits of the abovementioned, risk exposures exist in several 
areas for NETs. Technology risk regarding the reliance on CCS coupled with questions over 
commercial readiness and scalability; operational risk where high concentrations of variable 
generation diminish generator capacity factors, market participant risk with market prices 
reducing due to the overall shift in the cost of energy from operational costs to capital costs 
and finally; consumer risk with incremental electricity costs varying widely and therefore run 
the risk of heightening budgeting concerns for the consumer. 
The benefit of high temporal resolution dispatch modelling demonstrates that 1) abated 
generation such as coal and natural gas may not surpass 50% capacity factor in a High VRE 
scenario, 2) unabated biomass and natural gas generation endures capacity factors between 18-
35% and 3) unabated coal has no place in either decarbonisation scenario. In short, we 
demonstrate that there is a balance to be found between the level of dispatchable generation 
installed, how much can be dispatched due to the merit order effect with vast amounts of zero-
marginal cost generation, and what is needed to maintain a stable power system. While this 
analysis does not investigate the risks or challenges listed, we see this as the first step to a 
technically complete comparison of decarbonisation scenarios. Throughout this chapter we 
provide a view into the techno-economic aspect of optimally dispatched power systems under 
different decarbonisation pathways, highlighting concerns related to system operation (reduced 
capacity factors), economics (shrinking OPEX cost component of total system costs) and 








A recent study presented roadmaps for 139 countries delivering emissions reductions greater 
than required by the Paris climate agreement. The roadmaps are extremely ambitious and 
warrant significant scrutiny. Each roadmap proposes a near-100% electrification of all energy 
sectors (transportation, heating/cooling, industry, agriculture/forestry/fishing), in contrast to 
19% electrification in 2018. In addition, the electricity systems in these roadmaps are 100% 
based on wind, sun and water. This chapter assesses the technical feasibility the 100% 
renewable Europe roadmap, by testing the results with a European power system model. This 
chapter does not explore whether it is feasible to electrify all sectors, nor does it address the 
societal barriers associated with installing the required scale of generation and transmission 
capacities. The analysis does show however, via detailed power system simulations, that an 
electricity supply close to 100% based on wind, sun and water may be technically feasible in 
Europe if system adequacy and reliability concerns are addressed. Furthermore, the analysis 
finds that allowing low levels of dispatchable generation capacity in high renewable systems 
can improve system reliability, can lower both VRE and transmission capacity requirements 
and reduce associated system supply costs by 25% while delivering a carbon neutral energy 
system.1 
Keywords: WWS; 100% renewable energy systems; European power systems; Paris climate 
agreement; High renewable energy power systems. 
 
 
1 Submitted for review as: Gaffney, F., Deane, J., Daly, P., Pfenninger. S., Staffell. I., Ó Gallachóir, B. 2019. 
‘Reliably providing highly renewable 100% emissions-free electricity across Europe benefits from incorporating 






Several recent studies have examined 100% renewable energy systems at global or national 
levels, with divergent views on their feasibility (Brown et al., 2018a; Clack et al., 2017; Heard 
et al., 2017; Jacobson et al., 2018).  Due to the urgency of the climate action challenge, such 
studies receive substantial attention.  Public controversies such as that surrounding Jacobson 
et al. (2015) and Clack et al. (2017) divergent views regarding a fully decarbonised U.S. energy 
system highlight the importance of the input assumptions and the capability of models used to 
determine the feasibility of such scenarios.  Interestingly, energy research lags behind other 
scientific fields such as medicine or economics (Begley and Ellis, 2012; Downing, 2004) in 
moving to more open and reproducible science (Pfenninger, 2017; Pfenninger et al., 2017).  
The fact that this research is directly relevant to the urgent policy challenge of rapid energy 
system decarbonisation (DeCarolis et al., 2012; Nature, 2014) makes reproducibility of results 
particularly important.   
Recently Jacobson et al. (2018) presented roadmaps for 139 countries delivering emissions 
reductions greater than required by the Paris climate agreement (UNFCCC, 2015).  Each 
roadmap proposes a near-100% electrification of all energy sectors (transportation, 
heating/cooling, industry, agriculture/forestry/fishing), in contrast to 19% electrification today 
(International Energy Agency, 2018). The roadmaps also solely on vast amounts of weather-
dependent variable renewable energy (VRE), primarily wind, water and solar (WWS) power, 
to meet electrical and thermal demand.  
Both of these pathway components, i.e. complete electrification of energy systems and 
complete electricity systems driven by WWS are at times critiqued individually and also 
critiqued together. The focus of this analysis is on the ability of a WWS power system to deliver 
electricity when required. The ability of a full energy system to be electrified is not addressed 
in this analysis.  
From a system perspective, flexibility in the WWS energy system is key to proposals. And 
while Jacobson et al. (2018) assume significant flexibility in demand and expanding 
interconnection capacity is not seen as an issue, there is relatively little dispatchable generation 
or long-duration storage. Some concerns regargind this challenge may be addressed by 
evidence of modern portfolio theory (Markowitz, 1952) and how complementing technologies 
can alleviate the issue, especially when coupled with the broadening of geographical areas 





40 countries. Nevertheless, assessing system adequacy and overall reliability is an important 
aspect of planning an operable 100% renewable electricity system. 
Here we examine the technical feasibility of a 100% renewable Europe, basing our results on 
a replication and extension of the Jacobson et al. (2018) study using a detailed and available 
European power system model. Applying input data from the aforementioned study, we aim to 
reproduce the highly electrified, highly renewable European energy system, testing the 
societally critical objective of providing a reliable power system whilst determining the 
relationship between variable generation, energy storage, transmission capacity and 
dispatchable power. We pay particular attention to concerns outlined in recent literature on 
100% renewable energy systems (Brown et al., 2018a; Clack et al., 2017; Heard et al., 2017; 
Heuberger and Mac Dowell, 2018; Sepulveda et al., 2018; Trainer, 2012, 2013; Zappa et al., 
2019) namely system adequacy, flexibility and stability. Displacing conventional power plants 
with renewable energy creates challenges due to increased supply-side variability (Collins et 
al., 2018) for example. These challenges are not examined by Jacobson et al. (2018) in detail.  
Where technical shortfalls emerge in results, we propose corrective measures to ensure system 
reliability. 
To promote transparency in the energy modelling community, our model is available within 
Appendix C. 
 Context 
The wind, water and solar (WWS) roadmaps outlined by Jacobson et al. (2018) are extremely 
ambitious (and extremely controversial) decarbonisation pathways. The proposed WWS 
roadmap for the United States of America, for example, led to the well-documented 
controversy between Jacobson et al. (2015) and Clack et al. (2017). In this chapter, the analysis 
seeks to first identify the relevance of the WWS roadmaps in the context of the European 
energy system and then to analyse their technical feasibility of its implementation.   
This chapter examines the WWS portfolio through the limited lens of power system reliability 
only. The analysis focuses on frequency balancing, unmet energy and levels of reserve. It does 
not include a detailed analysis of reactive power, voltage control or transient stability. Nor does 
it do a complete due diligence on the other concepts, practicalities, cost, etc. that fall outside 
of the arena of power system reliability,  many of which have been raised and discussed in 





From a high level, major concerns exist regarding various aspects of the WWS roadmaps. For 
instance, electrification of nearly the entire energy sector is central to the roadmaps. This key 
assumption is highly questionable when one considers the litany of industrial processes and 
modes of transportation that may not be suited to electrification. Regarding energy demand, 
the WWS roadmaps also assume a decrease in overall energy requirements between today and 
those of 2050, which Jacobson et al. (2015) explained is achieved through energy efficiencies, 
especially process efficiencies such as mining, oil and gas exploration/refining, etc. The WWS 
roadmaps also assume that up to 75% of demand is flexible over several hours or days, 
depending on the specific demand type (mainly transportation and high-temperature industrial 
processes). Compared to current levels of demand flexibility, which is extremely limited, this 
is highly ambitious and untested. Another compelling assumption is that all thermal-based 
generation capacity (with or without carbon capture and storage) such as nuclear, bioenergy, 
coal, waste, natural gas-fired generation is excluded citing air pollution health and climate 
concerns, nuclear weapon proliferation risks, issues with toxic waste and finally, construction 
delays. The WWS roadmaps also assume thermal storage capacities in the form of extremely 
large district heating networks may be used to store excess electricity in the form of thermal 
energy which can be used months later to fulfil heating requirements. For a full breakdown of 
the WWS roadmaps, see the Supporting Information from (Jacobson et al., 2018).  
 Approach 
We replicate modelling of the European region as outlined by Jacobson et al. (2018).  
Containing 40 countries (the EU-27 and neighbours), we simulate the full energy system 
(power and thermal – generation, storage and demand) for 1 year at 5-minute resolution using 
PLEXOS® Integrated Energy Modelling software (Energy Exemplar). This approach is 
different to that of Jacobson et al. (2018) who estimate the variable generation capacity required 
to match annually averaged electricity and thermal demands, ignoring detailed analysis over 
shorter timescales. We incorporate 30 years of weather variability into the generation profiles 
through a multi-sample modelling approach previously employed by Collins et al. (2018) to 
understand impacts of wind and solar inter-annual variation and weather extremes2. Where 
 
 
2 The multi-sample approach was not considered for demand profiles due to the proposed scale of demand 





corrective actions to the original WWS portfolios are required for system reliability reasons, 
the capacity expansion function in PLEXOS® is employed using technical and economic 
characteristics. This approach also includes reserve requirements for the power system, see 
Section 6.3.4. Further information on the methodology, model structure, data, et cetera, is 
available in the proceeding Methods section (6.5) and Appendix C.  
 WWS scenarios 
The scenarios, or ‘cases’ as labelled by Jacobson et al. (2018), contain three alternative 
approaches to decarbonise the entire energy system.  The primary commonalities across the 
cases are three-fold; extremely high levels of VRE capacity, storage capacities much greater 
today’s values and lastly, significant elasticity in demand, as demonstrated in Figure 6.1.  The 
chief differentiating factors between the cases are:  
• Case A assumes large stationary battery capacity (1000 GW) (up from approximately 
1 GW today (Schmidt et al., 2019));  
• Case B assumes peak hydro discharge rates increase by a factor of 4;  
• Case C assumes thermal demand is mainly fulfilled using heat pumps (up from 
approximately 6% share today (European Heat Pump Association, 2018)).  
 
 
hours/days depending on the specific type of demand. Therefore, it was decided that any demand profile applied 








Figure 6.1: Overview of the WWS portfolios. a) Presents a fuel-type view of installed generation capacity. b) 
Presents energy storage assumptions. c) Illustrates the system demand assumptions. Acronyms: PHES, pumped 








* Historic data represents the WWS European region excluding Belarus, Moldova, Malta, Ukraine and 
Kosovo(ENTSO-E, 2018a). ** Gross final energy demand for EU-28 countries only(International Energy 
Agency, 2018). Data to replicate the WWS cases was acquired from Delucchi et al. (2016) and the Supporting 
Information(Jacobson et al., 2018). 
 Results and discussion 
 Inter-annual variability 
When examined at 5-minute resolution using PLEXOS®, all scenarios proposed by Jacobson 
et al. (2018)  experience energy shortages in the order of 3-17% of demand unmet across the 
30 weather years we sample from. Natural weather variation has clear effects on WWS power 
generation (Figure 6.2). We also establish that the WWS scenarios do not meet system 
adequacy standards. 
 
Figure 6.2: High level insights into the WWS energy system scenarios applying a multi-sample modelling 
approach. Energy shortages are greater than energy curtailments in two of the three scenarios, therefore an energy 
deficit exists, even if all variable renewable energy (VRE) could be utilised. For the other scenario, Case C, no 
large-scale energy storage is assumed thereby making it difficult to utilise excess energy generated. VRE 
generation represents onshore and offshore wind, solar PV, solar thermal, tidal and wave power. Dispatchable 
generation represents hydro power, geothermal, geoelectric and solar CSP. Seasonal patterns of large thermal 
storage are included in Appendix C to demonstrate the role of diurnal storage.  
For the most part, our assumptions are taken directly from the WWS roadmaps, as 
demonstrated in Figure 6.1. Where the approaches differ is with respect to generation profiles. 





45.2%, as do we. However, our approach applies a historic monthly profile to the hydro 
generation which is representative of actual conditions rather than using an annualised capacity 
factor constraint that may not be realistic in terms of energy inflow from climatic-dependent 
conditions such as melting ice or seasonal rainfall, see Appendix C for a comparison of both 
approaches. We also apply high temporal resolution generation profiles for wind (onshore and 
offshore) and solar (PV) based on validated historic data over the last three decades, whereas 
Jacobson et al. (2018) assume more ambitious capacity factors for the same generation types 
(Table 6.1). Wind and solar PV represent 88-94% of total generation capacity in the WWS 
study, therefore capacity factor deviations of the magnitude shown in Table 6.1 enviably result 
in large differences in overall energy production. To compensate for the lower capacity factors 
applied in this analysis, we expand generation capacities in the next section. However, the 
variances between the different results may also be associated with the differing 
methodological approaches undertaken, i.e. we employ a full unit commitment model matching 
supply and demand at high temporal resolution – a fundamental requirement of power systems. 
Table 6.1: Comparing the average annual capacity factor assumptions used for both WWS and our 
approach along with utilised results. The European average capacity factors for solar PV and onshore wind 
represent the long-term future planned fleet of farms but are one-third lower than those assumed in the WWS 
scenarios.  For the ‘utilised (after curtailment)’ capacity factors, we use the mean of the 30 samples applied to 
wind and solar PV generation.  Curtailment reduces the ‘net’ capacity factor of solar PV and wind by a further 4–
6%. 
Technology WWS Assumptions Our Assumptions Utilised (after curtailment) 
Geothermal Elec 81.6% 81.6% 81.1% 
Geothermal Heat 97.3% 97.3% 91.0% 
Hydro 45.2% 45.2% 45.2% 
Tidal 22.4% 22.4% 21.4% 
Wave 19.5% 23.9% 23.1% 
Solar PV 18.9% 12.9% 12.1% 
Solar CSP 49.5% 49.5% 37.3% 
Solar Thermal 7.2% 7.3% 6.9% 
Wind Onshore 35.0% 23.2% 22.4% 
Wind Offshore 36.3% 32.3% 31.1% 
 WWS scenarios modified to achieve today’s reliability levels 
Electricity plays a fundamental role in modern-day society (Armstrong et al., 2016) and even 
more so in WWS proposals for 2050. We propose corrective measures to Jacobson et al.’s 
scenarios to bring them in line with today’s adequacy standards, considering the most difficult 
year for wind and solar power generation over the past three decades, 2010. The approach used 
in this chapter aligns with the ENTSO-E’s Mid-term Adequacy Forecast 2017 (ENTSO-E, 
2017a) in that we consider the maximum acceptance level of power shortages, also known as 





(see Appendix C for more details). This standard aligns with that of other international systems 
such as the PJM network in the United States and the Australian National Electricity Market 
(Čepin, 2011), and is approximately 4000 times lower than found in Figure 6.2.  
We propose two alternative corrective measures for each scenario. The first aligns with the 
views of the WWS scenarios (Jacobson et al., 2018) and is based around increasing VRE 
generation capacity. The second contrasts with Jacobson et al. (2018) and introduces new 
dispatchable generation capacity which, as shown in Figure 6.3, may provide positive cost 
benefits. The latter is included as an alternative to increasing VRE capacities beyond 
magnitudes already considered high, and thus further increasing reliance on a small number of 
generating technologies (Clack et al., 2017). Augmenting storage capacity is not considered as 
it would have no effect on increasing overall power generation because as Figure 6.2 
demonstrates, energy shortages are greater than energy curtailments in two of the three 
scenarios. Therefore, an energy deficit will still exist even if all curtailed energy could be 
utilised. For the other scenario, Case C, no large-scale energy storage is assumed thereby 
making it near impossible to utilise excess energy generated. Figure 6.3 gives context around 
the scale of generation capacity supplementation required for either VRE or dispatchable 
capacity to attain system adequacy standards in each case.  
Regarding new dispatchable capacity, we propose that high efficiency combined cycle gas 
turbine technology be the technology of choice as it is a mature technology (eliminating 
technological development risk), has the ability to ramp generation output quickly (improving 
operational flexibility) and consumes natural gas which can be substituted with synthetic gas 
created using excess/curtailed energy, as discussed by Child et al. (2019). Synthetic gas, or 
more accurately referred to as ‘e-gas’, may provide the energy storage medium the WWS 
scenarios appear to lack, i.e. the ability to convert stored energy back into electricity3. Zappa 
et al. (2019) and Sepulveda et al. (2018) support this proposal regarding dispatchable power 
 
 
3 It is acknowledged that other forms of synthetic gases may be better positioned to fuel dispatchable power. For 
example, biomethane has a higher technology readiness level and lower cost than hydrogen. Biomethane also 
represents 20% of Denmark’s gas grid while Ireland has a target of 33% biomethane followed by 17% hydrogen 
in their gas grid by 2050. However, as this chapter is seeking to replicate the WWS roadmaps, the decision was 






and its importance for maintaining current levels of system adequacy, albeit only considering 
the power sector rather than the entire energy sector as done here. Sepulveda et al. (2018) 
suggests that dispatchable capacity can half electricity costs in fully decarbonised scenarios.  
In terms of energy system decarbonisation, Figure 6.3 shows the consequence of choosing one 
corrective measure over the other. Electing to install dispatchable capacity over VRE means 
the sector remains at least 83% renewable and potentially 84-95% carbon neutral (if operating 
on e-gas) while costing 13-34% less. As such, achieving the cost-optimal carbon neutral energy 
system in this analysis is dependent on the availability of excess, curtailable energy. Next, we 
combine the corrective measures to calculate an optimal blend of each corrective measure for 
complete energy sector decarbonisation.  
 
Figure 6.3: Additional power generation capacities associated with alternative corrective measures for each 
scenario to attain adequacy standards. Compares the additional newly installed capacity of two alternative 
corrective measures required to reduce unserved energy to within adequacy standards, along with the incremental 
cost of each option. We assume new dispatchable power is 60% efficient and consumes natural gas or e-gas when 
available at a cost of $27 GJ-1. The total power system costs associated with each measure is demonstrated as an 
incremental cost per unit of delivered electricity and does not include costs related to demand side participation, 
i.e. representative of a supply-side cost, see Supplementary Information for more details. E-gas may be considered 
renewable; however, debate is ongoing. Total power system costs are annualised, undiscounted costs (i.e. no 
interest rates applied) where the capital expenditure is spread over the technical lifetime of the technology with 
variable costs also included, see Appendix C for more details.  
 System reliability using carbon neutral generation 
While the counterfactual is assumed to be the ‘More VRE’ corrective measure, in alignment 
with the 100% WWS vision, dispatchable capacity is incrementally introduced to achieve a 





5% or less dispatchable capacity which is fuelled by e-gas converted from excess, otherwise 
curtailed, electricity. From the figure, the red rectangle highlights the cost-optimal yet carbon 
neutral variant in each case. Further percentage-sized incremental increases in each case result 
in the system not achieving carbon neutrality due to e-gas scarcities. The figure also 
demonstrates that capacity requirements and power system costs all improve with incremental 
additions of dispatchable generation. These have simple linear relationships over the range 
shown, allowing the results to be interpolated, or potentially extrapolated to higher shares of 
dispatchable generation.  
As shown in the legends of Figure 6.4(a-c), 1 GW of dispatchable generation can displace 2.8-
6.5 GW of VRE capacity and 1-1.5 GW of transmission capacity across the WWS scenarios.  
50 GW of dispatchable generation lowers the continent-average power price by approximately 
$1 MWh-1. There clearly exists a trade-off between cost-efficiency and the desire to achieve 
near-100% renewable share.  
Irrespective of how the unserved energy is resolved or what level of decarbonisation is 
achieved, further questions and significant challenges regarding the operability of these WWS-









Figure 6.4: Incrementally increasing the level of dispatchable capacity in the More VRE corrective 
measure. The legend included in (a-c) represents the relationship between each additional GW of dispatchable 
power and transmission/VRE/electricity cost. Each percent of dispatchable power in Cases A-C equates to 
approximately 130 GW, 125 GW, 60 GW respectively. Electricity used to create e-gas is assumed excess to both 
generation and reserve requirements. 
 System stability of the WWS roadmaps 
Once a power imbalance occurs reserves are activated to contain and then restore frequency. 
In this chapter, these are referred to as containment and restorative reserves respectively. 
Literature suggests that reserve requirements may increase in accordance with the level of VRE 
installed in a system (Brouwer et al., 2014; Holttinen et al., 2008; Papavasiliou et al., 2011). 
Brouwer et al. (2014) for example, estimates that secondary, tertiary and replacement reserves 
may increase by 7% of installed wind capacity. Here, we apply a published methodological 
approach by Holttinen et al. (2008) to estimate the increased operational reserve requirements 
for the restorative reserve using 3.5 standard deviations (99.9 percentile) (Dvorkin et al., 2015) 
which results in a dynamic reserve equal to 6.8% of generating VRE. When modelled, this 
dynamic reserve is held in parallel with the containment reserve requirements in continental 







Figure 6.5 shows that traditional providers of reserve (hydro, PHES, other dispatchable 
capacity) can represent less than half of the annual requirement with de-loaded VRE capacity 
providing the remainder. ‘De-loading’ is the process of reducing a unit’s output below 
maximum potential in a given period to provide the ‘headroom’ needed for upward reserve 
(Ela et al., 2014; Fleming et al., 2016). VRE reserve strategies, such as de-loading, reveal 
several potential issues regarding policy, economics, operations, etc., none of which are 
addressed in further detail. As with its energy production, there is an inherent variability and 
uncertainty (forecast error) with VRE reserve provision. From a risk exposure perspective, 
Figure 6.5 establishes a positive impact from introducing minimal dispatchable capacity as 
other traditional reserve providers increase their provision share. 
 
Figure 6.5: Annual restorative reserve provision shares by technology for continental Europe. Reserve 
provision is shown for upward only.  
 Reliance on cross-border transmission capacity expansion 
This analysis finds that cross-border transmission capacity expansion is an integral part of 
creating a reliable 100% renewable energy system, agreeing with Green et al. (2016). While 
transmission capacity assumptions are not specified in the source material, it is assumed that if 
congestion is an issue increasing transmission capacity would only result in a modest increase 
in cost (Jacobson et al., 2018). We find that compared to 2017-levels (60 GW), the WWS 
European region transmission network capacity needs to be approximately 13-36 times higher. 
When compared to projected 2040 transmission network capacities by ENTSO-E (173 GW), 





feasibility of commissioning these levels of transmission capacity may prove difficult, as 
discussed (Fürsch et al., 2013; Green et al., 2016; Nasirov et al., 2015; Spiecker et al., 2013). 
However, it is clear from Figure 6.6 that introducing dispatchable capacity can reduce reliance 
on transmission capacity and therefore reduce the associated risk exposure. In summary, we 
find that capacity requirements, system costs and ancillary services all improve with 
incremental additions of dispatchable generation.  
 
Figure 6.6: Estimated transmission capacities for each WWS scenario including corrective measures. 
Projected 2040 transmission capacity is taken from the ENTSO-E 2040 publication applying the ‘Distributed 
Generation’ scenario assumptions (ENTSO-E, 2018b). 
 Conclusion 
This chapter highlights several areas of concern surrounding the reliability of ambitious energy 
systems like those of the WWS proposals. While the WWS approach aims to reduce any over-
reliance on technological development, we find that the implicit reliance on power electronics 
to replace the system dynamics automatically provided by conventional generation could be 
viewed as such. Achieving a reliable energy system is essential. The continued existence of 
dispatchable generation capacity is likely beneficial to ensure a smooth transition in the short 
term. In the long term, various technological options are likely to come online to replace this 
dispatchable capacity. 
The original WWS portfolios come to within 25% of sufficient generation capacity to meet 
modern-day system adequacy standards in the most difficult year for VRE generation. Whether 
2017 (60 GW) 





additional energy storage, VRE, dispatchable capacity or alternative technology is chosen, the 
decision should be taken with a holistic view of an operational 100% renewable system. To 
create a reliable and resilient power system, having a diverse mix of sources providing 
adequacy, flexibility and stability is a key consideration. Increasing VRE capacity does not 
change system flexibility in terms of controllable response unless it is operated in a non-optimal 
way, such as de-loading, while the point made for energy storage is equally valid for VRE 
regarding system stability and the reliance on technological development. This analysis 
suggests that introducing 5% dispatchable generation improves all aspects of system reliability, 
lowers VRE and transmission capacity requirements and reduces system costs by 25%, all the 
while fuelled by carbon neutral means. 
The main concerns highlighted as part of this analysis involve ensuring system adequacy and 
establishing ancillary service strategies in a future system with high levels of VRE and low 
levels of dispatchable capacity. However, other apprehensions exist such as the feasibility of 
cross-border transmission capacities outlined herein, the technical experience of operating 
power systems at such low kinetic energy levels, reliance on larger seasonal thermal energy to 
name a few. Whether dispatchable power is introduced or not, the challenge largely remains 
the same. It is worth emphasizing that these concerns highlighted in this analysis relate to one 
aspect only transitioning to a WWS only energy system, The goal of WWS is laudable, but the 
IPCC envisage only 70-85% renewable energy (IPCC, 2018), and we suspect that such an 
ambition (below 100%) will confer many benefits, easing the decarbonisation of energy for 
operators and reducing the cost for consumers, thus reducing two potentially significant 
barriers to the wholesale transformation that is required.  This study highlights the complex 
nature of electricity systems, and the critical need for such complexity to not be glossed over.  
 Methods 
 Modelling technique 
This research uses PLEXOS® Integrated Energy Modelling software (Energy Exemplar) 
(PLEXOS®), a unit commitment and economic dispatch modelling tool that cost optimises the 
technical operation of a power system subject to technical constraints. PLEXOS® is an industry 
standard mixed-integer linear programming model that has been used for a multitude of studies 
such as renewable energy integration, techno-economic feasibility studies, system adequacy 





PJM market, the Chilean independent system operator, the Australian energy market operator 
and the European Network of Transmission System Operators. In this article, the model 
considers technical characteristics associated with thermal power generation capacity, such as 
ramp rates, minimum generation levels and max capacities, while creating an optimised 
dispatch of thermal, renewable and storage capacity. The analysis also incorporates ancillary 
service requirements for Europe into the simulations, further details outlined in Section 6.3.4 
and Appendix C. We simulate the entire system at high temporal granularity (5-minute) to 
allow more of the technical characteristics of electricity systems operation to be captured in the 
model, along with their associated additional costs (Deane et al., 2014). 
The PLEXOS® model is configured to simulate over a three-year period, one year before and 
one year post-2050, at 5-minute temporal resolution. This approach was taken on account of 
the magnitude of thermal energy storage. There are two stages to our modelling technique 
which seeks to best utilise the large energy stores. Stage 1) the entire three-year period is 
dispatched in one step at daily temporal resolution. This maximises the utilisation of the large 
energy storage capacities though its extended time horizon, i.e. storing energy in one season 
for later use in another. This approach effectively replicates the look-ahead function in 
PLEXOS® which, as the name suggests, looks ahead. What I do using this approach is use a 
very large horizon to dispatch in one step so therefore, large energy storage capacities can be 
utilised more efficiently. Capacity expansion decisions are also made at this stage if deemed 
necessary. Stage 2) takes energy storage end volumes and capacity expansion decisions from 
the stage 1 and simulates a 5-minute simulation to create a high temporal resolution set of 
results. This approach improves the utilisation of large seasonal energy stores which, otherwise, 
are wasted. This approach replicates a more optimised, better planned energy system.  
Within the model, each country is represented as a region containing two nodes; electricity and 
thermal. Both nodal types have their own stores, generation and demand. For example, each 
thermal node has solar-thermal generation with short term energy storage (STES) and 
underground thermal energy storage (UTES) to meet heating/cooling loads. As with the 
approach taken in Jacobson et al. (2018), we assume electricity can be used to meet thermal 
demand but not vice versa. A one-way link between the nodes is used to replicate energy 
conversion via dielectic heaters, electric furnaces, et cetera (Jacobson et al., 2017). 
Flexible demands are implemented in two parts; the demand and the flexibility. Demand 





via the purchaser class and assumed inflexible. The associated flexibility is introduced via the 
storage class. For example, power-to-gas is assumed to have two-days’ worth of hydrogen 
storage in Europe. This is implemented using head and tail reservoirs sized to the previously 
stated hydrogen volume linked to specific generators. These stores include constraints that 
ensure a minimum and/or maximum level of generation is achieved to align with the source 
material assumptions around flexibility. Similarly, thermal loads are implemented via the 
purchaser class and are inflexible. Flexibility is incorporated into these thermal loads through 
the Underground Thermal Energy Storage capacities.  
Where system adequacy standards are not met, the portfolios are supplemented with increased 
levels of generation and interconnection capacity using a long-term capacity expansion 
optimisation module built into PLEXOS®. Based on technology costs presented in Appendix 
C the long-term capacity expansion determines the least-cost portfolio that achieves the 
necessary reliability standards. For further details on the implementation of the long-term 
expansion, see Appendix C. While we assume CCGT technology as the dispatchable capacity 
of choice in this article, other forms of dispatchable capacity such as nuclear, bioenergy or 
carbon capture and storage technologies exist but were not considered for several reasons. For 
example; nuclear can result in weapons proliferation risk, waste, and delays, while carbon 
capture and storage technologies are currently not in commercial use for power generation and 






In this thesis, evolutionary pathways for the European power system driven by climate 
mitigation policies are analysed. Experiences of past and present transformations of the energy 
marketplace are distilled into clear and concise learnings. Considerations for future 
decarbonised power systems are discussed from a policy, regulation, economics and system 
operation perspective. Globally, policymakers and society are confronted by important 
decisions regarding the balance between cost equality, economic growth, energy security and 
climate action. This chapter concludes the thesis with a summary of insights gained. Initially, 
focusing on a national perspective in the past and present where the various learnings and 
strategies in place for an island system to remain fit-for-purpose are outlined. This followed by 
the focus switching to a future supranational perspective where system adequacy and overall 
reliability become the main focus of attaining an operable 100% renewable energy system. 
The original aim of the thesis was to analyse evolutionary pathways for the European power 
system resulting from climate mitigation policies. This was broken down into five research 
questions initially posed by this thesis in section 1.2 and restated below. Chapters 2-6 in this 
thesis have set out to achieve at least one of these research questions. 
1. How the electricity sector in Ireland evolved over the past century and what were the 
key learnings in the future? 
2. How can power sector decarbonisation ambitions be reconciled with market economics 
and system operations? 
3. Can coordinated European policy support schemes for renewable energies lead to more 
equitable and optimal power sector decarbonisation? 
4. Should Europe aim for a negative emissions power system over a high renewable 
alternative? 
5. Can a 100% renewable energy system be operationally resilient in Europe when based 
on wind, water and sunlight alone? 
 Marketplace Evolution 
A central focus of the thesis has been the persistent focus on evolution. Beginning with Chapter 





through to Chapter 6 where potential scenarios for reliable 100% carbon neutral energy systems 
are analysed on a European scale.  
Chapter 2 examined the struggles of a small electrically isolated electricity system to overcome 
security of supply concerns, geo-political unrest, poor policy decisions and the various energy 
crises to establish the first dual-currency electricity market in the world. Lack of energy policy 
caused great consternation when alerts by the national monopoly were ignored around over-
reliance on certain fuels, namely hydro and peat in the 1950’s then oil in the 1960’s, leading to 
large exposures to subsequent climatic and geo-political events in what exemplifies the reactive 
nature of Ireland’s energy policy at the time. The chapter highlights the importance of key 
decisions regarding the future of the sector when the ESB, the national monopoly, turned down 
the option of selling electricity in bulk to other distributors, instead opting to deliver electricity 
directly to consumers to reduce the effects of local politics and municipal boundaries on the 
development of a national electricity network. The examination identified the breakpoint in 
time when electricity policy became focused and a clear impetus was put on energy-related 
policy moving forward. The deployment and integration of large-scale wind power in Ireland 
resulting from strong national and supranational policy decisions is a prime example. 
Subsequently, Ireland’s electricity system has become a world-leader in the facilitation of 
variable renewable energy on a single synchronous power system, which leads into Chapter 3. 
Investigating the challenges in reconciling ambitions for variable renewable integration with 
market economics and system operation using Ireland’s electricity sector as a case study was 
discussed in Chapter 3. The case study highlights the strategies implemented to optimally 
balance efficiency, flexibility and adequacy while maintaining a fully functional system that 
strives to adapt to evolving conditions. This chapter presents real life challenges faced by a 
small isolated island system that could be considered a precursor to events/challenges awaiting 
a wide range of global electricity systems. We demonstrate how transforming the energy 
market, capacity mechanism and system service arrangements was instrumental in 
transitioning away from a previously cost-based market to a value-based alternative that 
rewarded flexible and reliable capacity with the ability to evolve with market conditions of the 
future. Future-proofing the market was the primary goal – one that appears particularly relevant 
at present considering the reality that most are not fit-for-purpose in the changing marketplace 





In what has been described as a ‘liberalised market on training wheels’, the analysis also 
identified how market participants before the market overhaul were shielded from financial 
risk through several mechanisms ensuring full cost-recovery and thereby not considered 
dynamic in their approach to normal market conditions, i.e. price signals did not always attain 
the required response. These circumstances resulted in a lack of competition and capacity 
mechanisms were required to entice investment. Post-market restructuring; the three primary 
revenue streams are geared towards securing the necessary generation capacity moving forward 
into a future power system that is, in many ways, dictated by the current focus on climate 
action.  
With a view to future European energy systems, Chapters 4, 5 & 6 are supported by emerging 
literature highlighting the essential role decarbonised electricity generation will play in future 
energy systems consistent with the Paris climate agreement. In Chapter 5 for example, the 
analysis compares the impacts of high levels of renewable electricity and negative emissions 
technologies on exploratory visions of the future EU power system in 2050 in terms of 
emissions reduction, technical operation and total system costs. The analysis shows that a 
Negative Emissions scenario bound by regional biomass potentials and national CO2 storage 
potentials can achieve a power system-wide CO2 intensity reduction relative to the baseline 
scenario while remaining cost-comparable. Furthermore, the analysis estimates that converting 
just 2% of the EU’s installed generation capacity to BECCS consumes 69% of the projected 
available sustainable biomass while enabling the power system to achieve net-negative 
emissions (-7.5 kgCO2 MWh
-1).  
In Chapter 6 the focus changes to entire energy system decarbonisation across Europe. The 
technical feasibility and economic viability of a 100% renewable Europe is examined while 
assessing the ability of the system to maintain stable power system operation with regards to 
system adequacy, system flexibility and system stability, basing our results on a replication and 
extension of extremely ambitious studies using a detailed and fully open European power 
system model. The analysis shows that while the original scenarios do not comply with 
modern-day system adequacy standards, the decision associated with system expansion should 
be taken with a holistic view of an operational 100% renewable system. To create a reliable 
and resilient power system, having a diverse mix of sources providing adequacy, flexibility and 





However, technology readiness and the associated risk exposure play a definitive role in results 
of Chapter 5 & 6. In terms of system decarbonisation, Chapter 5 demonstrates that the state of 
readiness for carbon capture and storage (CCS) technology dictates whether the High VRE or 
Negative Emissions scenario achieves the lowest system-wide CO2 intensity. Chapter 6 
identified concerns around over-reliance on power electronics to create an entire energy system 
resilient to energy shortfalls/scarcities which is primarily powered by variable generation. 
Moreover, the analysis shows that risk exposures can be reduced by re-introducing existing, 
mature technologies, such as combined cycle gas turbines in the case of Chapter 6. For 
example, introducing 5% dispatchable generation improves all aspects of system reliability, 
lowers VRE and transmission capacity requirements and reduces system costs by 25%, all the 
while fuelled by carbon neutral means. Major technology risk is also present regarding CCS 
technology with questions over commercial readiness and scalability; operational risk where 
high concentrations of variable generation diminish generator capacity factors; market 
participant risk with market prices reducing due to the overall shift in the cost of energy from 
operational costs to capital costs and finally; consumer risk with incremental electricity costs 
varying widely and therefore run the risk of heightening budgeting concerns for the consumer.  
 Policy 
History shows that policy must continually adapt to maintain balance between market 
competitiveness, system security and consumer protection all the while implementing national 
or international objectives such as climate mitigation policy. In this thesis, policy is 
instrumental throughout each chapter. The learnings from delayed, reactive policy decisions 
discussed in Chapter 2, which sparked a defined energy policy focus in Ireland post-1970’s, to 
concentrated and clear policy measures outlined in Chapter 3 where reconciling ambitions for 
variable renewable integration with market economics and system operation were addressed, 
is but one example. 
In Chapter 4 where the quantification of renewable electricity (RES-E) shares on a country-by-
country basis is discussed, policy is a central theme as climate mitigation plans push up against 
market dynamics, potentially resulting in cost inequalities that expose the European consumer. 
Questions around whether RES-E shares should be measured based on consumption rather than 
production are important to analyse considering the likely part to play by variable RES-E 
generation-interconnection nexus in future decarbonised power systems. The chapter 





which exacerbates an underlying issue with price distortions stemming from out-of-market 
financial support schemes that decrease wholesale market prices. Moreover, the analysis 
singles out a paradox: “as renewable generation (receiving out-of-market support) increases, 
wholesale electricity prices decrease, becoming more attractive to export at a price that is not 
truly reflective of the cost to generate that power.” Consequently, the analysis shows that price 
distortions create cost inequalities as consumers are left to remunerate the renewable electricity 
producer while the energy is consumed out of state. The proposed ‘consumption-based 
quantification’ policy would correct this cross-border subsidisation of RES-E, enabling more 
equitable and optimal electricity decarbonisation – effectively socialising the cost of renewable 
electricity across state boundaries to improve cost equalities during the transition to a 
decarbonised system.  Increasing the accuracy of cost distributions associated with the 
consumption of renewable electricity would also provide secondary gains. Aside from reducing 
the level of revenue required to remunerate RES-E generation in an exporting country, this 
approach would lower the economic barriers surrounding the cost to consumers of developing 
higher levels of RES-E capacity.   
The importance of policy is also evident in Chapters 5 & 6. To achieve a decarbonised power, 
or entire energy, system for Europe, policy direction is essential. The main objective of the 
analysis outlined in Chapters 5 & 6 is to provide robust analysis for policy makers to make an 
informed decision applying highly transparent and reproduceable methodological approaches. 
In Chapter 5 we show that technological readiness and risk exposure go ‘hand-in-hand’ with 
policies heavily dependent upon un-tested technologies. The analysis quantifies this reliance 
on negative emission technologies (NETs) in terms of decarbonisation levels achieved versus 
the potential for Europe in a 2050 setting to add additional emphasise the overall message.  
Reliance on NETs may help to achieve a negative emissions status, however, delayed or lack 
of technological progression could leave the system in a worse off place than alternate 
pathways from a decarbonisation point of view. It is unlikely there is a silver bullet to undo 
decades of climate inaction, therefore learnings from Chapter 2 tell us that policy makers must 
not over-rely on a small number of options to achieve their goals.  
In a similar vein, Chapter 6 highlights several areas of concern surrounding the reliability of 
ambitious energy systems when relying on variable sources of energy for near-100% of energy 
demand. From a policy decision making perspective, alternative measures may offer greater 
security both in terms of risk and reliability exposures, however these alternates may require a 





scenarios replicated in Chapter 6 for example, rely on variable electricity generation for most 
of their energy required. These scenarios also assume hydrogen is created via power-to-gas 
(PtG) for transportation purposes. Our analysis identifies an alternative approach that takes the 
same assumption (that PtG will be technological feasible) and creates e-gas which is carbon 
neutral (some might say, renewable) and a form of energy storage with a vast distribution 
network via the existing grid infrastructure. This e-gas is then used to power dispatchable 
power generation which improves all aspects of system reliability, lowers VRE and 
transmission capacity requirements and reduces system costs. Therefore, taking the same goal, 
we propose an alternative that relies on the same technological readiness regarding PtG, yet 
reduces reliance on capacity development, increases system reliability and all at a lower cost. 
This is an example of an alternative scenario that is made highly transparent and open to 
reproducibility, critique and hopefully, further development on the pathway to assessing the 
optimal choice(s) for the situation at hand. Open and reproducible science is key. 
 Future Work 
This thesis does not present a silver bullet solution to the challenges ahead. Energy sector 
decarbonisation is perhaps the biggest hurdle ever faced by mankind. Much of the analysis 
needed, remains unfinished and already too late. To-date, significant questions remain around 
the best approach for energy system decarbonisation. However, no matter the choice, cost 
inequalities much be avoided. Protection of the European consumer is essential. As such, real 
time analysis of cross-border renewable electricity flows could be a future piece of work 
following on from this thesis. 
Chapter 4 outlined a methodological approach for quantifying renewable electricity flows 
across European member state boundaries, demonstrating the potential scale of the cost 
inequality issue in a 2030 scenario. In what was described as “food for thought” for policy 
makers, further work could be the creation of a taskforce to assess the feasibility of accessing 
real time data from system operators with an ultimate aim of trialling the concept in a testbed 
environment for a given period. Findings could be presented to national and European policy 
makers regarding the technical feasibility and economic viability of the project along with 
insights gained into cost inequality issues with corrective policy recommendations. 
Another area requiring further work would be increasing the geographical resolution of 





mimics day-ahead market operations. While this represents the majority of power traded in 
Europe (and globally), it does not account for sub-country level network or system constraints. 
Real time representation of system operation adds valuable insights from the alternative 
perspective; that of an operator.  For example, the well-documented north-south power flow 
bottleneck in Germany is not captured in any models used in this thesis. In a similar way, more 
realistic options for transmission/VRE/storage capacity expansions would strengthen overall 
results immeasurably. However, this ‘wish list’ is all data driven. Accessibility is the main 
barrier. This circles back to a key point made in the introduction; energy research can and must 
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This appendix serves to provide the equations used in PLEXOS®. 
Indices 
j  Generation Unit 
t   Time period. 
stor  Index related specifically to pumped storage unit 
RESup  Upper Storage Reservoir 
RESlow  Lower storage Reservoir 
 
Variables  
Vjt  Integer on/off decision variable for unit j at period t  
Xjt  Integer on/off decision variable for pumped storage pumping unit j at period t  
Ujt  Variable that = 1 at period t if unit j has started in previous period else 0  
Pjt  Power output of unit j (MW) 
Hjt  Pump load for unit j period t (MW) 
Wint  Flow into reservoir at time t (MWh) 
Woutt  Flow out of reservoir at time t (MWh) 
Wt  Volume of storage at a time t (MWh) 
 
Parameters   
vl            Penalty for loss of load (€/MWh) 
vs           Penalty for Reserve not met 
use  Unserved Energy (MWh) 
usr           Reserve not met (MWh) 
D  Demand (MW) 
obj         Objective Function 
njt            No load cost unit j in period t (€) 
cjt  Start cost unit j in period t (€)           





estor  Efficiency of pumping unit (%) 
pmaxj  Max power output of a unit j (MW) 
pminj  Mini stable generation of unit j (MW) 
pmpmaxstor Max pumping capacity of pumping unit  
Jj  Available units in each generator 
Jstor  Number of pumping units 
MRUj  Maximum ramp up rate (MW/min) 
MRDj  Maximum ramp down rate (MW/min) 
MUTj  Minimum up time (hrs) 
Ap  Number of hours a unit must initially be online due to its MUT constraint (hrs) 
WINT  Initial Volume of reservoir (GWh)  










The objective function in PLEXOS® is to minimise the start-up cost of each unit (start cost 
(€)* number of  starts of a unit) + the no load cost of each online unit + production costs of 
each online unit + the penalty for unserved load+ the penalty of unserved reserve.   
The objective function is minimised within each simulation period. The simulation solution 
must also satisfy the constraints below: 
 






ttjtjt DuseHP   
Energy balance equation states that the power output from each unit at each interval minus the 
pump load from pumped storage units for each interval + unserved energy must equal the 
demand for power at each interval. (Note that line losses can also be included here but is not 
shown). As the penalty for unserved energy is high and part of the objective function, the model 
will generally try to meet demand.  





Basic operational constraints that limit the operation and flexibility of units such as maximum 
generation, minimum stable generation, minimum up/down times and ramp rates. 
 
11 =−+− t      UV jtjt   
011 +− ++ jtjtjt UVV   
These two equations define the start definition of each unit and are used to track the on/off 
status of units. 
0.max − jtjjt VPP  
Max Export Capacity: A unit’s power output cannot be greater than it maximum export 
capacity. 
0.min − jtjjt VPP  
Minimum Stable Generation: A unit’s output must be greater than it minimum stable generation 
when the unit is online. 
0.max − jtStorjt XPmpH   
Pumping load must be less than maximum pumping capacity for each pumping unit  
storjXV jtjt +     where1   
JjJXJV Storjjj        
These constraints limit a pumped storage unit from pumping and generating at same time.  









jtjjptj tMUTVAV  
Minimum Up Times1: (Note the following text is directly from the PLEXOS Help files). The variable Ap tracks if 
any starts have occurred on the unit inside the periods preceding p with a window equal to MUT. i.e. if no starts 
happen in the last MUT periods then Ap will be zero, but if one (or more) starts have occurred then Ap will equal 
unity. The MUT constraints then sets a lower bound on the unit commitment that is normally below zero, but 
when a unit is started, the bound rises above zero until the minimum up time has expired. This fractional lower 
bound when considered in an integer program forces the unit to stay on for its minimum up time.  
















jpjtjtj tAMDTVV  
Minimum Down Times: The variable Ap tracks if any units have been shut down inside the periods preceding p 
with a window equal to MDT. i.e. if no units are shut down in the last MDT periods then Ap will be zero, but if 
one (or more) shutdown then Ap will equal unity. The MDT constraints then set an upper bound on the unit 
commitment that is normally above unity, but when a unit is stopped, the bound falls below unity until the 
minimum down time has expired. 
 
0.. min1. −−− − jjjtjtjjt UpVMRUPP   
 
0).(. min1.min −−−+ − jjjttjjtjtj pMRDPPPPp   
 
Maximum Ramp up and down constraints: These constraints limit the change in power output 
from one time period to another.  
 
Water Balance Equations:  
These equations track the passage of water from the lower reservoir to the upper reservoir. In 
this set-up there is no inflow and water volume are conserved. 
 
lowUpRINTtRintRouttR RESRESRtWWWW ,,.. ,1  ==−+  
0
,,.
=−+ upupup RESinRESoutRESt WWW  
0.
..
=− upup tRESinRESjtstor WHe  
0
...







Country Specific Portfolio Assumptions 














































AT 846 0 8700 5330 2850 0 0 0 0 4009 0 0 0 0 6803 5230 106 0 0 
BE 1002 0 28 165 14805 0 0 0 1 4722 0 0 0 3280 6052 1310 136 0 0 
BG 868 0 2044 292 1678 0 2400 0 2 4082 0 1188 990 0 2599 1050 50 0 0 
CH 0 0 12316 6048 0 0 1145 0 0 3692 0 0 0 0 295 1840 0 0 0 
CY 11 0 0 0 1378 0 0 184 3 894 0 0 0 0 417 0 8 0 0 
CZ 642 0 882 513 2901 435 6846 24 0 3089 0 2002 1095 0 838 1180 106 0 0 
DE 6578 0 1628 5544 41436 0 0 674 6 86141 0 16112 7930 9369 77180 6810 756 0 0 
DK 2601 0 0 10 3928 366 0 58 12 844 0 0 0 2787 4450 0 56 0 0 
EE 366 0 0 20 910 0 0 0 8 0 0 468 0 132 1581 0 13 0 0 
ES 2156 0 12628 4554 14782 0 0 782 201 43459 2200 97 0 153 46989 5150 370 0 0 
FI 3130 0 1788 1960 4044 0 4952 49 5 25 0 327 0 388 2752 0 121 0 0 
FR 3636 0 21900 4623 34612 448 32265 626 224 42950 4653 2890 0 3056 54513 7170 706 0 0 
GR 260 0 3366 223 4900 0 0 153 20 8908 352 834 0 0 7884 700 71 0 0 
HR 85 0 1256 1030 1000 0 0 16 10 2149 234 464 0 0 1340 282 26 0 0 
HU 388 0 0 268 3460 0 3693 0 0 592 0 0 0 0 1616 0 62 0 0 
IE 313 0 296 145 4632 0 0 0 6 19 0 0 0 375 5379 290 42 0 0 
IT 6120 0 15450 4158 45090 0 0 128 14 53915 3000 1902 0 644 25314 7590 499 0 0 
LT 166 0 0 286 496 0 1117 0 0 74 0 0 0 0 1144 900 16 0 0 
LU 37 0 0 49 1244 0 0 0 0 160 0 0 0 0 485 1300 16 0 0 
LV 134 0 0 1664 802 0 0 0 1 2 0 0 0 51 632 0 12 0 0 
MT 0 0 0 0 1426 0 0 137 2 313 0 0 0 0 54 0 4 0 0 
NL 2646 0 37 0 17802 0 0 0 2 5871 1200 3245 250 5000 7818 0 170 0 0 
NO 0 0 47391 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2495 1350 0 0 0 
PL 3020 0 483 945 9232 0 8250 63 2 350 0 5032 4944 1887 16990 1790 282 0 0 
PT 568 0 6946 3045 678 0 0 123 97 2916 336 0 0 27 7076 1420 64 0 0 
RO 612 0 4917 1764 2511 976 2828 115 1 4143 0 0 885 0 7450 0 87 0 0 
SE 3410 0 8195 9751 4761 0 9024 0 28 96 0 0 0 436 10784 100 216 0 0 
SI 165 0 1248 217 820 0 1117 0 1 867 0 250 0 0 280 180 22 0 0 
SK 462 0 1490 394 956 0 3021 0 0 1119 0 119 330 0 164 920 45 0 0 




















































AT 2267 0 7385 4524 1390 0 0 177 0 4331 0 0 0 0 8792 5230 106 1295 879 
BE 2685 0 24 140 7571 1604 0 90 3 17013 0 0 0 18026 12308 1310 136 4716 979 
BG 1745 0 1735 248 727 0 792 90 9 1933 0 1073 894 0 2398 1050 50 428 492 
CH 0 0 10458 5132 0 0 453 0 0 9744 0 0 0 0 4140 1840 0 0 0 
CY 33 0 0 0 706 0 0 515 16 2695 0 0 0 0 2398 0 8 503 101 
CZ 1936 0 749 435 2012 393 2711 361 0 4044 0 1807 989 0 2126 1180 106 609 751 
DE 16092 0 1382 4704 23533 5663 0 1575 27 109039 0 16473 7162 73406 130355 6810 756 30897 4281 
DK 6388 0 0 9 1702 331 0 665 56 5764 0 0 0 16955 11477 0 56 3376 439 
EE 1104 0 0 17 479 0 0 181 39 773 0 423 0 652 2558 0 13 393 96 
ES 5571 0 10714 3865 6466 3229 0 2118 921 59546 16900 88 0 7402 76071 5150 370 14121 2730 
FI 7862 0 1518 1663 1753 0 1961 1173 21 4640 0 295 0 2172 11669 0 121 1824 854 
FR 9135 0 18588 3924 19419 3236 12777 1481 1025 46400 35800 2609 0 43435 78405 7170 706 17725 5453 
GR 784 0 2858 189 2124 0 0 271 94 13031 2700 753 0 6081 12308 700 71 3102 516 
HR 935 0 1065 874 433 0 0 361 48 541 1800 419 0 0 3197 282 26 369 231 
HU 1170 0 0 227 1499 0 1463 735 0 3093 0 0 0 0 3197 0 62 621 461 
IE 944 0 251 123 2007 0 0 470 28 1547 0 0 0 4778 10390 290 42 1852 290 
IT 15377 0 13111 3528 19543 4886 0 2086 64 45062 23400 3148 0 24838 28429 7590 499 9707 3805 
LT 500 0 0 243 215 0 442 181 2 5400 0 0 0 869 1598 900 16 777 142 
LU 112 0 0 42 539 0 0 181 0 201 0 0 0 0 400 1300 16 59 104 
LV 404 0 0 1412 348 0 0 181 7 23 0 0 0 1086 1279 0 12 236 124 
MT 0 0 0 0 618 0 0 247 7 994 0 0 0 0 0 0 4 98 41 
NL 6499 0 31 0 10223 2813 0 181 7 35573 9100 2930 226 50891 11829 0 170 0 1193 
NO 0 0 40200 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 869 16042 1350 0 9751 0 
PL 7588 0 410 802 7805 2459 3267 722 11 32872 0 5880 5022 15202 52633 1790 282 9941 2097 
PT 1712 0 5897 2584 294 0 0 554 444 13589 2600 0 0 5603 15985 1420 64 3473 475 
RO 1845 0 4175 1497 1088 441 1120 208 5 4640 0 0 799 0 12788 0 87 1720 630 
SE 8100 0 6960 8278 2124 0 3574 596 126 5183 0 0 0 2831 27842 100 216 3540 1672 
SI 497 0 1059 184 355 0 442 90 3 756 0 226 0 0 400 180 22 114 162 
SK 1393 0 1265 334 454 0 1196 90 0 1186 0 107 298 0 521 920 45 169 341 
UK 42350 0 1438 109 19798 5688 6849 1219 10687 30160 0 4064 404 61528 31809 2740 575 13456 4190 
 


















































AT 2311 0 9893 6063 1849 0 0 0 0 5189 0 0 0 0 7760 5230 106 0 879 
BE 2286 452 32 188 10990 0 0 0 5 5823 0 0 0 3018 10864 1310 136 0 979 
BG 1697 335 2325 332 1056 0 3122 0 17 2306 0 0 0 0 2116 1050 50 0 492 
CH 0 0 14015 6878 0 0 1787 0 0 6457 0 0 0 0 3654 1840 0 0 0 
CY 39 0 0 0 1025 0 0 690 29 793 0 0 0 0 2116 0 8 0 101 
CZ 1570 310 1003 584 1826 0 10686 0 0 4082 0 0 0 0 1877 1180 106 0 751 
DE 15100 2984 1852 6307 33904 0 0 1631 50 76446 0 1839 0 19596 115061 6810 756 0 4281 
DK 5652 1117 0 11 2472 0 0 140 104 3389 0 0 0 3795 10130 0 56 0 439 
EE 1072 0 0 23 628 0 0 0 72 115 0 0 0 0 2257 0 13 0 96 
ES 7530 1666 14371 5179 9333 0 0 1419 1717 46121 5200 0 0 0 67146 5150 370 0 2730 
FI 8796 0 2034 2229 2545 0 7730 120 40 1384 0 0 0 914 10300 0 121 0 854 
FR 8294 1639 24900 5257 26466 0 50362 1136 1913 36205 11000 0 0 9145 69206 7170 706 0 5453 
GR 763 151 3827 254 3083 0 0 370 174 4612 832 0 0 390 10864 700 71 0 516 
HR 909 180 1429 1172 629 0 0 484 89 231 552 0 0 0 2822 282 26 0 231 
HU 949 187 0 305 2177 0 5765 0 0 2306 0 0 0 0 2822 0 62 0 461 
IE 918 181 337 165 2915 0 0 0 53 577 0 0 0 914 9171 290 42 0 290 
IT 14359 2837 17573 4730 28367 0 0 308 118 29045 7200 0 0 855 25093 7590 499 0 3805 
LT 487 96 0 325 312 0 1744 0 4 92 0 0 0 0 1411 900 16 0 142 
LU 130 0 0 56 783 0 0 0 0 231 0 0 0 0 353 1300 16 0 104 
LV 393 78 0 1893 505 0 0 0 13 12 0 0 0 196 1129 0 12 0 124 
MT 0 0 0 0 897 0 0 166 13 320 0 0 0 0 0 0 4 0 41 
NL 7187 1420 42 0 15091 0 0 0 14 461 2800 0 0 15023 10441 0 170 0 1193 
NO 0 0 53922 0 0 0 0 0 0 461 0 0 0 0 14160 1350 0 0 0 
PL 8269 1634 549 1075 11279 0 12878 160 20 2802 0 1791 0 2939 46458 1790 282 0 2097 
PT 2660 0 7897 3463 427 0 0 298 829 2094 800 0 0 78 14109 1420 64 0 475 
RO 1795 355 5594 2006 1580 0 4414 278 9 2306 0 0 0 0 11287 0 87 0 630 
SE 9075 0 9325 11088 3035 0 14086 0 235 2006 0 0 0 248 24576 100 216 0 1672 
SI 484 96 1419 247 516 0 1744 0 6 369 0 0 0 0 353 180 22 0 162 
SK 1355 268 1695 448 613 0 4716 0 0 826 0 0 0 0 460 920 45 0 341 
UK 38263 7561 1927 146 28745 0 26995 820 19935 28703 0 0 0 28978 28077 2740 575 0 4190 
 
Table B4: Transmission capacity for Reference scenario (MW) 
Direction Export Limit (MW) Import Limit (MW) Direction Export Limit (MW) Import Limit (MW) Direction Export Limit (MW) Import Limit (MW) 
AT-CZ 1000 -1200 DE-DK 4000 -4000 HU-HR 2000 -2000 
AT-DE 7500 -7500 DE-FR 4800 -4800 HU-RO 1300 -1400 





AT-IT 1655 -1385 DE-NL 5000 -5000 HU-SK 2000 -2000 
AT-SI 1200 -1200 DE-PL 2000 -3000 IE-UK 1600 -1600 
BE-DE 1000 -1000 DE-SE 1315 -1315 IT-SI 1380 -1530 
BE-FR 2800 -4300 DK-NL 700 -700 LT-LV 2100 -1800 
BE-LU 1080 -700 DK-NO 1640 -1640 LT-PL 1000 -1000 
BE-NL 2400 -2400 DK-SE 2440 -1980 LT-SE 700 -700 
BE-UK 1000 -1000 DK-UK 1400 -1400 NL-UK 1000 -1000 
BG-GR 1728 -1032 EE-FI 1016 -1000 NO-DE 1400 -1400 
BG-RO 1400 -1500 EE-LV 1600 -1600 NO-NL 700 -700 
CH-AT 1700 -1700 ES-FR 8000 -8000 NO-SE 3695 -3995 
CH-DE 4700 -3286 ES-PT 4200 -3500 NO-UK 1400 -1400 
CH-FR 1300 -3700 FI-SE 2800 -3200 PL-SE 600 -600 
CH-IT 6240 -3860 FR-IE 700 -700 PL-SK 990 -990 
CY-GR 2000 -2000 FR-IT 4350 -2160 SI-HR 2000 -2000 
CZ-DE 2600 -2000 FR-LU 380 0       
CZ-PL 500 -600 FR-UK 5400 -5400       
CZ-SK 2100 -1100 GR-IT 500 -500       
 
Table B5: Transmission capacity for High VRE scenario (MW) 
Direction Export Limit (MW) Import Limit (MW) Direction Export Limit (MW) Import Limit (MW) Direction Export Limit (MW) Import Limit (MW) 
AT-CZ 1000 -1200 DE-DK 8050 -8050 FR-UK 6750 -6750 
AT-DE 7500 -7500 DE-FR 6600 -6600 GR-IT 500 -500 
AT-HU 1200 -800 DE-LU 2300 -2300 HU-HR 2000 -2000 
AT-IT 1655 -1385 DE-NL 7250 -7250 HU-RO 1300 -1400 
AT-SI 1200 -1200 DE-PL 6500 -7500 HU-SI 1700 -1700 
BE-DE 1000 -1000 DE-SE 1315 -1315 HU-SK 2000 -2000 
BE-FR 3700 -5200 DE-UK 1800 -1800 IE-UK 2500 -2500 





BE-NL 4200 -4200 DK-NO 1640 -1640 LT-LV 2100 -1800 
BE-UK 1450 -1450 DK-PL 5400 -5400 LT-PL 1000 -1000 
BG-GR 1728 -1032 DK-SE 5590 -5130 LT-SE 700 -700 
BG-RO 1400 -1500 DK-UK 1400 -1400 NL-UK 1900 -1900 
CH-AT 1700 -1700 EE-FI 1016 -1000 NO-BE 3600 -3600 
CH-DE 4700 -3286 EE-LV 1600 -1600 NO-DE 5000 -5000 
CH-FR 1300 -3700 ES-FR 8900 -8900 NO-NL 2500 -2500 
CH-IT 6240 -3860 ES-PT 4200 -3500 NO-SE 3695 -3995 
CY-GR 2000 -2000 FI-SE 2800 -3200 NO-UK 3200 -3200 
CZ-DE 2600 -2000 FR-IE 700 -700 PL-SE 8700 -8700 
CZ-PL 500 -600 FR-IT 4350 -2160 PL-SK 990 -990 
CZ-SK 2100 -1100 FR-LU 380 0 SI-HR 2000 -2000 
 
Table B6: Transmission capacity for Negative Emissions scenario (MW) 
Direction Export Limit (MW) Import Limit (MW) Direction Export Limit (MW) Import Limit (MW) Direction Export Limit (MW) Import Limit (MW) 
AT-CZ 1000 -1200 DE-DK 4000 -4000 HU-HR 2000 -2000 
AT-DE 7500 -7500 DE-FR 4800 -4800 HU-RO 1300 -1400 
AT-HU 1200 -800 DE-LU 2300 -2300 HU-SI 1700 -1700 
AT-IT 1655 -1385 DE-NL 5000 -5000 HU-SK 2000 -2000 
AT-SI 1200 -1200 DE-PL 2000 -3000 IE-UK 1600 -1600 
BE-DE 1000 -1000 DE-SE 1315 -1315 IT-SI 1380 -1530 
BE-FR 2800 -4300 DK-NL 700 -700 LT-LV 2100 -1800 
BE-LU 1080 -700 DK-NO 1640 -1640 LT-PL 1000 -1000 
BE-NL 2400 -2400 DK-SE 2440 -1980 LT-SE 700 -700 
BE-UK 1000 -1000 DK-UK 1400 -1400 NL-UK 1000 -1000 
BG-GR 1728 -1032 EE-FI 1016 -1000 NO-DE 1400 -1400 
BG-RO 1400 -1500 EE-LV 1600 -1600 NO-NL 700 -700 





CH-DE 4700 -3286 ES-PT 4200 -3500 NO-UK 1400 -1400 
CH-FR 1300 -3700 FI-SE 2800 -3200 PL-SE 600 -600 
CH-IT 6240 -3860 FR-IE 700 -700 PL-SK 990 -990 
CY-GR 2000 -2000 FR-IT 4350 -2160 SI-HR 2000 -2000 
CZ-DE 2600 -2000 FR-LU 380 0       
CZ-PL 500 -600 FR-UK 5400 -5400       







This sensitivity replaced 16 GW of Coal-CCS with 16 GW of BECCS in the High VRE 
scenario. Table 7 outlines the main results of the sensitivity analysis compared to the 
counterfactual, with and without DAC. 
Table B7: Overview of gross CO2 production and CO2 capture in several scenarios. 
 High 
VRE 
High VRE w. 
DAC 
High VRE w. 
BECCS 
High VRE w. 
BECCS_DAC 
CO2 Gross Production (MtCO2) - Natural Gas 117.6 125.8 99.5 107.4 
CO2 Gross Production (MtCO2) - Oil 0.2 0.2 0.1 0.1 
CO2 Gross Production (MtCO2) - Coal 53.5 53.7 1.3 1.6 
Negative CO2 Emissions - BECCS (MtCO2) 0 0 -52.7 -52.8 
Abated CO2 from Coal & Natural Gas Capacity 
(MtCO2) 
-79.6 -80.0 -30.6 -31.0 
Negative CO2 Emissions - DAC (MtCO2) 0 -111.0 0 -111.0 
Total CO2 Emissions Released (MtCO2) 91.7 -11.2 17.6 -85.6 
Carbon Intensity (kg MWh-1) 21.5 23.2 4.1 5.9 
Carbon Intensity (kg MWh-1) w. DAC 21.5 -2.6 4.1 -19.8 
 
Breakdown of Total System Costs 
Table B8: Breakdown of total system costs per scenario (€billion).  
Scenarios Disaggregated Costs  
Pathway Variant CAPEX OPEX Total System Cost Carbon-related Costs 
Reference 
REF  €                 70  €     105   €       175  €     40 
REF - DAC  €                 73  €    122   €       195  €     35 
REF - No CCS  €                 70  €     103  €       173  €     47 
High VRE 
H-VRE  €               164   €      53  €      218  €     24 
H-VRE - DAC  €               168  €      71  €      239   €      6 
H-VRE - No CCS  €               163  €      52  €      216   €     33 
H-VRE - BECCS  €               158  €      51  €      210  €       5 
H-VRE - BECCS_DAC  €               162   €      69 €      231  -€     14 
H-VRE - No PtG  €               143  €      53  €     196   €     30 
Negative Emissions 
NE  €               122   €      53  €     174  -€     8 
NE - DAC  €               125   €      71  €     196  -€    26 







To promote transparency in the energy modelling community, our complete model is freely 
available within the Supplementary Material (also see https://energyexemplar.com/datasets/ 
for the PLEXOS® model). 
The necessary data to replicate Jacobson, et al.’s (Jacobson et al., 2018) WWS cases for the 
European region is acquired from Delucchi et al. (2016) and the Supporting Information 
(Jacobson et al., 2018). Other data was requested, and granted, directly from the authors via 
email correspondences. 
Generation 
Generation capacities are categorised by class, e.g. hydro, solar PV, onshore wind, geothermal 
electric, dispatchable, et cetera. Portfolios are disaggregated into individual power plant types 
by technology class and assigned standard technical characteristics as shown 0in Table C1, an 
approach previously used by Ref. (Gaffney et al., 2018; Gaffney et al., 2019a). All new 
dispatchable generation capacity efficiency is assumed to be high efficiency (60%) combined 
cycle gas turbine technology capacity.  
Normalised hourly generation profiles for wind power (onshore and offshore)(Staffell and 
Pfenninger, 2016), and solar (photovoltaic(Pfenninger and Staffell, 2016a) and concentrated 
solar power)(Pfenninger and Staffell, 2016a) from 1985 to 2016 were obtained for each country 
from the Renewable.ninja (Pfenninger and Staffell, 2016b). Thermal energy storage associated 
with concentrated solar power is modelled using an approach outlined by Denholm and 
Hummon (2012); (Denholm and Mehos, 2014; Denholm et al., 2013). Storage capacity 
assumptions align with source material (Jacobson et al., 2018), in that we assume the storage 
is sized at 14 hours of charging rate which is 1.61 times larger than discharge rate, thereby 
making storage 22.5 hours. This means the solar field is 2.61 times larger than the discharge 
capacity. We assume the overall CSP round-trip efficiency is 40% based on observations from 
Spanish CSP operations. Solar thermal generation profiles are based on solar PV profiles scaled 
to capacity factors outlined in source material. Generation profiles and installed capacity 





in alignment with Jacobson et al. (2018), i.e. the former applies a flat profile and the latter uses 
offshore wind profiles from the specific country scaled to specific capacity factors as identified 
in the source material. Individual hydro profiles were decomposed from monthly generation 
constraints from ENTSO-E (ENTSO-E, 2012) to weekly and hourly profiles in the optimisation 
algorithm function within PLEXOS® which, on an annual basis, align with capacity factors 
assumed by Jacobson et al. (2018). Pumped hydro energy storage assumptions align with Ref. 
(Jacobson et al., 2018), e.g. 80% efficiency.  
Table C1: The standardised generation characteristics applied for all 40 countries. Dispatchable power uses 
the efficiency characteristics of a nuclear power station(International Energy Agency, 2017b).   
Fuel Type Capacity (MW) Min Stable Factor (%) Ramp Rate (MW/Min) Efficiency 
(%) 
Dispatchable 500 30 5 60% 
Geothermal Electric 70 40 5 - 
Hydro 150 5 10 - 
Pumped Hydro 200 10 30 80%(Jacobson 
et al., 2018) 
Solar (CSP) 100 40 30 40%(Jacobson 
et al., 2018) 
 
Table C2: Installed generation capacity for the European region in original scenarios (GW) 
Technology Case A Case B Case C 
Geothermal Elec 3.1 3.0 3.1 
Geothermal Heat 22.3 22.3 22.3 
Hydro 160.2 640.9 160.2 
Tidal 15.0 15.0 15.0 
Wave 37.7 37.7 37.7 
Solar (PV) 3060.3 4248.9 2578.2 
Solar (CSP) 63.3 202.8 63.3 
Solar (Thermal) 153.4 0.0 0.0 
Wind Onshore 2601.9 1735.1 1518.0 
Wind Offshore 665.3 628.4 443.5 
 
Table C3: Installed generation capacity for the European region in “Include VRE” scenarios (GW) 
Technology Case A Case B Case C 
Geothermal Elec 3.1 3.0 3.1 
Geothermal Heat 22.3 22.3 22.3 
Hydro 160.2 640.9 160.2 
Tidal 15.0 15.0 15.0 
Wave 37.7 37.7 37.7 
Solar (PV) 4388.3 4394.8 2578.2 
Solar (CSP) 63.3 202.8 63.3 





Wind Onshore 2601.9 2688.5 3306.0 
Wind Offshore 2727.9 2073.3 764.8 
 
Table C4: Installed generation capacity for the European region in “Include Dispatchable power” scenarios 
(GW) 
Technology Case A Case B Case C 
Geothermal Elec 3.1 3.0 3.1 
Geothermal Heat 22.3 22.3 22.3 
Hydro 160.2 640.9 160.2 
Tidal 15.0 15.0 15.0 
Wave 37.7 37.7 37.7 
Solar (PV) 3060.3 4248.9 2578.2 
Solar (CSP) 63.3 202.8 63.3 
Solar (Thermal) 153.4 0.0 0.0 
Wind Onshore 2601.9 1735.1 1518.0 
Wind Offshore 665.3 628.4 443.5 
Reserve Requirements 
Once a power imbalance occurs reserves are activated to contain and then restore frequency. 
In chapter6 these are referred to as containment and restorative reserves respectively. Literature 
suggests that reserve requirements may increase in accordance with the level of VRE installed 
in a system (Brouwer et al., 2014; Holttinen et al., 2008; Papavasiliou et al., 2011). Brouwer et 
al. (2014) for example, estimates that secondary, tertiary and replacement reserves may 
increase by 7% of installed wind capacity. Here, we apply a published methodological 
approach by Holttinen et al. (2008) to estimate the increased operational reserve requirements 
for the restorative reserve using 3.5 standard deviations (99.9 percentile) (Dvorkin et al., 2015) 
which results in a dynamic reserve equal to 6.8% of generating VRE. When modelled, this 
dynamic reserve is held in parallel with the containment reserve requirements in continental 




Table C5: Annual average all-sector inflexible and flexible loads (GW) for 2050 for European region used 
































Case A 1420 355.2 1065 79.2 566.2 317.2 101.9 
Case B 1420 355.2 1065 79.2 566.2 317.2 101.9 
Case C 910.1 491.1 419 0 0 317.2 101.9 
 
Inflexible load for all cases uses profiles attained from ENTSO-E’s TYNDP 2018 (ENTSO-E, 
2018b). The load series applied is the forecasted load profiles for a “Distributed Generation” 
scenario in 2040. This scenario was chosen as it is most similar to the WWS proposal in terms 
of non-centralised power generation. ENTSO-E (2018b) provide hourly resolution demand 
curves for 35 of the 40 countries for different climatic conditions, i.e. normal (1984), wet 
(1982) and dry (2007). We applied the normal climatic conditions. The remaining 5 countries 
used demand profiles from neighbouring countries: Belarus (Lithuania), Gibraltar (Spain), 
Moldova (Romania), Ukraine (Poland) and Kosovo (Serbia). These demand profiles were 
linearly scaled to the overall demand estimates used for each case. 
The inflexible base load, that is common across all three cases (355.2 GW), is distributed across 
the 40 countries as outlined by Jacobson et al. (2018) and applies the aforementioned profiles. 
The additional inflexible demand in Case C, 135.9 GW, derive from thermal loads and as such, 
have profiles more aligned with the nature of their individual loads, as discussed next. 
Thermal loads, cold and low-temperature loads, are distributed based on Cooling Degree Days 
(CDD) and Heating Degree Days (HDD) as demonstrated in the Supporting Information by 
Jacobson et al. (2018). In aligning with the source material, we also apply the minimum CDD 
and HDD of 0.01-degree day per day to represent energy expended for refrigeration and water 
heating needs, respectively. The CDD and HDD data for 2013-2014 was acquired from authors 
following a request. Short term energy storage (STES) is assumed to have 6 hours storage. 
Underground thermal energy storage (UTES) is assumed to have 4 days and 11 days’ worth of 
storage for Case A and B respectively. 
While these thermal loads are considered flexible in Case A and B, Case C does not. Therefore, 
the previously mentioned 135.9 GW delta in inflexible load is distributed between the thermal 
loads proportionally and assumes the same load profile yet is considered inflexible. 
Power-to-gas (PtG) load (hydrogen used in transport sector) is considered constant across the 
year. There is 2 days’ worth of hydrogen storage assumed for the European region in all three 





efficient. The latter comes from assumptions on page 7 of Supporting Information regarding 
energy used for conversion.  
Demand response load is considered constant across the year in terms of daily load. This load 
can be ‘shifted’ by up to 8 hours within day, at which point it become inflexible and must be 
fulfilled. We assume this process is 100% efficient. Demand response can charge and discharge 
storage capacity in 2 hours. 
Types of flexible load 
There are different types of flexible loads incorporated into this analysis. The first is load 
shifting, i.e. demand response. This can move a load up to 8 hours within day. The second are 
loads which can be stored days in advance of when it may be needed. Hydrogen and UTES are 
prime examples. Respectively, these loads must be met using energy generated at the time of 
the demand or come from storage. If we consider the start position of stored energy in each 
type at the beginning of the simulation horizon, the first can buy or sell power from the 
beginning of the day whereas the second must buy energy and store energy before being able 
to provide the benefits of being a flexible load. 
Storage 
Demand response storage is sized to allow the average hourly load to shift by up to 8 hours 
within day. We assume this process is 100% efficient. The storage capacity can charge and 
discharge in 2 hours. 
Hydrogen storage capacity is sized to hold 2 days’ worth of hydrogen demand for the European 
region in all three cases. We assume storage can fully charge in 6 hours and that the entire 
process is 68% efficient. The latter comes from energy conversion assumptions on page 7 of 
Supporting Information. Hydrogen is not subject to demand response therefore the energy 
released from storage is only used for the hydrogen load which is constant around the entire 
period being simulated. 
Pumped hydro energy storage (PHES) has its energy and capacity aligned with the 
supplementary information paper. The efficiency of PHES is assumed 80%. 
Stationary battery capacity is sized in accordance with Jacobson’s approach, i.e. 1000 GW and 
100 GW in Case A and C respectively, with 1.94 hrs capacity. We assume stationary battery 





Short term energy storage (STES), i.e. CW-STES, HW-STES and ICE, energy and capacity 
assumptions are in alignment with the source material. We combine the STES capacities for 
simulation purposes. This results in an efficiency of 83.4%; weighted average of the charging 
rates of the three contributors, see Table S3 in Supporting Information of Ref.(Jacobson et al., 
2018). The charge/discharge and storage capacity of STES aligns with Table S4 of Supporting 
Information.  
Underground thermal energy storage (UTES) is charged by a combination of thermal and 
electrical means. This storage capacity aligns with the source material. The round-trip 
efficiency is assumed 56%, see Table S3 in Supporting Information. The charge/discharge and 
storage capacity of STES aligns with Table S4 of Supporting Information.  
Table E6: Summary of storage capacities 
Technology Capacity (GWh) Charge/Discharge 
Rate (GW) 
Efficiency (%) 
Stationary Battery 1940 (Case A) 
194 (Case C) 
1000 (Case A) 
100 (Case C) 
90 
90 
Hydro 634.2 160.2 (Case A & C) 
640 (Case B) 
45.2 (Annual Capacity 
Factor) 
Pumped Hydro 2780 198  80 
Demand Response 2537 1268 100 
Power-to-Gas 4890 815 40.8 
Solar CSP 1431 (Case A & C) 
4582 (Case B) 
63.4 (Case A & C) 
202.8 (Case B) 
40 
STES 10620 1665.2 83.4 
UTES 152300 (Case A) 
418800 (Case B) 
2533.4 (Charge – Case 
A) 





Cross Border Transmission 
Cross-border transmission capacity assumptions are not specified in the source material 
(Jacobson et al., 2018). Instead it is assumed that if congestion is an issue, increasing 
transmission capacity would only result in a modest increase in cost. The long-term planning 
algorithm in PLEXOS® is used to calculate the cost-optimal transmission capacity 
requirements between countries to avoid unserved energy where possible. Energy flow across 
transmission capacities is modelled as simple active power transport rather than optimised 
power flow which would include active and reactive power balance constraints. Wheeling 
charges of €3/MWh are included on each interconnector to account for losses. There is no 






The fuel price assumed for dispatchable power remains consistent across all cases at $27 GJ-1 
($2013) whether consuming natural gas or a synthetic alternative. E-gas is created using 
otherwise curtailed electricity which excess after all energy and ancillary service requirements 
are met. We assume the conversion to gas is 68% efficient. When coupled with the efficiency 
of the combined cycle gas turbine, the full roundtrip efficiency of power-to-gas and back to 
power is 40.8%.  
Operational Assumptions 
System Adequacy 
This paper uses the same approach to system adequacy as the ENTSO-E’s Mid-term Adequacy 
Forecast 2017 (ENTSO-E, 2017a), in that we consider the maximum acceptance level of power 
shortages for the entire European region to be 0.004% of total annual electricity demand. This 
limit is based on 36 European countries in 2025, the furthest year analysed, which are in the 
WWS roadmaps, i.e. Unserved Energy 139.9 GWh, Demand 3390.7 TWh.  
Total Power System Cost Assumptions 
Total power system costs are calculated using data from multiple sources (Carlsson, 2014; 
International Energy Agency, 2017b; Jacobson et al., 2018; Tsiropoulos et al., 2017). Lifetime, 
capital expenditures, operation and maintenance costs, decommissioning cost and cost of 
storage are visible from Table C8. In this analysis we employ the European Commission’s 
definition of ‘total system costs’ (European Commission, 2014b). Total system costs are 
annualised, undiscounted costs where the CAPEX is spread over the technical lifetime of the 
technology with variable costs also included.  
Demand-side costs are excluded; therefore, the total power system costs are akin to a supply 
side cost. Supply side energy system costs include capital costs for energy installations (e.g. 
power plants) and energy infrastructures such as interconnection capacity and energy 
purchase costs.  These costs do not reflect whole system costs which typically include costs 
associated with all energy-using equipment, appliances, vehicles and efficiency investment 
costs. For instance, costs associated with converting electrical energy into thermal energy are 
not accounted for as is the case with the source material (Jacobson et al., 2018).  





Table C8: Cost assessment assumptions for the various aspects to be considered ($2013). *Dispatchable 
generation characteristics assume that of nuclear power (International Energy Agency, 2017b). **Lifetime of 








g Cost (% of 
CAPEX) 
Cost of Storage  
($ kWh-1) 
Dispatchable* 35 $1,140  $4.56  2.50% - 
Geothermal 
Electric 
45 $4,370  $45.00  2.50% - 
Geothermal Heat 45 $4,370  $45.00  2.00% - 
Hydro 85 $2,920  $15.50  2.50% - 
Hydro – Power 
Capacity 
Expansion 
85 $385  $15.50  2.50% - 
Tidal 45 $3,850  $125.00  2.50% - 
Wave 45 $4,330  $175.00  2.00% - 
Solar PV 48 $1,830  $20.31  0.75% - 
Solar CSP 45 
(32.5**) 
$6,240  $50.00  1.25% $20.00 
Solar Thermal 35 $1,350  $50.00  1.25% - 
Wind Onshore 30 $1,510  $37.00  1.25% - 
Wind Offshore 30 $3,920  $80.00  2.00% - 
Interconnection 60 $522/km(C
arlsson, 2014) 
 $18.27  - - 
Battery  32.5  - - -  $160.00  
Pumped Hydro  32.5  - - -  $14.00  
STES  32.5  - - -  $8.38  
UTES  32.5  - - -  $0.90  
Power-to-gas  32.5  - - - Case A & B: 
$0.00135 
Case C: $0.00211 
Generation Capacity Factor Comparison 
Capacity factor comparison by technology 
Table C9: Comparing assumed, actual and potential capacity factors. For the actual capacity factors, we use 
the mean of the 30 samples utilised for wind and solar PV generation. Potential represents the capacity factor 
when no energy curtailment or reserve provision takes place.   
Technology WWS Assumptions Our Assumptions Resulting 
Geothermal Elec 81.6% 81.6% 81.1% 
Geothermal Heat 97.3% 97.3% 91.0% 
Hydro 45.2% 45.2% 45.2% 
Tidal 22.4% 22.4% 21.4% 
Wave 19.5% 23.9% 23.1% 
Solar PV 18.9% 12.9% 12.1% 





Solar Thermal 7.2% 7.3% 6.9% 
Wind Onshore 35.0% 23.2% 22.4% 
Wind Offshore 36.3% 32.3% 31.1% 
 
Hydro capacity factor assumptions 
Figure C1 demonstrates the difference when we introduce historic monthly capacity factor 
constraint which reflects the actual generation from hydro versus using an annual capacity 
factor. While both equal the same capacity factor on an annual basis, i.e. 45.2%, the two 
approaches are very different in terms of generation profile per month. 
 
Figure C1: Comparing hydro capacity factors when constrained by monthly profiles or using an annual 
average.   
Long Term Capacity Expansion 
The transmission network was expanded using the long term (LT) planner in PLEXOS®. 
Assuming build costs and technical lifetimes demonstrated in Table C8, the software built the 
required capacity to avoid unserved energy, where possible. We did not limit the size of 
expansion between countries.  
The dispatchable capacity was expanded using the long-term planner in PLEXOS®. Assuming 
CAPEX and technical lifetime assumptions demonstrated in Table C8, the software built the 






VRE capacity was expanded using the long-term planner in PLEXOS®. Assuming CAPEX 
and technical lifetime assumptions demonstrated in Table C8, the software built the required 
capacity to avoid unserved energy. We did limit the commissioned capacity per country at 
estimated potentials listed in the Supplementary Material from Jacobson et al. (2018), i.e. 
onshore wind: 2152 GW, offshore wind: 2331 GW and Solar PV: 96000 GW. The only 
exception was the assumption around onshore wind. The estimated potential for onshore wind 
appears larger in the WWS Case A scenario than suggested in the Supplementary Material, 
therefore we assume that onshore wind energy cannot expand beyond 2602 GW in any scenario 
with capacity expansion as an option.  
Seasonal patterns of large thermal storage capacity  
Figure C2 illustrates the seasonal storage volumes across 12 months for both Case A & B. The 







Figure C2: The seasonal underground thermal energy storage (UTES) volumes for Case A & 
Case B in all 30 individual samples. Case C does not include any UTES.  
